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Abstract
In this thesis, I develop and defend a distinctive version of a position I call
(following Schwitzgebel (2002)) phenomenal dispositionalism. On this view,
having such-and-such beliefs, desires, character traits etc. is just a matter
of having such-and-such behavioural, cognitive and phenomenal dispositions;
dispositions, roughly, to act, think and feel thus-and-so in such-and-such cir-
cumstances.
Phenomenal dispositionalism has its roots in Ryle (2000) (who, I argue, is no
behaviourist). Just as Ryle frames his position as an alternative to the Carte-
sian ‘Official Doctrine’ of his day, I frame mine as an alternative to what Baker
(1995) calls the ‘Standard View’ in contemporary philosophy of mind (roughly,
the view that mental states are brain states). In Baker’s view and in mine,
Standard View theorists repeat the Cartesian error of construing the mind as a
causal system.
I attack this error at what I take to be its root, arguing (contra Mumford (1998))
that disposition ascription does not and cannot work by picking out particular
internal properties or states of the object of ascription, occupying particular
causal roles. Nonetheless, I argue, disposition ascriptions (including mental
state ascriptions) can explain - and (pace Ryle) explain causally.
The role of ‘folk psychological’ language, I argue, is not to pick out internal
states occupying particular causal roles. Nor (pace Schwitzgebel) is it to as-
sert subjects’ conformity to ‘dispositional stereotypes’ for each individual men-
tal state ascribed to them. Rather, it is holistically to describe subjects’ dispo-
sitional profiles - their overall sets of behavioural, phenomenal and cognitive
dispositions.
I argue that our rich, everyday mental-state taxonomy is fit for this purpose, and
stands in no need of revision either by those who are inclined to boil it down
to beliefs and desires, or those who posit ‘aliefs’ in order to fill the explanatory
gaps this leaves us with (Gendler, 2008a).
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1 Introduction: Why Dispositionalism?
1.1 Introduction
Rylean dispositionalism - the thesis that for a person to be in a mental state
such as believing that P is just for her to have certain dispositions - has long
been conflated with the position variously known as logical, analytic, or philo-
sophical behaviourism.1 This is something Ryle saw coming, predicting that his
theory would ‘undoubtedly, and harmlessly, be stigmatized as “behaviourist”’
(2000, p.308). In my view, there has been nothing ‘harmless’ about this stigma-
tization; it has meant that the failure of behaviourism has been seen as the
failure of dispositionalism.
But of course, dispositionalism only amounts to behaviourism if one thinks that
among all a subject’s dispositions, only her behavioural dispositions are rel-
evant to the question of what mental states may be ascribed to her. In this
thesis, I will develop and defend a distinctive version of a more liberal position -
a position I call (following Schwitzgebel (2002)2) phenomenal dispositionalism.
On this view, it is not just a subject’s behavioural dispositions that matter for
the purposes of ascribing mental states to her, but also her phenomenal and
cognitive dispositions - her dispositions, respectively, to have certain sorts of
conscious experience and to reason in certain ways.3
1These terms have generally been employed in order to distinguish this strand of philosoph-
ical thought from a broadly contemporary, related, but distinct strand of thought in psy-
chology, also known as ‘behaviourism’ (or, in its Skinnerian form, ‘radical behaviourism’)
(Skinner, 1953; Watson, 1930; 1913). When I talk simply about ‘behaviourism’ in this the-
sis, it is philosophical behaviourism I have in mind.
2Although Schwitzgebel’s project is in many ways the starting point for my own, it is not my
intention simply to defend phenomenal dispositionalism as he formulates it. Indeed, I will
argue in Chapter 6 that Schwitzgebel’s formulation of the position is untenable, due to
fundamental problems with the use he makes of the notion of dispositional stereotypes for
the possession of particular mental states.
3For convenience, I will sometimes talk about behavioural, cognitive and phenomenal dispo-
sitions as dispositions to ‘act, think and feel’ a certain way. This loose terminology should
be taken with a pinch of salt; no doubt there are phenomenal features of mental life that
have at least as much to do with ‘thinking’ as with ‘feeling’ (e.g. consciously working out a
maths problem in one’s head).
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The position I am advocating is at odds with what Lynne Rudder Baker justi-
fiably calls the ‘Standard View’ in contemporary philosophy of mind - the view
that ‘the attitudes, if there are any, are (or are constituted by, or are realized in)
particular brain states’ (1995, p.5). If I am right, it is a mistake to think - even if
physicalism is true4 - that the beliefs and desires (etc.) we routinely ascribe to
subjects can only be said to exist if they can be identified with (or be said to be
constituted by, or realized in) particular brain states of those subjects.
1.2 Dispositionalism and eliminativism
The sceptical reader may find himself wondering why we should trouble our-
selves even to consider abandoning what has been a hard-won, albeit partial,
consensus in the philosophy of mind in order to pursue a largely-abandoned
line of thinking. By way of motivation, then, I want to suggest that disposi-
tionalism may very well prove to be our last line of defence against a claim
that really would shake up our consensus view of the mind: the eliminativist
claim that there are no such things as beliefs, desires, and so on, with the
consequence that ascriptions to subjects of such states are uniformly false.
Why should we think so? Consider an idea that is part and parcel of the Stan-
dard View, an idea sometime called the ‘theory theory’. According to the theory
theorist, beliefs, desires and the like are entities posited by a commonsense
or ‘folk’ theory of the causal processes responsible for the production of be-
haviour. If we take this idea seriously, we must - in my view - also take seri-
ously the possibility that the theory in question, so-called ‘folk psychology’, is
fundamentally mistaken.
For the claims made by folk psychology, thus understood as a quasi- or proto-
scientific theory, are far from modest. This theory does not restrict itself to
claims about subjects’ observable behaviour - claims, broadly, about how sub-
jects who have in the past acted thus-and-so may be expected to act if ex-
posed to such-and-such stimuli in such-and-such circumstances. Nor does it
restrict itself to treating the mind as a ‘black box’ - asserting that the mind plays
such-and-such a role in generating certain behavioural outputs in response to
certain environmental inputs, but refraining from making assertions about how
it plays that role. On the contrary, it makes bold assertions about the functional
organization of the mind - about the mental processes causally mediating be-
tween stimulus and response. It provides us with a quasi- or proto-scientific
4I take physicalism to be the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical.
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taxonomy of state types and tells us how particular token states are brought
into being through exposure to certain stimuli, how they interact with one an-
other, and how they ultimately cause subjects to act as they do.
It tells us, for instance, that a subject who has an ice cream placed in front
of him will typically acquire a particular, individuable token state, a belief that
there is an ice cream in front of him. It tells us that this token state will then
interact causally with various other token states of the subject, so that if (for
instance) the subject has tokens of the belief that ice creams melt quickly on
hot days and of the belief that it is a hot day today, he will acquire a token of
the belief that the ice cream in front of him will melt quickly. It tells us that if
the subject has a token of the desire to eat a non-melted ice cream, he will
acquire a token of the desire to eat the ice cream in front of him quickly, before
it melts. It tells us that unless prevented from doing so by certain other token
states - e.g. tokens of the belief that eating ice cream at the required rate would
be likely to cause him to experience a sharp pain behind his eyes, and of the
desire to avoid that experience - the aforementioned beliefs and desires will
interact to produce ice-cream-eating behaviour by the subject.
It’s true enough that the claims of folk psychology, as construed by the theory
theorist, are modest in one respect: by characterizing mental states in purely
functional terms, they allow for the multiple realizability of such states and so
do not entail commitment to the truth of empirically defeasible assertions about
(say) the physical composition of subjects possessing those states. This fact,
however, does not strike me as being nearly so impressive as philosophers
often appear to think. If I offer a speculative explanation of how an unfamiliar
model of car works in terms of things like cylinder heads, fan belts and brake
fluid reservoirs, I am allowing for the multiple realizability of these functionally-
characterized components of four-stroke petrol engines and hydraulic braking
systems. But I am not allowing for the multiple realizability of car engines
and braking systems themselves. I might be quite wrong in asserting that
the system mediating between inputs from the driver (e.g. presses on the
accelerator and brake) and ‘behavioural’ outputs (e.g. changes in speed) has
components playing such-and-such cylinder head roles, fan belt roles, brake
fluid reservoir roles, and so on. Maybe the vehicle has some other sort of
engine or braking system, performing the same overall functional role as a
four-stroke petrol engine and a hydraulic braking system, but quite different in
terms of its components and workings.
Similarly, the functional organization of the mind may - in principle - be quite
different from what folk psychology (again, as construed by the theory theorist)
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supposes it to be. In arguing for an eliminativist position, Stich (1983) makes
the following point:
It is a fundamental tenet of folk psychology that the very same state
which underlies the sincere assertion of ‘p’ also may lead to a vari-
ety of nonverbal behaviours. There is, however, nothing necessary
or a priori about the claim that the states underlying assertions also
underly nonverbal behaviour. There are other ways to organise a
cognitive system. There might, for example, be a cognitive system
which, so to speak, keeps two sets of books, or two subsystems
of vaguely belief-like states. One of these subsystems would inter-
act with those parts of the system responsible for verbal reporting,
while the other interacted with those parts of the system responsible
for nonverbal behaviour.
(Stich, 1983, p.231)5
This being the case, it’s perfectly plausible that a subject should possess a
state responsible for the production of certain nonverbal behaviour, and yet
lack a state responsible for the production of certain verbal behaviour we feel
ought to go along with it. Indeed, Stich (1983, pp.231-233) adduces evidence
from the psychological literature that subjects can be induced to go through
certain mental processes, as evidenced by their non-verbal behaviour, which
they sincerely and resolutely deny that they have gone through. This leads
Nisbett and Wilson (1977, cited in Stich, 1983, pp.233-237) to hypothesize that
subjects who are asked why they responded in a particular way to a particu-
lar stimulus do not report thought processes they actually went through, but
rather make a judgement about what sort of process, according to some pre-
existing theory, might plausibly have been responsible for their responding as
they did. Introspective evidence about the processes actually responsible for
their nonverbal behaviour might be quite unavailable to the systems responsi-
ble for producing their verbal behaviour.
To sketch one example of the sort of experiment Stich has in mind here: in-
somniac subjects given a placebo pill and told it would relieve their symptoms
typically took longer to get to sleep as a result, while insomniac subjects given
a placebo and told it would make their symptoms worse typically got to sleep
more quickly as a result (Storms and Nisbett, 1970, cited in Stich, 1983, p.232).
These results bore out the experimenters’ hypothesis that subjects in the for-
5I should note that I see no principled reason why there should not be a system keeping more
than two sets of books, with different subsystems involved in the production of different
types of verbal and nonverbal behaviour. But focusing on the coarse-grained distinction
between verbal and nonverbal behaviour suffices to make the point.
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mer group would infer that their thoughts must be more troubling to them than
usual (since they were still experiencing symptoms of insomnia in spite of hav-
ing taking the pill), while subjects in the latter group would put their symptoms
down to the pill they had taken and so infer that their thoughts must be less
troubling to them than usual. When later asked to explain why they had found
it easier or more difficult to get to sleep on the night they took the pills, sub-
jects in the former group talked about their more-troubling-than-usual thoughts
that night, and subjects in the latter group about their less-troubling-than-usual
thoughts. But subjects did not believe that their coming to view their thoughts
as more or less troubling than usual had anything to do with having taken the
pill they took. The inferential process that had taken place had apparently
done so without the knowledge of whatever cognitive system was responsi-
ble for producing the subjects’ verbal reports. Those reports seem more like
ad hoc rationalizations of subjects’ behaviour than accounts of the processes
actually responsible for that behaviour.
What this suggests is that there may be cognitive states which play the role in
some cognitive processes associated by folk psychology with some particular
belief, and yet which fail to play the role in other cognitive processes associated
by folk psychology with that very same belief. And this is no less true in cases
where verbal and nonverbal behaviour accord with one another; quite plausibly
there are often two distinct cognitive states at work, playing two distinct causal
roles, neither of which can be identified with any of the beliefs posited by folk
psychology.
Much the same point could be made with reference to experiments involving
‘split brain’ patients who have had the lines of communication cut between the
left and right hemispheres of their brains through the severing of the corpus
callosum. Show these patients an image in only the left side of their visual field
- that image being transmitted to the brain’s right hemisphere - and they will be
able to identify the object shown by drawing it, or picking out a related image
with the hand under the control of that hemisphere (the left hand); but since
the speech control centre is in the left hemisphere, which has no access to the
image, they will be unable to identify the object verbally (even denying that they
saw anything) (Gazzaniga, 2000, pp.1316-1318). No state of such a subject,
surely, can be identified with or seen as realizing a folk psychological ‘belief’
about what the image shows, since the functional role associated (according to
the theory theory) with such a folk psychological belief just is not being played
by anything in such cases. That role, after all, includes giving rise to verbal as
well as nonverbal behaviour.
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Split brain patients also engage in ad hoc rationalizations of the nonverbal
behaviour carried out by their left hands. One subject had an image of a snowy
scene shown to his right hemisphere, and an image of a chicken claw shown
to his left; when he then picked out an image of a shovel with his left hand, he
explained that this was because shovels are used to clean out chicken coops
(Gazzaniga, 2000, pp.1316-18). But the belief that shovels are used to clean
out chicken coops can have played no role in producing the item of nonverbal
behaviour he was trying to explain, since that behaviour was produced by the
right hemisphere of his brain (which had no access to the image of the chicken
foot, and was responding to the image of a snowy scene that it did have access
to).
Of course, in subjects with normal brains, the two hemispheres can commu-
nicate with one another. But that’s no reason to think the distinct brain states
and processes involved in the production of verbal and nonverbal behaviour
in the brains of split-brain patients might not also be present in normal brains,
at least some of the time. Our brains are quite plausibly highly modular, with
different states of different systems responsible for doing different things - in-
cluding things that folk psychology, according to the theory theory, takes to be
done by one individuable state called, say, a ‘belief that P’.
Perhaps it will be objected that the solution is simply to say that having a belief
that P is a matter of one’s left and right hemispheres, and perhaps the tissue
connecting them, collectively being in a state such that the right verbal and
nonverbal behaviour is produced in the right circumstances. This would allow
us to insist that neurologically intact subjects, at least, really do have beliefs in
virtue of which they act the way they do. But it seems to me that this would
be to play into the hands of the eliminativist, who can point out that the ‘be-
lief’ state here is explanatorily superfluous at best (since we could, in principle,
explain and predict subjects’ behaviour just as well by appealing to the individ-
ual verbal- and nonverbal-behaviour-generating states brought under belief’s
umbrella) and theoretically unsupportable at worst (since it actively obscures
important distinctions between distinct states playing distinct roles in producing
distinct types of behaviour).
It must be emphasized that the empirical questions here, about the actual func-
tional organization of the brain, are incidental. The point is just that if we take
our everyday mental-state language to induce commitment to a particular the-
ory about what cognitive state types there are and what roles they play, we
leave ourselves wide open to the empirical falsification of all sorts of everyday
assertions about the mind. A better theory really might come along.
14
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A certain line of eliminativist argument (Churchland, 1981) presses the point
that this cannot be dismissed as a merely theoretical, remote possibility. Why,
after all, should we expect the posits of this folk theory to turn out really to
exist, when the posits of other folk theories generally turn out not to exist? The
gods of folk meteorology, held responsible for sending the rain and so on, don’t
exist. Nor do the forces folk medicine takes to be at work when people fall
ill or recover - disruption to or restoration of the flow of qi around the body’s
meridians, say. The posits of folk physics and folk chemistry have fared no
better. So isn’t it rather unlikely that our distant ancestors got lucky when they
posited the existence of beliefs, desires and so on to explain one another’s
behaviour?
To this it is tempting to reply that whereas we never had direct experience of
the gods we once took to be behind the rain and winds (say), we do have direct
experience of our own mental states. The existence of beliefs, desires and so
on is therefore not open to doubt in the way that the existence of the gods is
open to doubt. But however seriously we take introspective evidence, this will
not do. From the fact that I can, for instance, make internal utterances such as
‘it’s sunny’ or even ‘I believe that it’s sunny’, and perhaps feel confidence in the
truth of those statements, it does not follow that I am either directly conscious
of or entitled to infer the existence of an internal state playing just the role
reserved by folk psychology, according to the theory theory, for the belief that
it’s sunny. Perhaps there just is not any single, individuable state responsible
both for the production of those internal utterances (and their accompanying
feelings), and for the production of certain items of behaviour folk psychology
would - again, according to the theory theory - take to be produced by the belief
that it’s sunny; raising my hand to shade my eyes, say.
All that being said, however, I am not in the least inclined to doubt that the
claims of eliminativism are false. Of course subjects have beliefs and desires.
And this is so, I will argue, because beliefs and desires are not posits of a folk
psychological theory about the functional organization of the mind at all. They
are not internal or intrinsic states of subjects at all. So long as a subject has
the right behavioural, phenomenal and cognitive dispositions, nothing science
tells us about why he has those dispositions - in terms of what cognitive or neu-
rological states and processes play what roles in mediating between sensory
inputs and behavioural outputs - has any bearing on the truth of ascriptions to
that subject of such-and-such beliefs, desires, and so on. Thus dispositional-
ism can insulate folk psychology - properly understood - from the eliminativist’s
attack.
15
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Before I set out how I propose to go about developing and defending the phe-
nomenal dispositionalist position, I should perhaps say something about how
I think folk psychology should be understood. It should be clear that I think
it is a mistake to think of it as a theory about the functional organization of
the mind, about the states and processes mediating between sensory inputs
and behavioural outputs. However, it would be too strong, I think, to say that it
isn’t a theory in any sense. As practitioners of folk psychology, we are in the
business of theorizing about what sorts of behaviour, inferential processes and
conscious experiences typically ‘go together’ in what sorts of subject. We are
adept at predicting subjects’ future behaviour from their past behaviour (verbal
and nonverbal). We readily infer, on the basis of subjects’ behaviour, that those
subjects are having (or have had) conscious experiences of certain kinds. We
confidently assume that subjects with access to certain facts will have made
certain inferences. But this has, in my view, far more to do with our ability to
recognize patterns in the way subjects act, think and feel in different circum-
stances than with any presumed knowledge about the functional organization
of the mind. We need no more possess a theory about the functional orga-
nization of the mind in order successfully to practice folk psychology than we
need possess a theory about the functional organization of four-stroke petrol
engines and hydraulic braking systems in order successfully to drive a car.
1.3 The case for phenomenal dispositionalism
The foregoing was intended to show why I think there is at least a prima facie
case for giving the phenomenal dispositionalist case serious consideration. Let
me now set out how I propose to make that case.
The starting point for any dispositionalist position in the philosophy of mind, and
my starting point in Chapter 2, is logical behaviourism. As formulated by Car-
nap (2002), in response to verificationist concerns about the meaningfulness
of mentalistic language, logical behaviourism held that all sentences of psy-
chology (including folk psychology) were logically equivalent to (= reducible to,
= intertranslatable with) sentences about observable behaviour - specifically,
about the observable behaviour subjects are disposed to exhibit in a range of
external circumstances.
Logical behaviourism, I concede, fails because for many mental states, there
is no set of behavioural dispositions the possession of which is necessary and
sufficient for the possession of that state. A respectable dispositionalism must
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admit the relevance of non-behavioural dispositions to the question of what
mental states a subject has, as well as offering some account of how it is that
mental states interact in such a way that, for instance, subjects with a given
belief in common come to have different dispositions when they have different
desires.
Though usually characterized as a behaviourist, Ryle (2000) did in fact admit
the relevance of non-behavioural dispositions to the question of what mental
states a subject has. The roots of the position I advocate, phenomenal dis-
positionalism, are therefore - I suggest - present in Ryle. However, Ryle did
not offer a satisfactory account of how mental states interact. Nor did he re-
spect the intuition that explanations of subjects’ behaviour that cite their mental
states are causal explanations.
My discussion of Ryle is followed by a discussion of Stout’s (2006) defence
of behaviourism. I argue that this defence ultimately fails, in part because
of lingering concerns about the relevance of non-behavioural dispositions to
questions about mental states, and in part because it rests on a problematic
account of mental causation.
In closing Chapter 2, I note that an influential ‘functionalist’ line of thinking
has sought to resolve certain key problems facing the Rylean dispositionalist
by identifying mental states with categorical states of subjects playing certain
causal roles (specifically, brain states). This allows for mental states to interact
in a straightforward, causal sense, and respects the intuition that mental-state
explanations are causal explanations. I further note that Stephen Mumford has
offered a functionalist account of dispositions in general, according to which all
dispositional properties are identical with their categorical bases. To adopt this
view of dispositional properties would be to offer phenomenal dispositionalism
as a variant of functionalism; if it is to be a distinctive position, therefore, this
view of dispositions must be refuted and an alternative account of the interac-
tion of mental states and their role in causal explanations must be offered.
Chapter 3 consists of my attempt to refute Mumford’s functionalist account of
dispositions. Central to this account is his ‘argument from identity of causal
role’. Mumford claims that the dispositional properties we prescientifically as-
cribe to objects occupy the same causal role conceptually that is revealed by
science to be occupied in fact by certain intrinsic, categorical properties of
those objects, and that those dispositional properties must therefore be iden-
tical with those categorical properties. (This move is crucial to the bringing
together of functionalism and physicalism by thinkers such as Lewis (2002);
more on this in Chapter 4). I argue that Mumford’s argument fails, because
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the concept of ‘occupancy’ is such that there are cases in which two entities
may occupy the same thing and yet fail to stand to one another in a relation of
identity. I further argue that if we grant that dispositional properties conceptu-
ally occupy causal roles, these roles include the roles not only of categorical
properties of the object of ascription, but also those of categorical properties
of other objects with which they interact - and, indeed, of other features of the
environment in which those interactions take place. For instance, I argue that,
conceptually, sugar’s disposition to dissolve in water would have to be taken to
occupy the causal roles not just of certain categorical properties of sugar, but
also of certain categorical properties of water; and water’s disposition to dis-
solve sugar would have to be taken to occupy those very same causal roles.
Finally, I argue that there is no reason to think of dispositional properties as
intrinsic properties of the objects of ascription at all; better to think of them as
relational properties of those objects.
In Chapter 4, I consider some of the implications for the philosophy of mind of
taking such a relational view of dispositions. If the conclusions of the previous
chapter are correct, Lewis’s (2002) functionalist argument for the identity of
mental states with neural states is deeply misguided. To be in such-and-such
a mental state is not to be in an intrinsic state playing such-and-such a causal
role, but to stand in a certain relation to certain objects and to certain actual or
possible events. Just as the water-solubility of a sugarcube has its categorical
basis in physical properties of the sugarcube, of water, and of the environ-
ment in which sugar and water interact, so a subject’s fear of spiders (say)
has its categorical basis in physical properties of that subject, of spiders, and
of the environment in which they interact. These properties all have distinct
causal roles to play, none of which is individually identifiable with the causal
role conceptually played (according to the theory theory of folk psychology) by
the subject’s fear of spiders.
Chapter 4 concludes with a discussion of Lynne Rudder Baker’s ‘Practical Re-
alism’, a position according to which ‘S believes that p if and only if there are
certain counterfactuals true of S, where the content of the counterfactuals may
be intentionally characterized’ (1995, p.21) and which can, I think, reasonably
be characterized as dispositionalist. Two aspects of Baker’s work are espe-
cially relevant to my project. Firstly, she undermines the idea that for a state
of something to be causally relevant, it must be an internal, physical state of
the object of ascription. The ‘state of financial health’ of a Savings & Loan,
she points out, is causally relevant to its performance, but is not identical with
any internal state of the S & L; and the same goes for subjects’ mental states.
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Secondly, she makes clear that we do not have to deny, with Ryle, that explana-
tions of subjects’ actions in terms of their mental states are causal explanations
- even if we deny that mental states are identical with causally efficacious in-
ternal states of subjects. I take Baker successfully to have demonstrated that
the dispositionalist can oppose functionalism and the Standard View while re-
specting the intuition that mental-state explanations of subjects’ behaviour are
causal explanations.
In Chapter 5, I set out Schwitzgebel’s version of phenomenal dispositionalism,
this being the contemporary starting point for my own. Schwitzgebel argues
(2002, p.253) that ‘To believe that P. . . is nothing more than to match to an ap-
propriate degree and in appropriate respects the dispositional stereotype for
believing that P’ - this being ‘the cluster of dispositions that we are apt to asso-
ciate with the belief that P’. These include not just behavioural dispositions, but
also phenomenal and cognitive dispositions - dispositions, respectively, to have
certain sorts of conscious experience and to reason in certain ways. There is
no determinate set of dispositions someone must have in order to qualify as
believing that P; whether or not the belief that P should be ascribed to someone
will depend on the context of ascription and on what we know about the sub-
ject’s other beliefs, desires, character traits etc. In some contexts (e.g. when a
subject has atypical desires, or there is something preventing him from acting
as he normally would), we will recognize that there are ‘excusing conditions’
that explain the non-manifestation of a disposition belonging to the stereotype.
And sometimes a subject will be ‘in between’ having and lacking a certain be-
lief, meaning we have to decide on pragmatic grounds whether it makes sense
in a given context to ascribe that belief to him, deny that he has it, or simply
spell out the respects in which he does and does not conform to the stereotype
for possessing that belief.
Phenomenal dispositionalism, at least in the form I advocate, is an externalist
position in the sense that it does not take the content of subjects’ mental states
to be determined solely by the way things are ‘in her head’, but also by the
way things are in her environment. However, Schwitzgebel (2002) notes an
apparent tension between externalism and dispositionalism: dispositionalism
seems to require that we ascribe the same dispositions, and so the same men-
tal states, to physically identical subjects in different environments (say, Earth
and Twin Earth) - because, assuming physicalism, those subjects would have
identical responses to being placed in identical circumstances - but externalism
holds that these subjects have different mental states. However, Schwitzgebel
points out that we can respect externalism by specifying some of the disposi-
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tions subjects have in external terms - allowing for physically identical subjects
in Earth and Twin Earth environments to have different mental states. And it
should be borne in mind that phenomenal dispositionalism is not in the busi-
ness of providing binary yes-or-no answers to the question of whether subjects
have or lack certain mental states. On the phenomenal dispositionalist view,
we ascribe such states to subjects for pragmatic reasons when it’s useful to
do so; thus it makes perfect sense to deny that my Twin Earth counterpart has
any beliefs about water while he’s going about his business on Twin Earth, but
to ascribe such beliefs to him the moment he is teleported to Earth and we
become concerned to predict and explain his interactions with water.
In Chapter 6, I argue that Schwitzgebel’s reliance on dispositional stereotypes
containing ‘dispositions that we are apt to associate with the belief that P’ is
problematic, since this invites two quite different readings. Do these stereo-
types include all the dispositions we’re apt to associate with a given belief in
any circumstances whatever - e.g. when we know a subject to have very un-
usual desires or habits of thought? In that case, pretty much any disposition
may qualify as belonging to the stereotype for any belief. Or do they include
only those dispositions we’re apt to associate with a given belief ‘by default’
- on the assumption that subjects’ desires etc. are more or less typical (e.g.
the disposition to take an umbrella when going outside)? I argue that neither
reading can be integrated coherently into Schwitzgebel’s overall position, and
that in fact the idea that there is any such thing as a dispositional stereotype
for the possession of any given belief (or other mental state) is unsustainable.
Rather, there is a plausibly infinite number of dispositional clusters associated
with each belief: one for having that belief plus these desires, these character
traits, etc., one for having that belief plus those desires, those character traits,
etc., and so on. I therefore argue that the phenomenal dispositionalist should
reject the idea that we can account for mental states one-by-one by referring to
a ‘stereotype’ for the possession of each individual belief, desire etc. A more
holistic account is needed, according to which a subject’s having the overall set
of mental states he has is a matter of his having a certain dispositional profile
- a certain overall set of behavioural, phenomenal and cognitive dispositions.
In Chapter 7, I suggest that in seeking to accommodate the holism of the men-
tal, the phenomenal dispositionalist can draw on Dennett’s (2002) version of
interpretationism for inspiration. The interpretationist does not attempt to ac-
count for subjects’ mental states on a one-by-one basis; rather, he acknowl-
edges that interpretation involves ascribing complex sets of complementary
beliefs, desires etc. to subjects all at once. I suggest, however, that interpre-
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tationism tends to place too much weight on rationality as the arbiter of correct
interpretation; in fact we need to make more room for non-rational features
of mental life, including the phenomenal qualities of conscious experience. In
cases where rival schemes of interpretation are available - where different sets
of beliefs and desires fit a subject’s behaviour equally well - it may be that a
subject’s phenomenal dispositions are what settle, in principle, the question of
what mental states she has.
By the end of Chapter 7, my version of a Ryle/Schwitzgebel-type phenomenal
dispositionalist position will be on the table. To see what that position amounts
to in practice, however, I think it will be very helpful to apply it to a specific
problem.
Chapter 8, therefore, takes the form of a ‘case study’. In it, I consider Alston’s
(1989) attempt to show that a functionalist account of mental-state terms al-
lows for them to be applied univocally to human beings and to God, while
respecting both God’s personhood and his ‘radical otherness’. I argue that
while this account fails to accommodate a number of important theistic con-
victions concerning the nature of God, a phenomenal dispositionalist account
of the meaning of these terms fares rather better. A broader point emerging
from this discussion is that phenomenal dispositionalism - unlike functionalism
- is in tune with common-sense intuitions when it comes to questions about
the mental states that may be attributed to atypical agents such as God, com-
puters, and the Martians (Lewis, 1980), ‘super-Spartans’ (Putnam, 1963) and
‘Blockhead’-type systems (Block, 1981) that populate philosophical thought ex-
periments. On a phenomenal dispositionalist view, (full?) mentality may not be
ascribed to systems that have the right behavioural dispositions but the wrong
(or no) phenomenal dispositions, while (limited?) mentality may be ascribed to
subjects that have phenomenal dispositions but the wrong (or no) behavioural
dispositions.
In Chapter 9, I make a last-ditch attempt to illustrate the dangers of sticking
with a Standard View approach to mental states in the face of arguments that
our folk psychological taxonomy of such states is mistaken. Gendler (2008a)
attempts to maintain her footing on the eliminativist’s slippery slope by propos-
ing the inclusion of a new state type - alief - in that taxonomy, to fill a causal
gap that is supposedly left behind once one recognizes that the concept of
‘belief’ is too bound up with rationality for us to accept beliefs as being respon-
sible for a whole range of arational behaviour. I argue, firstly, that the concept
of mental-state content used by Gendler in defining alief is obscure at best;
and, secondly, that once we embark on this project of ‘discovering’ new mental
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state types to account for the full range of human behaviour, there is no saying
where it will end. Why not distinguish, for instance, between alief-like states in
which the role of habit is crucial, and alief-type states in which instinct is key?
Or between affect-laden and non-affect-laden aliefs? As philosophers, I argue,
we should not be in the scientific business of taxonomizing the mental state
types that ‘really’ drive our behaviour at all. Rather, we should focus on the
way everyday mentalistic language enables us to make sense of one another -
which is, in my view, by helping us to build up pictures of subjects’ dispositional
profiles.
1.4 Scope and approach
Let me conclude this introductory chapter by clarifying a couple of points about
the scope of this thesis and the general approach I propose to take.
In the sense in which ‘dispositional’ is contrasted with ‘occurrent’, it is uncontro-
versial that some mental states are dispositional states. To say that a subject
believes that apples are green and desires that he should eat an apple a day,
for instance, is not to report that something is happening to that subject right
now - e.g. that an image of an apple is hovering before his mind’s eye with
two labels attached to it reading ‘this is green’ and ‘I should eat one of these
a day’. Nor are we reporting any such mental occurrences when we say that
a subject is confident, vain, wise, quick-witted etc., or that a subject loves his
dog but hates next door’s cat. We use this sort of language - we ascribe dis-
positional mental states of these types (propositional attitudes, character traits
etc.) - when we want to say something about what a subject is like in general.
The reporting of mental occurrences, meanwhile, has its own language - he
decided to catch the bus, the right word suddenly popped into her head, he felt
a twinge of regret, she realized that it was lunchtime already.
I offer phenomenal dispositionalism as an account of the sort of dispositional
mental states just mentioned. Things like realizations and twinges might count
as manifestation events for certain dispositions, but they are not themselves
subject to a dispositional analysis. This makes the whole enterprise sound
rather trivial; just how controversial can it be to argue that dispositional men-
tal states should be understood in dispositional terms? But I hope that the
manner of the dispositional understanding I propose is sufficiently distinctive -
when contrasted, especially, with a Standard View understanding of these dis-
positional mental states as being identifiable with (or realized by, or constituted
by) particular categorical brain states - to be interesting.
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Wherever possible, I will try to avoid treating mental states as a special sort
of mystery. My hope is that if we can get clear on how disposition ascrip-
tion works in general - what its purpose is and what the relationship is between
something’s dispositional states or properties and its categorical states or prop-
erties - certain problems in the philosophy of mind can be dispelled, and others
reframed in a more constructive way.
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2 Beyond Behaviourism
2.1 Introduction
Any discussion of dispositionalism necessarily takes place in the shadow of
logical behaviourism. Assessing the claims of phenomenal dispositionalism
means understanding how they differ from the claims of behaviourism, and
especially how it is that the phenomenal dispositionalist thinks he can answer
certain objections to behaviourism that have generally been found compelling.
In this chapter, therefore, I want to begin by sketching (in section 2.2) a position
that deserves the name ‘logical behaviourism’ if anything does - the position
expressed by Carnap in his (2002) - and spelling out the objections that have
seen this position consigned to the dustbin of history. In section 2.3, I will
highlight some crucial differences between Carnap’s views and the views of
Ryle, as expressed in his (2000). My aim here will be to remove the stigma of
behaviourism from Ryle’s work, by drawing attention to Ryle’s frank acknowl-
edgment of the relevance of non-behavioural dispositions to the question of
what mental states may be ascribed to subjects. I will also seek to clarify the
sense in which I take Ryle to be opposed to a ‘Cartesian’ view of the mind:
not, that is, in challenging the idea that we can meaningfully talk about unob-
servable ‘inner’ experiences and processes, but in challenging the ‘category
mistake’ made by anyone who thinks that mental-state talk is talk about the
causal workings of a mechanical or para-mechanical system called a ‘mind’.
This section should make clear that to be a dispositionalist in the Rylean tra-
dition is not to embrace behaviourism, and so is not to be subject to certain
compelling objections levelled against that position.
Before moving on, in future chapters, to consider what a liberal, non-behaviourist
version of dispositionalism ought to look like, I will briefly consider (in section
2.4) Stout’s (2006) defence of behaviourism itself. I will argue that Stout’s cen-
tral claim - that being in such-and-such a mental state is just a matter of having
such-and-such behavioural dispositions - remains untenable. However, I will
suggest that his attempt to show how behaviourism must and can accommo-
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date the holism of the mental has implications for the development of a more
liberal dispositionalist position.
2.2 Behaviourism
2.2.1 Carnap’s logical behaviourism
In his (2002), Rudolf Carnap makes the claim that ‘all sentences of psychology
describe physical occurrences, namely, the physical behaviour of humans and
other animals’ (p.39, Carnap’s italics). This claim is open to misinterpretation,
and so it is worth pinning down just what Carnap seems to have in mind.
Carnap does not mean that every time we say something about a subject’s
mind, what we are really doing is reporting that that subject is now behav-
ing thus-and-so, or behaved thus-and-so at such-and-such a time. Rather, he
means that every time we say something about a subject’s mind, we are as-
serting ‘the existence of a physical structure characterized by the disposition
to react in a specific manner to specific physical stimuli’ (Carnap, 2002, p.43).
To say that a subject, Mr. A, is ‘excited’, for instance, is to assert ‘the exis-
tence of some physical structure (micro-structure) of Mr. A’s body (especially
of his central nervous system) that is characterized by a high pulse and rate
of breathing, which, on the application of certain stimuli, may even be made
higher, by vehement and factually unsatisfactory answers to questions, by the
occurrence of agitated movements on the application of certain stimuli, etc.’
(Carnap, 2002, p.43). These testable claims about subjects’ behavioural dis-
positions are, says Carnap, analogous to testable claims about the behavioural
dispositions of physical objects; to claim that a wooden support is ‘firm’, for in-
stance, is to assert the existence of some physical structure of that support
‘that is characterized by the fact that, under a slight load, the support under-
goes no noticeable distortion, and, under heavier loads, is bent in such and
such a manner, but does not break’ (2002, p.43).
Carnap’s claim needs to be understood in the context of his commitment to
verificationism. As a verificationist, Carnap believes that claims are meaningful
only if there are, in principle, observations that one could make that would tend
to confirm or disconfirm the truth of those claims. If no observable feature
of the world could ever serve either to give weight to the claim that P or to
undermine that claim, then the claim that P is (according to the verificationist)
literally meaningless; it doesn’t say anything about the world at all.
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If claims about a subject’s mind were claims about private, unobservable goings-
on in a sort of hidden inner realm, therefore, those claims would be meaning-
less on a verificationist view. In order to maintain the meaningfulness of such
claims, Carnap proposes that sentences expressing such claims are inter-
translatable with (or have the same meaning as) sentences expressing testable
claims about something observable. This ‘something’ is behaviour. A sentence
like ‘Bob wants an apple’ does not, on this view, express the untestable claim
that (say) Bob is holding an image of an apple before his mind’s eye while ex-
periencing a sense of longing, but rather the testable claim that Bob will accept
an apple if offered one, assent to the proposition that he wants an apple, and
so on.1
Carnap denies, therefore, that sentences of psychology make assertions about
‘a consciousness, a certain power or entity’ (2002, p.43) existing alongside
subjects’ physical bodies. Insofar as they were interpreted as making such
assertions in addition to assertions about subjects’ behavioural dispositions,
sentences of psychology would not be testable and so would be meaningless.
The existence of such a parallel entity is just not, in principle, something we
could confirm empirically.
In short, then: Carnap holds that claims about subjects’ mental states are
logically equivalent to, or reducible to, claims about their dispositions to exhibit
certain overt, observable behaviour in certain circumstances. This is a view
that seems to me to be deserving of the name ‘logical behaviourism’. As I will
argue in section 2.3, however, it would be a mistake to attribute this view to a
philosopher often regarded as its most prominent advocate, Gilbert Ryle.2
Before I move on to talk about Ryle, though, I think is is worth pausing to note
1There are some thorny issues to do with the validity of inductive reasoning in the vicinity
here. Claims such as ‘Fs always A in circumstances C’ and ‘if this F had (counterfactually)
found itself circumstances C at t2, it would have A-ed’ should plausibly be regarded as
meaningless on a verificationist view, since there is seemingly no observable difference
between a world in which Fs always A in circumstances C and a world in which Fs just
happen to A in circumstances C when we happen to be looking; or between a world in
which F would have A-ed if it had found itself in circumstances C at t2 and a world in which
F would not have A-ed if it had found itself in circumstances C at t2 (even if F has been
observed to A in circumstances C at t1, t3 etc.). I don’t propose to get into these issues;
suffice it to note that Carnap thinks observations of particular events can serve to confirm
or disconfirm general claims of this sort (concerning laws, dispositions etc.); we can test
the truth of such general claims by testing the truth of specific claims that are deducible
from them (e.g. we can test the truth of the claim that Fs always A in circumstances C by
putting some Fs in circumstances C at different times and seeing whether they consistently
A or not) (Carnap, 2002, pp.40-41).
2Julia Tanney notes that while the question of whether Ryle is a behaviourist is still the subject
of some debate, the ‘standard interpretation [of] Ryle’s view is that statements containing
mental terms can be translated, without loss of meaning, into subjunctive conditionals about
what the individual will do in various circumstances’ (Tanney, 2009a, xxv).
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some of the important objections faced by the behaviourist. The success of
any alternative version of dispositionalism will, after all, depend on its being
able to answer these objections.
2.2.2 Objections to behaviourism
As arguments put forward by Chisholm (1957, ch.11) and Geach (1957, p.8)
make clear, behaviourism demands an impossibly tight connection between
the possession of particular mental states and the possession of particular be-
havioural dispositions. To take a stock example, consider the belief that it is
raining. According to the behaviourist, the claim that a subect has that belief
is reducible to the claim that he is disposed (among other things) to use an
umbrella while outdoors if possible. But it is easy to imagine cases in which a
subject lacks that behavioural disposition, and yet (intuitively) possesses that
belief: for instance, he might simply enjoy getting wet. And the obvious re-
sponse - tweaking the specification of the circumstances in which a subject
with the belief that it is raining would use an umbrella, so as to exclude cir-
cumstances in which he has the desire to get wet - is not available to the log-
ical behaviourist. The logical behaviourist, after all, is trying to ‘analyze away’
all references to mental states, and so cannot refer explicitly to a subject’s
‘desires’ in her analysis of that subject’s beliefs; nor, though, can she simply
translate that reference to a subject’s desire to get wet into the language of be-
havioural dispositions. For consider what this would involve. The behaviourist
would want to reduce the claim that a subject desires to get wet to the claim
that that subject is disposed (among other things) to venture outside without
an umbrella when it’s raining; and so we end up with a reduction of the claim
that Bob believes it’s raining to the claim that Bob is disposed (among other
things) to use an umbrella outdoors if possible unless he is disposed (among
other things) to venture outside without an umbrella when it rains. Plainly this
won’t do; rather than telling us anything meaningful about the way people’s ac-
tions, beliefs and desires relate to one another, the behaviourist appears to be
prescribing the reduction of all mental-state ascriptions to vacuous assertions
that subjects are disposed to act thus-and-so, unless they’re not.
This objection rests on the claim that the possession of a particular set of be-
havioural dispositions is not necessary for the possession of some particular
mental states; one can believe that it’s raining, for instance, without being dis-
posed to take an umbrella when one ventures outdoors. A second objection
rests on the claim that the possession of a particular set of behavioural dispo-
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sitions is not sufficient for the possession of particular mental states of certain
sorts. Prima facie, after all, certain mental states are the states they are partly
in virtue of their phenomenal character. A subject could not be ‘in pain’, for
instance, unless his conscious experiences had a particular character - even if
he was disposed to exhibit ‘pain behaviour’ in appropriate circumstances. He
might be, as Block puts it (1981, p.12), a ‘perfect pain-pretender’. (This ob-
jection is not going to cut any ice with the committed verificationist, of course,
since he will think that assertions about ‘conscious experiences’ are nonsensi-
cal insofar as they are irreducible to assertions about behavioural dispositions;
but it strikes me as overwhelmingly plausible that at least some mental states
must be characterized at least in part with reference to their phenomenal fea-
tures. It also strikes me as overwhelmingly implausible that no meaning can
be attached to a claim such as ‘in addition to being disposed to limp (etc.) in
circumstances C, this animal/robot/Martian experiences feelings of pain in its
leg in circumstances C’.)
The phenomenal dispositionalist response to these objections is simply to con-
cede that the possession of a particular set of behavioural dispositions may
indeed fail to be either necessary or sufficient for the possession of a partic-
ular mental state. (More than this, as we shall see in Chapters 5 and 6, the
phenomenal dispositionalist concedes that there is not even any determinate
set of behavioural and non-behavioural dispositions the possession of which
is necessary and/or sufficient for the possession of a particular mental state;
given the holism of the mental, this sort of one-at-a-time reduction of mental
states to sets of dispositions is not possible.)
A further objection, often raised by philosophers in the functionalist tradition
(e.g. Armstrong, 1981), cannot be so straightforwardly dodged by the phe-
nomenal dispositionalist. Behaviourism, so the objection goes, is incompatible
with the view that mental states such as beliefs and desires are the causes
of subjects’ actions. If ‘believes that P’ just meant ‘tends to act thus-and-so
in such-and-such circumstances,’ then prima facie it wouldn’t tell us anything
about the cause of a subject’s acting thus-and-so in those circumstances. That
can’t be right, so the objection goes, because conceptual analysis reveals that
we take beliefs and desires to be the causes of subjects’ behaviour. Further-
more, behaviourism is unable to account for the causal interaction of men-
tal states like beliefs and desires. (The thought here is this: when someone
puts up his umbrella, his belief that it is raining and his desire to remain dry
are somehow combining to cause that behaviour. So a successful account of
mental states will be one that takes those states to interact causally with one
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another as well as with sensory stimuli and behavioural responses.)
This objection is a powerful one, and Chapter 3 is devoted to the consideration
and ultimate rejection of one possible way of answering it: the adoption of what
we might call a ‘compatibilist’ view, according to which being in such-and-such
a mental state is indeed just a matter of having such-and-such dispositions,
but those dispositions are themselves the causes of a subject’s actions. In
Chapter 4, I will defend the view that we don’t in fact need to think of mental
states as playing a causal role in the production of subjects’ behaviour in order
to account for their explanatory role in causal explanations of such behaviour.
2.3 Ryle’s dispositionalism
2.3.1 Ryle vs. Cartesianism
There are, of course, similarities between Carnap’s views and Ryle’s. Ryle,
like Carnap, is hostile to the notion that in addition to their physical bodies, the
histories of which are histories of public, observable events occurring in the
physical world, people also possess nonphysical minds, the histories of which
are histories of private, hidden events occurring in a mental world (Ryle, 2000,
13ff.). However, his objection to such Cartesian views is not, first and foremost,
that they invite us to conceive of the mind as something nonphysical, private
and hidden; it is, rather, that they invite us to conceive of the mind as a system
of causes and effects:
My destructive purpose is to show that a family of radical category-
mistakes is the source of the double-life theory. The representation
of a person as a ghost mysteriously ensconced in a machine de-
rives from this argument. Because, as is true, a person’s thinking,
feeling and purposive doing cannot be described solely in the id-
ioms of physics, chemistry and physiology, therefore they must be
described in counterpart idioms. As the human body is a complex
organized unit, so the human mind must be another complex orga-
nized unit, though one made of a different sort of stuff and with a
different sort of structure. Or, again, as the human body, like any
other parcel of matter, is a field of causes and effects, so the mind
must be another field of causes and effects, though not (Heaven be
praised) mechanical causes and effects.
(Ryle, 2000, p.20)
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Ryle is equally opposed, therefore, both to Cartesian dualism and to the po-
sition Lynne Rudder Baker calls ‘Cartesian materialism’ (1995, p.6) - the view
that the mind is a field of physical causes and effects. Both positions, for Ryle,
involve the very same category mistake: the mistake of thinking that terms
like ‘belief’ refer to states of a causal system generating behaviour. As Julia
Tanney points out, ‘to suppose the explanatory power of mental conduct terms
depends on their designating an event or state that is causally related to the
performance [of the action to be explained] is to accept another version of the
“paramechanical” hypothesis, even though it is now couched in ontic-neutral or
physicalist terms’ (2009b, section 6.1). For Ryle, mental states are not causes,
and explanations of subjects’ behaviour which cite their mental states are not
causal explanations.
2.3.2 Ryle and non-behavioural dispositions
Like Carnap, then, Ryle thinks that psychological claims are claims not about
the hidden causes of subjects’ responses to stimuli, but about their disposi-
tions to have certain responses. However, while he certainly emphasizes the
fact that much of our mental-state talk has to do with subjects’ dispositions to
exhibit overt behaviour, he does not share Carnap’s commitment to the view
that assertions about other features of subjects’ mental lives are meaningless.
Indeed, he often makes such assertions himself. Schwitzgebel (2002) draws
attention to the following passage as evidence that Ryle countenances the rel-
evance of phenomenal and cognitive dispositions, as well as behavioural dis-
positions, to the question of what mental states may be ascribed to a subject:
Certainly to believe that the ice is dangerously thin is to be unhesi-
tant in telling oneself and others that it is thin, in acquiescing in
other peoples’ assertions to that effect, in objecting to statements
to the contrary, in drawing consequences from the original propo-
sition, and so forth. But it is also to be prone to skate warily, to
shudder, to dwell in imagination on possible disasters and to warn
other skaters. It is a propensity not only to make certain theoretical
moves but also to make certain executive and imaginative moves
as well as to have certain feelings.
(Ryle, 2000, p.129)
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Elsewhere, Ryle could hardly be more explicit in claiming that to ascribe cer-
tain motives3 to subjects in explaining their actions is to ascribe to them an
assortment of behavioural, phenomenal and cognitive dispositions:
To say, then, that a certain motive is a trait in someone’s character is
to say that he is inclined to do certain sorts of things, make certain
sorts of plans, indulge in certain sorts of daydreams, and also, of
course, in certain situations to feel certain sorts of feelings.
(Ryle, 2000, p.90)
These passages are noteworthy for the explicitness with which they appeal to
non-behavioural dispositions - ‘pronenesses’, ‘propensities’ and ‘inclinations’
privately to think and feel a certain way - but in many ways they are quite
unexceptional; Ryle often makes assertions about ‘inner’ experiences without
any suggestion that they can be reduced to assertions about behaviour. For
instance, he happily asserts (2000, p.28) that ‘Much of our ordinary thinking
is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquy, usually accompanied
by an internal cinematograph-show of visual imagery’ - a strange way for a
behaviourist to characterize ‘thought’, but not something a more liberal dispo-
sitionalist needs to apologize for. Ryle does not set out to deny the existence
of ‘inner’, private mental goings-on, but to debunk the idea that explanations of
behaviour in terms of beliefs, desires and so on are reports of causal transac-
tions between inner entities.
Thus we find in Ryle no doomed attempt to translate sentences making psy-
chological claims into sentences making claims only about observable be-
haviour - to reduce the assertion that a subject is in a particular mental state
to the assertion that that subject would behave like this in circumstances C1,
like this in circumstances C2, like this in circumstances C3, and so on. Instead,
a disposition ascription like ‘Jones believes the earth is round’ must be under-
stood, as Tanney puts it, in terms of what would satisfy it: in terms, that is, of
‘an open-ended (infinite) list of inferrings, imaginings, saying [sic] and doings
(etc.) on the part of Jones’ (2009b, section 9) that we would take to reflect
Jones’s possession of that belief.
There is, no doubt, a price to pay for abandoning the behaviourist’s insistence
that our criteria for mental-state ascription must boil down to something pub-
licly observable - i.e. the overt behaviour of the subject of ascription. To cite
3According to Ryle, ‘Roughly, “believe” is of the same family as motive words’ (2000, p.129).
So too is ‘desire’ (2000, p.85), along with a whole range of other words used to explain
why a subject acts in a certain way - ‘vanity, kindliness, avarice, patriotism and laziness,’
for instance (2000, p.82.)
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phenomenal and cognitive dispositions is to invite a series of hard questions,
generally outside the scope of this thesis, about things like phenomenal con-
sciousness and our knowledge of other minds. This is not, in my view, a weak-
ness of phenomenal dispositionalism, since these hard questions are real and
interesting, and so we should be more wary of positions in the philosophy of
mind that see them analyzed away than of positions that remind us of them.
However, rather than make haste towards the development of a more liberal
dispositionalist position, I think it’s worth pausing at this point to consider a
recent defence of behaviourism offered by Rowland Stout (2006). While I will
argue that Stout’s position fails convincingly to answer certain long-standing
objections to behaviourism, and invites certain important objections of its own,
I will suggest that there are important lessons for any dispositionalist in Stout’s
handling of the problem of mental holism.
2.4 Stout’s defence of behaviourism
2.4.1 Teleological dispositions
In his (2006), Stout offers a novel version of behaviourism built around the
following account of behavioural dispositions:
[B]ehavioural dispositions are teleological dispositions. . . [that] must
be characterised in normative terms. They are dispositions to do
the right thing to achieve the right goal, according to some con-
ception of what constitutes rightness. . . This does not mean that
behavioural dispositions are dispositions to respond to a person’s
internal representations of what is right. . . Instead, we should un-
derstand the idea of being disposed to behave in a norm-governed
way as being disposed to do what the rules of practical rationality
dictate. . . So, mental states, the framework causes of human be-
haviour, are dispositions to behave in ways that are sensitive to
practical rationality.
(Stout, 2006, p.97)
This stands in need of some clarification.
Stout insists that mental states must be conceived of as what he calls frame-
work causes of behaviour, as distinct from input causes of behaviour. That is
to say, they must be thought of as consisting in the existence of mechanisms
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through which certain behaviour is produced, and not as events or facts feed-
ing into such mechanisms (2006, 72ff.). So it is a mistake to think of things
like beliefs and desires as inputs to a psychological mechanism for producing
behaviour. To be in the dispositional state that is believing that P is, rather,
to embody a mechanism for producing such-and-such behaviour in such-and-
such circumstances.
So Stout takes what we might call a non-psychological view of practical ratio-
nality, in the following sense: the facts about what behaviour a certain version
of practical rationality recommends are not facts about what recommendations
for behaviour happen to be generated by certain psychological processes -
say, a process in my head that takes as inputs my belief that it will rain and
my desire to stay dry, and generates the recommendation that I should take
an umbrella if going outside. Versions of practical rationality should, according
to Stout, be thought of as abstract systems, external to subjects, the inputs to
which are facts. For instance, there is at least one version of practical rational-
ity which, taking as inputs the facts that it will rain and that I need to go out,
would yield as an output the recommendation that I should take an umbrella
(Stout, 2006, pp.99-100). According to this version of practical rationality, the
right goal to have when it will rain is the goal of staying dry, and the right way
to achieve that goal is to take an umbrella.
If my way of behaving can be recognized as being in accordance with the rules
characterizing this version of practical rationality - e.g. ‘if it will rain and you
need to go out, take an umbrella’ - I can thereby be said to have the belief
that it will rain. What this means is that I embody a mechanism for producing
behaviour that is in accordance with the rules generated by this version of
practical rationality. This mechanism, or dispositional state, is a framework
cause of my taking an umbrella when I go out. An input cause of my taking
an umbrella, meanwhile, is a fact - the fact that according to this version of
practical rationality, I should take an umbrella with me if it will rain and I need
to go out. (Note that it is this fact itself that is the input cause of my behaviour,
according to Stout - not, for instance, a brain state representing this fact, or an
event of this fact’s coming to be held true by me.)
2.4.2 Stout on causal explanation
The foregoing is a rather crude sketch of a rather complex position, but it does
bring out roughly the shape of Stout’s answer to one of the key objections to
behaviourism discussed above: the objection that explanations of behaviour in
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terms of behavioural dispositions are not causal explanations. On Stout’s view,
they are causal explanations. If I explain that Bob took his umbrella because
he believed that it would rain, I am asserting that an input cause of Bob’s
behaviour was the fact that according to some version of practical rationality,
taking an umbrella with you is the thing to do if it will rain; and that a framework
cause of Bob’s behaviour was his embodiment of a mechanism for behaving
as that version of practical rationality recommends one should behave.
In one important respect, I am very sympathetic to Stout’s project. He is right,
I think, to resist the functionalist idea that when we talk about a subject’s be-
liefs, desires and so on, we are asserting the existence of discrete states of
those subjects playing defined roles in mediating between sensory inputs and
behavioural outputs (and so, in my view, leaving ourselves open to the risk that
advances in empirical science will prove us wrong and the eliminativist right).
It seems much more plausible to me to think that claims about mental states
are rather more modest assertions - about the way subjects behave in certain
circumstances, rather than about the causal mechanisms underlying that be-
haviour. For reasons that will become apparent in Chapter 3, I would not agree
with Stout that the mechanism through which S’s behaviour is produced is a
mechanism embodied by S if, as seems plausible, this implies that S’s dispo-
sitional properties are internal or intrinsic properties of S (which, I shall argue,
they are not). Still, it seems broadly right to say that assertions about S’s men-
tal states are (at least in part) assertions that as a result of some mechanism
or other, the functional details of which we may not know even in outline, S can
be expected to behave thus-and-so in such-and-such circumstances.
However, I confess that I struggle to make sense of the idea that facts about
versions of practical rationality might be the input causes of behaviour. If facts
are to be regarded as causes, surely they must be grounded in the actual world
in something like the way Mellor (1995) grounds certain facts in the actual world
by identifying them with spatiotemporally located states of affairs. But a fact
about an abstraction like a version of practical rationality is not thus grounded
in the actual world. How might the fact that (say) according to some version
of practical rationality, taking an umbrella with you is the thing to do if it will
rain, go about inserting itself in a chain of spatiotemporally located causes and
effects leading from the beating down of rain on Bob’s roof to Bob’s taking
of an umbrella when he heads outside? I understand Stout’s reasons for not
wanting to regard Bob’s belief in the truth of that fact as an input cause of
Bob’s behaviour; but why not take the input causes of his behaviour to be such
events as rain’s beating down upon Bob’s roof, or sound waves caused by
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the rain beating down upon his roof reaching Bob’s ears? Or, if a fact-based
ontology of causation is preferred, such spatiotemporally located facts as that
rain beats down upon Bob’s roof or that the sound waves caused by the rain
beating down upon his roof reach Bob’s ears? Nothing about this picture, so
far as I can see, precludes us from characterizing Bob’s dispositions as Stout
wants to characterize them - that is, in normative terms, as dispositions to act
according to the rules generated by a certain version of practical rationality.
The facts about what those rules are, are plainly relevant to the question of
what specific instances of behaviour we can expect to see from Bob in what
circumstances; they are relevant, that is, to the question of what dispositional
state he is in. But causes of his behaviour? Surely not.
2.4.3 Stout on the phenomenal character of mental states
As we have seen, a further key objection to behaviourism is that the possession
of at least some mental states is a matter of having certain types of conscious
experience, as well as of exhibiting certain behaviour. In answering this objec-
tion, Stout again pursues what we might call an ‘externalizing’ strategy. Just as
he conceives of the input causes of behaviour as being external to subjects - as
being facts about what should be done (according to some version of practical
rationality), rather than beliefs about what should be done - so he conceives of
phenomenal qualities as being external to subjects:
This response shifts what we might think of as qualitative nature
from being an aspect of inner experience to being an aspect of the
world - an aspect that is only perceivable from a certain perspective.
It is the world that has phenomenal qualities, not the mind. If there
is any difficulty in knowing the qualitative nature of things it is not a
difficulty concerning knowledge of mental things but a difficulty con-
cerning knowledge of the world. So having knowledge of the way
the world is includes having what Block describes as ‘phenomenal’
consciousness, since it includes awareness of the qualitative nature
of things.
(Stout, 2006, pp.209-210)
Elsewhere, Stout says:
Being conscious of the dusty redness and ineffable earthy smell of
a tomato is to know the dusty redness and ineffable earthy smell of
the tomato through their being present to one’s visual and olfactory
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capacities. Sensory qualities are out there, and when their pres-
ence to us enables us to know them they enter into our conscious
states.
(Stout, 2006, p.19, Stout’s italics)
The strategy here is to reduce phenomenal consciousness to epistemic con-
sciousness, so that my being conscious of a tomato’s redness is really just
my knowing that it’s red. And my knowing that it’s red, of course, is (on a
behaviourist view) really just my being disposed to act as if it’s red - e.g. to
describe it as being red, or to pick it out when asked to pick out a red object.
There is nothing fundamentally more mysterious going on here than there is
in the case of a thermostat being ‘conscious’ of the temperature in a room (=
‘knowing’ what the temperature is, = being disposed to act as if that’s what the
temperature is - by turning down the heating, say).
So Stout takes what is, I think, best termed a ‘naive realist’ view of secondary
qualities.4 I think we have good reason to reject this view, however. While I
perceive a tomato as a dusty red, my dog (so I understand) probably perceives
it as a browny grey. But the tomato is not ‘really’ one colour or the other; what’s
‘out there’ is just an object that reflects light at a certain wavelength, and that
therefore produces one sort of visual experience in me and another in my dog
(given the differences in our sensory apparatus). No doubt there is a sense in
which my dog and I are perceiving the same quality or property of the tomato -
its capacity to reflect light at such-and-such a wavelength - but this is surely not
a phenomenal quality of the tomato named both by ‘dusty red’ and by ‘browny
grey’. To return to the thermostat: both it and I have the capacity to detect a
certain quality or property of the air in a very hot room, its high temperature.
But this quality of the air is not identical with the phenomenal quality of my
experience when I sit, sweltering, in that room.
So Stout’s attempted reduction of phenomenal consciousness to epistemic
consciousness fails, in my view. Hence it remains far from obvious that phe-
nomenal dispositions can be reduced to behavioural dispositions.
4I am aware that I am skimming over some deep epistemological waters in this brief dis-
cussion; deeper than I propose to dive into here. To be clear, though: I do not mean to
disparage or reject out of hand the direct realist position per se, understood as the thesis
that in perception we are directly aware of external objects (rather than of intermediaries
such as sense data). Rather, I am challenging the supplementary thesis that these external
objects of which we are directly aware possess such phenomenal properties as redness
independently of perceivers. The conjunction of the two theses is what I mean by ‘naive
realism’.
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2.4.4 Stout on holism
A third key objection to logical behaviourism was that it demands an impos-
sibly tight connection between the possession of particular mental states and
the possession of particular behavioural dispositions. To believe that P is not
in itself to have any particular behavioural dispositions; it all depends what de-
sires one has, what other beliefs one has, what physical and mental capacities
one has, and so on.
Stout acknowledges that a successful version of behaviourism must be holistic
and non-reductive; it cannot seek to reduce claims about particular mental
states to claims about particular behavioural dispositions. However, he argues
that the behaviourist need not be wedded to the idea that each mental state
we can ascribe is associated with just one set of behavioural dispositions:
[Ryle’s] view is that when we apply a mental predicate we are de-
scribing the way someone is disposed to behave. But this does not
commit him to the view that for each mental predicate there is just
one corresponding way of behaving. Describing something as con-
cave is to describe its shape; but it does not follow that there is only
one shape corresponding to the predicate ‘concave’.
(Stout, 2006, p.110)
Stout argues that the claims of behaviourism should be expressed explicitly
in terms of the links between subjects’ overall states of mind and their overall
sets of behavioural dispositions, rather than in terms of links between particular
mental states and particular behavioural dispositions:
According to a holistic behaviourist, knowledge of someone’s over-
all state of mind is knowledge of how that person behaves. On this
conception there is not just one way of behaving per person. Nor is
there one way of behaving per psychological attitude. There are as
many ways of behaving as there are possible overall states of mind.
There is one way of behaving which is believing that it will rain at
the same time as wanting to stay dry and intending to go out, and
so on. There is another way of behaving that is believing that it will
rain at the same time as wanting to get wet and believing that going
out in the rain is the best way of getting wet, and so on.
(Stout, 2006, p.113)
Although I reject Stout’s behaviourism, I endorse his holistic approach to dis-
positionalism. The reductive behaviourist approach of trying to say, in disposi-
tional terms, what it is to have one particular belief (say) will not do; nor, as we
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shall see in Chapter 6, does Schwitzgebel’s attempt (2002) to deal with these
issues in terms of conformity to ‘dispositional stereotypes’ stand up to scrutiny.
My claim will be that for a subject to have a particular set of (dispositional)
mental states5 is just for them to have a particular set of behavioural, cognitive
and phenomenal dispositions; but to have any particular belief (say) is neither
to have any particular dispositions, nor to conform closely to any particular
dispositional stereotype.
2.4.5 A note on rationality
Although Stout allows that ‘versions of practical rationality’ might sometimes
be rather irrational - they might involve some rather eccentric inferences from
facts about what situation someone is in to recommendations about what they
ought to do - his position still strikes me as being, in a sense, too rationalistic.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the problem as I see it is with an example.
Suppose, then, that we observe two subjects - one an arachnophobe, the other
not - acting in just the same way in just the same circumstances: each sees
a venomous false widow spider on the floor in front of him and backs away
from it. Each can therefore be described, in Stout’s terms, as acting according
to the rules of a version of practical rationality according to which the goal to
have when there is false widow spider on the floor in front of you is to avoid
that spider, and the way to avoid it is to back away from it. Does this suffice
for the ascription to both subjects of the (de re) belief that false widow spiders
are dangerous? We had better say ‘no’, since the arachnophobe might in other
respects not be disposed to act in such a way as to justify the ascription of that
belief. For instance: he might be disposed not to assent to the proposition that
the spider in front of him is dangerous, but rather to say something like: ‘I’m
sure it’s harmless, but I can’t help being frightened of it anyway’. The ascrip-
tion of the belief that false widow spiders are dangerous had better, then, be
conditional on a subject’s acting according to the rules of a version of practical
rationality that recommends, in the circumstances described, not only that one
should avoid false widow spiders by backing away from them, but also that one
should assent to the proposition that the spider in front of one is dangerous,
etc.
All this is fine so far as the non-arachnophobe is concerned - he does act
5As I noted in the Introduction, the mental states I am concerned with in this thesis are
those states that are dispositional in the sense in which ‘dispositional’ is contrasted with
‘occurrent’ - states such as beliefs, desires, fears, prejudices, character traits, and so on,
as opposed to states such as the state of experiencing a certain sensation.
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according to such a version of practical rationality, and we can (very plausi-
bly) express this fact by ascribing to him the belief that false widow spiders
are dangerous (together with other beliefs and desires that similarly make ra-
tional sense of his behaviour). But what of the arachnophobe? It would be
futile, surely, to try to come up with a set of beliefs and desires that make ra-
tional sense of his behaviour in the same way. We can make sense of it all
right, but only by citing his irrational fear of spiders. And this is surely not
a matter of attempting to characterize a ‘version of practical rationality’ which
generates rules according to which the arachnophobe acts. Rather - as I shall
argue in subsequent chapters - it is a matter of attempting to characterize the
arachnophobe’s dispositional profile; to express something about his overall
set of behavioural, phenomenal and cognitive dispositions.
2.5 Conclusion
I have suggested that we find in Ryle the roots of a form of dispositionalism that
is more liberal than Carnap’s logical behaviourism in two important senses.
Firstly, it is less restrictive about the classes of dispositions that are relevant to
the question of whether a subject does or does not possess a particular mental
state; a subject’s phenomenal and cognitive dispositions matter, as well as
his behavioural dispositions. Secondly, it denies that there is any determinate
‘checklist’ of particular dispositions the possession of which is necessary and
sufficient for the possession of any particular mental state; as we have seen
noted by both Tanney (2009b) and Stout (2006), rather than there being just
one set of behaviours that a subject must exhibit in order to be said to believe
that P, there may be a whole range of behaviours (and - on Tanney’s reading
of Ryle - a whole range of imaginings, inferrings, etc.) that would satisfy the
ascription to a subject of that belief.
This sort of phenomenal dispositionalism therefore escapes two of the most
important objections levelled at behaviourism: it does not demand the afore-
mentioned tight connection between the possession of particular mental states
and the possession of particular behavioural dispositions, and it does not re-
quire that we ascribe states such as ‘pain’ to systems which have the right
sort of behavioural dispositions, but the wrong sort of conscious experiences
(or no conscious experiences at all). However, it does not so easily escape
the objection that a dispositional account of mental states is at odds with our
folk-psychological conception of mental states as things that occupy particu-
lar causal roles in mediating between sensory inputs and behavioural outputs,
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and that, in doing so, interact causally with one another. And this, in my view,
is where we need to go beyond Ryle and show how the phenomenal disposi-
tionalist can accommodate the powerful intuition that to offer an explanation of
subjects’ behaviour by citing their mental states is to offer a causal explanation
of their behaviour.
There is more at stake here, however, than simply accommodating that intu-
ition. The dispositionalist must also accommodate the holism of the mental;
he must be able to say how the range of behaviours (etc.) that would satisfy
the ascription of a particular belief (say) to a subject changes depending on
what other mental states that subject has. The functionalist deals with this is-
sue by allowing the causal roles played by particular mental states to include
interacting with other mental states in particular ways; but how should the dis-
positionalist deal with the same issue?
One reply to this objection might be this: dispositional accounts of mental
states are compatible with our folk-psychological conception of mental states
as occupants of particular causal roles, because we conceive of dispositions
themselves as occupants of particular causal roles. On this view, for a subject
to have such-and-such a belief, say, would just be for her to be in some state
(or: to possess some property) occupying the right causal role in mediating
between sensory inputs and behavioural outputs. And part of that causal role
includes interacting causally with other such states, so that the range of be-
haviours caused by any state considered individually changes depending on
what other states are around to interact with.
To offer this answer would be to propose phenomenal dispositionalism as a
variant of functionalism - one that takes mental states to be the states they
are solely in virtue of the ‘forward-looking’ causal roles they occupy in the pro-
cesses giving rise to certain sorts of behaviour, experiences and patterns of
reasoning, and not also in virtue of the ‘backward-looking’ causal roles they oc-
cupy in the processes through which they themselves came to be possessed
by a subject.6In Chapter 3, I will consider and reject an avowedly functionalist
account of dispositions of the sort that would lend itself to such a view, invit-
ing us to identify dispositional mental states with categorical brain states. In
doing so, I will begin to undermine the idea that the usefulness of disposition
6On this view, a subject would count as having the belief that snow is white, for instance, if
she were in some state that played a particular causal role in producing behaviour such
as verbally assenting to the proposition that snow is white, experiences such as mentally
picturing a snow-covered field as white, and inferences such as the inference that snow is
a different colour from grass. How the subject came to be in that state would not matter;
she would count as having that belief whether she acquired it (say) by looking out of the
window at a snow-covered field, or as a result of some freak event in her brain.
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ascriptions depends on their entailing the ascription to subjects of causally ef-
ficacious, intrinsic properties or states.
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Categorical Properties
3.1 Introduction
Like Schwitzgebel (2002) - and Ryle (2000), for that matter - I am primarily
concerned to offer a useful account of the role of disposition ascriptions in
mentalistic discourse rather than to puzzle over the question of where curious
things called ‘dispositions’ fit into the ultimate structure of reality. However, in
proposing a dispositional analysis of mental-state terms, it would seem remiss
wholly to neglect the question of what dispositions are. Something must be
said about how the disposition ascriptions we make relate to what’s ‘really’,
fundamentally going on in the world. How, especially, do objects’ dispositional
properties relate to their intrinsic categorical properties1 - the properties of
shape, structure and so on in virtue of which we typically take objects to have
the dispositions they do? Addressing this question is essential if we are to be
clear on just what the claims of phenomenal dispositionalism amount to.
One appealing suggestion is that an object’s dispositional properties are simply
identical with their categorical bases - the categorical properties which are their
causal grounds. On this view, a vase’s fragility, say, just is the microstructural
property of the vase which would cause it to break if subjected to certain stimuli
under certain conditions (if knocked off a table onto a tiled floor, and so on).
In general terms, the appeal of this view is that it accounts for the apparent
value of disposition ascriptions in causal explanation in the most straightfor-
ward way possible - the vase’s fragility causally explains its breaking simply
because it causes its breaking - while denying that an object’s causal powers
are grounded in anything other than the sort of categorical properties science
1I do not mean to imply that all categorical properties are intrinsic properties: ‘being ten per
cent larger than the Moon’ and ‘being a mile from Leeds’ look like categorical properties
to me, but plainly they are not intrinsic properties. However, it is specifically intrinsic cate-
gorical properties that I am concerned with in this chapter. I explain my reasons for this in
section 3.3.
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concerns itself with. An object does not, on this view, require an ethereal sec-
ond class of properties, dispositional properties, in addition to its observable
categorical properties, in order to enter into causal transactions with other ob-
jects.
As we saw in Chapter 2, this view also has a particular appeal to someone who
wants to analyze psychological language in dispositional terms: by allowing for
the identification of dispositional mental properties such as believing that P
with categorical physical properties such as being in brain state S, it allows for
things like beliefs and desires causally to interact with one another and causally
to give rise to manifestation events such as instances of behaviour. This would
both account for the role of dispositional mental state ascriptions in predicting
and explaining behaviour, and allow for the holism of the mental by allowing
individual mental states to send causal ripples through the whole network of
states possessed by a subject.
This is the view of dispositions defended by Stephen Mumford in his (1998),
and it’s the view I want to consider in this chapter. Spelling out just what I take
to be wrong with it will, I hope, bring us closer to an understanding of what it is
for something or someone to have such-and-such dispositions. By challenging
a functionalist account of dispositions in general, rather than a functionalist
account of mental states in particular, I hope to show that the dispositionalist
about mental states need not rely on special pleading to make his case, and
that the functionalist about mental states - and anyone else who takes the
mental states of folk psychology to be the occupants of causal roles - is resting
his case on some highly questionable assumptions.
Section 3.2 of this chapter will consist of a broad-strokes sketch of Mumford’s
account of dispositions. In section 3.3, I’ll address Mumford’s pivotal ‘argu-
ment from identity of causal role’. After setting aside a couple of initial ob-
jections, I will proceed by provisionally conceding to Mumford three central
points: that dispositions are causes of the events that are their manifestations;
that categorical property instances are causes of those events; and that dispo-
sitions and categorical property instances neither individually underdetermine
nor jointly overdetermine those events. I will then draw attention to a cer-
tain slipperiness in the concepts both of occupancy and of causal role, and
suggest that Mumford’s argument fails to go through even when the aforemen-
tioned concessions are made, because the premises are only plausible if the
expression ‘the occupant of causal role R’ is given a different reading in each.
In section 3.4, I will suggest that, in light of the foregoing discussion, Mum-
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ford’s widely-shared2 view that dispositions are intrinsic properties of objects is
not sustainable; dispositional properties are in fact extrinsic, relational proper-
ties. Section 3.5 will be something of a mopping-up exercise, taking - again - a
more broad-strokes view of Mumford’s position and drawing attention to what
I take to be its fundamental flaws. My conclusion will be that the relationship
between dispositional and categorical properties is best understood in terms
of supervenience rather than identity.
Note that because my concern in this chapter is just to block the route to a
functionalist account of dispositions and so to a functionalist understanding of
phenomenal dispositionalism, I do not propose to get into the details of what
an alternative account of dispositions should look like. That account would, I
think, have to be based on a conditional analysis, but as to how simple (Choi,
2008; 2006; Gundersen, 2002) or sophisticated (Lewis, 1997; Mellor, 2000;
Fara, 2005; Manley and Wasserman, 2008) that analysis should be - that is a
question I am happy to leave open.
3.2 Mumford’s functionalist account of
dispositions
In his (1998), Stephen Mumford argues for the view that every disposition - ex-
cepting abstract and ungrounded dispositions3 - is identical with its categorical
base. The kind of identity alleged is token-token, not type-type, allowing for
the variable realization of dispositions: the fragility of vase V might be identi-
cal with, say, V’s having molecular structure m1 (the microstructural feature of
V which would be causally responsible for the manifestation of fragility in the
relevant conditions), while the fragility of glass G might be identical with G’s
having molecular structure m2 (the microstructural feature of G which would be
causally responsible for the manifestation of fragility in the relevant conditions).
Mumford describes his account of dispositions as a functionalist one, on the
basis that dispositions are to be characterized in terms of their causal or func-
tional roles. It is to be distinguished, however, from the functionalist account
of Elizabeth Prior (1985), according to which a disposition D is itself a causally
2Choi and Fara (2012, section 5) note that the intrinsicness of dispositional properties has
been defended or take for granted by philosophers including Harré (1970), Armstrong
(1973), Mellor (1974), Mackie (1977), Lewis (1997), Bird (1998), Molnar (2003), Choi
(2005b), and Menzies (2009).
3Abstract dispositions include such things as the divisibility by two of the number eight; un-
grounded dispositions include such things as the fundamental properties of subatomic par-
ticles (e.g. an electron’s charge). See section 3.4.
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impotent, second-order property - the property of having some causally po-
tent, categorical first-order property occupying such-and-such a causal role.
On Mumford’s view, the fragility of V, say, just is V’s causally potent, categor-
ical first-order property of having molecular structure m1; on Prior’s view, the
fragility of V is a second-order property possessed by V in virtue of the fact that
V has some causally potent, categorical first-order property occupying the rel-
evant causal role - a property which happens to be ‘having molecular structure
m1’.4
Mumford is opposed to property dualism - the view that there are, fundamen-
tally, two different types of property out there in the world, dispositional and
categorical. He is also opposed, however, to four possible varieties of property
monism: reductive and eliminativist varieties of categorical monism (accord-
ing to which there is, fundamentally, just one type of property out there in the
world - categorical - and dispositional properties are either reducible to such
properties or wholly eliminable), and reductivist and eliminativist varieties of
dispositional monism (according to which there is, fundamentally, just one type
of property out there in the world - dispositional - and categorical properties are
either reducible to such properties or wholly eliminable). He argues instead for
a position he calls neutral monism, according to which there is, fundamentally,
just one type of property out there in the world, but it’s equally legitimate to
characterize those properties as either dispositional or categorical; there’s just
no need to insist that they’re ‘really’ one or the other.
While Mumford denies that there is an ontological distinction to be drawn be-
tween dispositional properties and categorical properties, he does accept that
there is a conceptual distinction between the two. The distinction, he sug-
gests, is that dispositional properties entail conditionals by conceptual neces-
sity, while it’s an a posteriori matter that certain conditionals are entailed by
certain categorical properties. So, for instance, to know that V is fragile is al-
ready to know that if it were dropped (in the right conditions) it would break;
but to know that V has molecular structure m1 is not yet to know any such
thing. That the possession of molecular structure m1 occupies such-and-such
a causal role in relation to breaking events is something we can come to know
only on empirical grounds. This characterization of the conceptual categorical-
4The discussion in subsections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 brings out the main reasons one might have
for preferring one of these accounts over the other. Roughly, though, Mumford’s account
might be preferred by someone who was concerned primarily to respect the intuition that
dispositions are the causes of their manifestations, while Prior’s account might be preferred
by someone who was concerned primarily to respect the intuition that two ‘fragile’ objects
(say) instantiate the very same dispositional property even if each instantiates a different
categorical property which is the causal ground of its fragility.
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dispositional distinction is one I am happy to accept, for the sake of argument
at least.
3.3 The argument from identity of causal role
3.3.1 The argument
With this background in place, we can consider Mumford’s argument for the
identity of dispositions and their categorical bases - the ‘argument from identity
of causal role’. I present the argument below, along with Mumford’s statement
of the identity conditions for a disposition token d and a categorical base token
c:
The argument from identity of causal role:
1. disposition d1 = the occupant of causal role R [by conceptual
necessity]
2. categorical base c1 = the occupant of causal role R [an empirical
fact]
Therefore: disposition d1 = categorical base c1
(Mumford, 1998, p.146)5
Identity conditions for a disposition token d and a categorical base
token c:
∀d∀c ((d = c)←→ ∃x (d causes or is caused by x & c causes or is
caused by x)
&
¬∃y ((d causes or is caused by y & ¬(c causes or is caused by y ))
5As we might expect from a functionalist theory of dispositions, Mumford’s argument here
closely parallels functionalist arguments for the identity of mental states and brain states -
notably this one, presented by David Lewis:
Mental state M = the occupant of causal role R (by definition of M).
Neural state N = the occupant of causal role R (by the physiological theory).
[Therefore:] Mental state M = neural state N (by transitivity of =).
(Lewis, 2002, p.88)
I will return to Lewis’s argument in Chapter 4.
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∨(¬(d causes or is caused by y ) & c causes or is caused by y )))
(Mumford, 1998, p.162)
(In the argument from identity of causal role, ‘the occupant of causal role R’
is intended as a definite description; in the statement of identity conditions for
d and c, x and y are variables ranging over actual and physically possible
events.)
3.3.2 Two initial objections
A prima facie objection to this argument, which Mumford attributes to Cum-
mins (1974), is that properties - whether categorical or dispositional - simply
can’t be causes because the relata of the causal relation are events (Mumford,
1998, pp.126-128). Mumford replies that while dispositions cannot, indeed, be
‘initiating’ or ‘efficient’ causes, they nonetheless occupy some causal role and
are thus, in a perfectly acceptable sense, ‘causes’.
Note that Mumford certainly does not think dispositions are merely causally
relevant, in just the way we might say that (e.g.) facts about physical laws or
about the truth of conditional statements are causally relevant. The picture
he favours is one on which dispositional properties combine with events to
produce effects; dispositions are causally potent (or efficacious) properties of
objects that wait around, as it were, for events to provide the extra bit of ‘oomph’
required for their manifestations. As we shall see, this insistence on the causal
potency, rather than the mere causal relevance, of an object’s dispositions, is
an important feature of Mumford’s position: ‘The explanatory value of appeal
to dispositions,’ he says, ‘typically resides in them being causally efficacious
and being properties’ (Mumford, 1998, p.14, Mumford’s italics).
This talk of causally efficacious properties has the potential to mislead, so let
me be clear. Although Mumford talks loosely about properties being causally
efficacious, he does not mean that properties themselves, qua universals, are
causally efficacious; rather, he means that particular instantiations of proper-
ties - or property instances - are causally efficacious:
When we say that the weight of the apple caused the pointer on
the scales to move, for example, we do not mean that a property
of weight in general, construed as a universal, caused the mov-
ing of the pointer. Rather it was this particular weight of this par-
ticular apple that caused the pointer to move. . . Unless we accept
some notion of properties being instantiated in particulars, then it
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seems difficult to sustain the evident link between a thing’s proper-
ties and the causal transactions into which it enters. It is difficult, in
short, to see how, unless we allow that there are particular property
instances possessed wholly by objects and substances, a thing’s
properties can have causal effects. What causes a square peg to
fit a square hole? It is not a timeless universal that exists nowhere,
rather it is something about this hole and this peg
(Mumford, 1998, pp.160-161)
A full consideration of the issues raised by the Cummins objection, which would
involve a lengthy excursion into the metaphysics of causation, would be outside
the scope of the present discussion. I propose, therefore, simply to concede
that Mumford may be right to think that property instances can, in principle, be
causes;6 it is on the question of whether dispositions may be identified with any
such causally efficacious property instances (specifically intrinsic, categorical
property instances) that I want to challenge him.
As I mentioned in footnote 1 above, it is only intrinsic categorical property in-
stances with which I am concerned in this chapter. This is simply because, in
the context of Mumford’s argument, intrinsic categorical property instances are
the only categorical property instances with which dispositions could plausibly
be identified. There are two reasons why this is so. Firstly, Mumford insists that
dispositions are themselves intrinsic properties - ‘instantiated properties which
inhere completely within the object of ascription’ (1998, p.74). And secondly,
Mumford thinks that non-intrinsic, relational properties, ‘if they are properties
at all, [arguably] need bestow no causal powers on the particular in which they
are instantiated’ (1998, p.122); dispositional properties, on the other hand -
those that are not abstract, anyway - necessarily bestow causal powers on
the particulars in which they are instantiated, in Mumford’s view. The prop-
erty instances with which Mumford thinks dispositions may be identified must
therefore be intrinsic as well as categorical.
A second, equally fundamental objection to the argument from identity of causal
6Mumford doesn’t really pin down just what sort of thing property instances are supposed to
be, so it’s hard to say how plausible this is. My hunch is that Mumford has got the relation
between physical objects and their properties essentially back to front. It is not a curious
object called ‘this apple’s weighing a hundred grams’ that provides the causal ‘oomph’ to
move the pointer on the scales; it is the apple itself. And it is because the apple itself does
so - not because some other object does so on its behalf - that we may truthfully say of the
apple that it weighs a hundred grams (or, if we like, that there exists a property instance
called ‘this apple’s weighing a hundred grams’). But I won’t press this objection - partly
because I don’t think Mumford’s account of property instances provides a clear enough
target, and partly because to do so would mean tackling metaphysical questions that are
outside the scope of the present discussion.
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role has been raised (in personal communication) by Helen Steward (2010),
who suggests that Mumford is guilty of equivocation in his use of the expres-
sion ‘the occupant of causal role R’. The thought is this: ‘disposition d1’ stands
for the name of a property, and if Mumford’s argument is to go through, this
must be the very same property picked out by the definite description ‘the oc-
cupant of causal role R’ in both premises. But in the first premise - grounded as
it is in conceptual necessity - ‘the occupant of causal role R’ must pick out the
property ‘having a property that is the occupant of causal role R’;7 it couldn’t
be a matter of conceptual necessity that ‘disposition d1’ names (and so rigidly
designates) the very property that is in fact the occupant of causal role R (the
property of having such-and-such a molecular structure, say).
So in the case of a particular dispositional property of a particular object - let’s
say its fragility - that first premise ought really to look like this:
1. Fragility = having a property that is the occupant of causal role R
[by conceptual necessity]
In the second premise, though, ‘categorical property c1’ clearly is the name of
the very property that is the occupant of causal role R, and not of the prop-
erty ‘having a property that is the occupant of causal role R’. So in the case
of a particular categorical property of a particular object - let’s say its having
molecular structure m - that second premise ought really to look like this:
2. Having molecular structure m = the property that is the occupant
of causal role R [an empirical fact]
And because ‘having a property that is the occupant of causal role R’ and ‘the
property that is the occupant of causal role R’ are different properties, these
premises simply do not license the move to the concusion:
Therefore: Fragility = having molecular structure m
In order to assess this objection, I want to introduce two bits of jargon: by
‘A-worlds’, I mean worlds with the same natural laws as the actual world (in-
cluding the actual world itself), and by ‘D-worlds’ I mean worlds with natural
laws which are at least somewhat different from those of the actual world.
Now, if dispositional terms name properties that objects tending to exhibit be-
haviour F in A-worlds have in common with objects tending to exhibit behaviour
F in D-worlds, I think Steward’s objection is fatal to the argument. If ‘fragility’,
say, names a property possessed both by an A-world vase that would break
if dropped in virtue of having molecular structure m, and by a D-world coun-
terpart that would break if dropped in virtue of having molecular structure n,
7This is very much in line with Prior’s view of dispositions as second-order properties (see
section 3.2).
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then it can’t be the case (and so can’t be a matter of conceptual necessity)
that ‘fragility’ names the property ‘having molecular structure m’. The D-world
vase, after all, does not have that property at all - but, ex hypothesi, it does have
the property named by ‘fragility’. More plausibly, ‘fragility’ names the property
Steward suggests it names: the property ‘having a property that is the occu-
pant of causal role R’, which we might think is a property possessed both by
the A-world vase and by its D-world counterpart.
However, Mumford explicitly denies that the property named by ‘fragility’ would
be possessed by the counterpart vase in the scenario just outlined - and with
some plausibility, I think. After all, as he points out (Mumford, 1998, p.156),
when we ascribe fragility to an actual-world vase, we are saying something
about the way it is disposed to respond to certain stimuli in A-worlds; nothing
at all is being said about the way it is disposed to respond to similar stimuli in
D-worlds. Disposition ascriptions must therefore be regarded as world-relative
(or, more generally, as relative to a set of conditions fixed by the context of
ascription - conditions which include the relevant natural laws) (Mumford, 1998,
pp.155-156).8
It might be suggested that this is no objection at all to the view suggested
by Steward - the view on which an easily-broken A-world vase and an easily-
broken D-world vase have the property named by ‘fragility’ in common. For one
might think that, on this view, disposition ascriptions are world-relative in the
perfectly good sense that fragility, say, is being thought of as a property which
the former vase has ‘relative to’ A-worlds but which the latter has ‘relative to’
(some) D-worlds. That being the case, this view seems perfectly capable of ac-
commodating the fact that in ascribing fragility to an actual-world vase, we are
saying something about how it is disposed to respond to certain stimuli in A-
worlds and not in D-worlds. Why, then, should we think that the world-relativity
of disposition ascriptions rules out the possibility that ‘fragility’ names a prop-
erty possessed both by easily-broken A-world vases and by easily-broken D-
world vases?
I think what a defender of Mumford would say here is something like this: ‘The
concept of a dispositional property like fragility is the concept of a causally
8In a similar vein, Galen Strawson argues that an object’s ‘fundamental dispositions include
the disposition to behave in way F in nomic environment 1, the disposition to behave in
way G in nomic environment 2, and so on’ (2008, p.277) (so that a vase that would break
easily in A-worlds but not in (some) D-worlds, and a vase that would break easily in (some)
D-worlds but not in A-worlds, have different fundamental dispositions). Mumford is making
the further claim that when we, as A-world occupants, use dispositional terms like ‘fragility’,
we are naming the properties responsible for objects behaving a certain way just in our
own, A-world, nomic environment.
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efficacious property of an object, a property that is itself the occupant of a
particular causal role. But the property Steward suggests is named by ‘fragility’
- the property ‘having a property which is the occupant of causal role R’ - just
doesn’t fit the bill, conceptually speaking; it’s not a property that could itself be
the occupant of causal role R. And Steward is wrong to think that it couldn’t
be a matter of conceptual necessity that a term like ‘fragility’ names the very
property that is the occupant of the relevant causal role in the actual world.
Why? Because the relevant causal role only exists - it only has an occupant - in
the actual world; and so ‘the occupant of causal role R’ really does succeed in
picking out the very property that is, uniquely, the occupant of that role. Only in
A-worlds, after all, does anything mediate causally between A-world droppings
and A-world breakings - between dropping-events and breaking-events that
occur under A-world conditions. This is what it means to say that disposition
ascriptions are ‘world-relative’. A vase that would break if dropped in some D-
world, but would not break if dropped in an A-world, plainly does not have any
property that occupies the role of causing it to break if dropped in an A-world;
therefore it does not have the property we’re ascribing to an A-world object
when we say it’s fragile.’9
What all this boils down to, I think, is a largely intuition-driven disagreement
over the correct conceptual analysis of dispositional terms like ‘fragility’. Mum-
ford thinks they name causally efficacious properties of objects; to say that
an object is fragile is to pick out the property in virtue of which it would break
if dropped. If he’s right about that, I think he can defend the argument from
identity of causal role against both the objections just considered.
3.3.3 Why think dispositions are causally efficacious
properties of objects?
Still, prima facie at least, it looks quite possible that such terms don’t name
causally efficacious properties of objects at all; rather they name second-order,
causally impotent properties of objects (like the property of having some first-
order property that occupies such-and-such a causal role - a Prior-type func-
tionalist view of the sort Steward’s objection seems to presuppose). So what
can Mumford say to support his analysis?
Well, according to Mumford:
9I don’t think this is to rule out the possibility that we could use the term ‘fragility’ to name the
property of some D-world object in virtue of which it would break if dropped; it’s just that,
given the world-relativity of disposition ascriptions, we’d be naming a different property from
the one we’re naming when we ascribe fragility to an A-world object.
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The justification for regarding dispositions as causally efficacious is
as follows. If type-identical stimuli are applied to two objects and
one reacts differently from the other, then the difference in reac-
tions must be accounted for in terms of some difference between
the objects and this is a difference that has a causal effect on the
reaction. . . For there to be explanatory value in. . . [a] disposition as-
cription. . . [it] would have to be taken as an ascription of something
that is causally efficacious of such behaviour in such conditions,
namely, a property of the object.
(Mumford, 1998, pp.14-15)10
A related point made by Mumford has to do with our realist intuitions when as-
cribing dispositions to objects: ‘[t]he concept of a disposition,’ he says, ‘is a con-
cept of something that lies behind what occurs’ (1998, p.63). So disposition-
talk can’t just be reduced to talk about the actual and possible events that
would constitute the evidence for the possession of dispositions; it has to be
construed as talk about ‘real instantiations of properties which afford possibil-
ities’ (1998, p.63). The fact that we take precautions to prevent the breakage
of fragile objects, for instance, shows that we take them to possess some rel-
evant property during times when the conditions for the manifestation of that
property are not satisfied.
A third reason for taking dispositions to be causally efficacious properties of the
objects to which they are ascribed is suggested by Mumford’s consideration of
the ‘virtus dormitiva’ objection (1998, 136ff.) - the objection that causal expla-
nations given in terms of dispositions are necessarily trivial if dispositions are
just defined as properties of an object occupying certain causal roles. (‘Why
does opium make one sleep?’ ‘It has a property such that it makes one sleep.’)
Mumford argues that while such explanations are indeed trivial, this is only so
because we begin by supposing that opium really does make one sleep. And
to say that opium really does make one sleep, by virtue of one of its proper-
ties, is to say something informative: it is to say that sleep follows the ingestion
of opium not because of divine intervention, say, or by pure coincidence, but
because of something about the opium (Mumford, 1998, p.138).
These are points to which I will return in section 3.4. They clearly have some
10Note that elsewhere, Mumford (1998, pp.119-120) argues in the same way for the causal rel-
evance rather than the causal efficacy of a property of the object - seemingly taking ‘being
causally relevant’, ‘being a cause’ and ‘being causally efficacious’ to be equivalent. That
they are equivalent is by no means obvious (see for instance Steward (1997, especially
chs.5-6); Jackson and Pettit (1990; 1988)). I will argue in Chapter 4 that there is a good
sense in which things can be causally relevant without being causally efficacious. Such
things might include facts, laws, and - in my view - dispositional properties.
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intuitive force, however, and so for now, I will simply let them stand.
3.3.4 On the concept of ‘occupancy’
Having set aside a couple of objections to the argument from identity of causal
role, and considered some of the reasons Mumford offers for supposing that
dispositions are causally efficacious, I propose to concede the following to
Mumford for the sake of argument:
1. Dispositions are causes of the events which are their manifestations.
2. Instances of categorical properties are causes of those same events.
3. In the context of the argument from identity of causal role, there couldn’t
be two wholly distinct property instances occupying the very same causal
role. (It could not be the case, that is, either that two wholly distinct
property instances are both necessary to produce the relevant effects,
or that two wholly distinct property instances are each sufficient and so
jointly overdetermine their effects).
Now, Mumford is clearly right to think that one way of reconciling these three
presumed facts is just to identify dispositions with the instances of categorical
properties that are the causes of their manifestation. But, I suggest, it is not
the only way to do so.
To see why, I want to set aside questions about dispositions, property instances
and causal roles for a moment and say something about the concept of occu-
pancy in general.
Lots of things occupy (are the occupants of, take up, fill) other things. Peo-
ple occupy jobs; intellectual projects occupy minds; objects occupy regions of
space. Note, however, that none of these ‘arguments from identity of thing
occupied’ is at all persuasive:
1. Mr Smith = the occupant of job ‘account keeper for ACME Elec-
tricals’
2. Smith & Jones Accountancy = the occupant of job ‘account
keeper for ACME Electricals’
Therefore: Mr Smith = Smith & Jones Accountancy
This is clearly wrongheaded. If Mr Smith keeps the accounts for ACME Elec-
tricals in his capacity as a partner at Smith and Jones Accountancy, then both
Mr Smith and Smith and Jones Accountancy can correctly be described as the
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holder, occupant or ‘doer’ of that job. Now, clearly Mr Smith and Smith & Jones
Accountancy aren’t two distinct things doing the same work twice over, or else
sharing the task between them. Neither, though, is Mr Smith just identical with
Smith & Jones Accountancy; rather, he in some way belongs to, or acts on
behalf of Smith & Jones Accountancy.
1. The designing of the conservatory = the thing that occupied Mr
Brown’s mind on January 5
2. The designing of the house = the thing that occupied Mr Brown’s
mind on January 5
Therefore: The designing of the conservatory = the designing of the
house
This is equally misguided. The designing of the conservatory is just part of
the designing of the house, and so either one can correctly be said to have
occupied Mr Brown’s mind on January 5.
1. The base of the filing cabinet = the thing that occupies that area
of the floor
2. The filing cabinet = the thing that occupies that area of the floor
Therefore: The base of the filing cabinet = the filing cabinet
Once again: if part of the filing cabinet occupies some region of space, we can
equally well say that the filing cabinet occupies that region of space.11
Obviously there are important differences between regions of space, jobs,
minds and causal roles; so no doubt there are important disanalogies between
these arguments. But it seems clear enough that the concept of occupancy
is, in general, such that if x and y can both be legitimately described as be-
ing ‘the occupant of Z’, and if there aren’t two wholly distinct things which are
11Note that these faulty arguments do not involve straightforward cases of failure to refer to a
unique object, as we see in the following:
1. John Lennon = The Beatles’ lead singer
2. Paul McCartney = The Beatles’ lead singer
Therefore: John Lennon = Paul McCartney
In that case, it’s clear enough what something would have to do in order to qualify as being
‘The Beatles’ lead singer’ (that is, a lead singer of The Beatles); the definite description itself
is not ambiguous. It’s just that at least two things meet the criteria (satisfy the description),
and so the description fails to refer to a unique object.
By contrast, when we consider what something would have to do in order to qualify as
being ‘the occupant of job “account keeper for ACME Electricals””, ‘the thing that occupied
Mr Brown’s mind on January 5’, or ‘the thing that occupies that area of the floor’, it’s ap-
parent that the definite descriptions themselves are distinctly slippery; they can be given
different readings under which they succeed in referring to different unique objects which,
while closely related, are not simply identical.
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the occupant of Z, then it may nonetheless be that x is not identical with y.
Rather, it may be that some other relation holds between x and y. Perhaps,
most obviously, it may be that one of them is part of, or partly constitutive of
the other.12
Perhaps I have been labouring an obvious and uncontroversial point. What the
foregoing discussion makes clear, though, is that we have good reason to be
on the lookout for a certain kind of equivocation when we see an expression like
‘the occupant of...’ popping up in an argument of the sort Mumford presents. It
could be that we are being invited to identify two things that are not identical at
all, but which stand in some quite different relation.
3.3.5 Implications for the relation between dispositional and
categorical properties
Is this plausible in the present context, however? Obviously a person might
be an employee of a company, a filing cabinet base might be part of a filing
cabinet, and an instance of conservatory-designing might be partly constitutive
of an instance of house-designing; but could a categorical property instance
and a disposition stand in some similar sort of relation?
Could a categorical property instance just be ‘part of’ a dispositional property
instance, say? Well, maybe not - I’m not sure property instances are the sort
of things that have parts (although it seems fair enough to say that ‘part of’
what it is, say, for my kitchen to instantiate the property of containing a table
and chairs is for it to instantiate the property of containing a table).
Let’s be clear, though. We have been given reasons to think, and have pro-
visionally conceded (in section 3.3.4), two things: that dispositions are the
causes of the events that are their manifestations, and that categorical prop-
erty instances are the causes of those events. What the foregoing discussion
shows, however, is that it just doesn’t follow from this that dispositions just are
property instances at all. Still less does it follow that they are identical with
particular categorical property instances.
12This may not exhaust the possibilities, though; it’s not entirely obvious to me, for instance,
that persons (like Mr Smith) are actually constituents of the companies they work for, the
charities they represent, and so on. One might prefer to say that it’s not the whole person
Mr Smith, but just the skills, knowledge and labour he contributes to Smith and Jones
Accountancy, that serve to make the firm what it is; and that this is why, if Mr Smith were to
be replaced by another individual contributing the same skills, knowledge and labour, the
firm would remain essentially the same.
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One alternative possibility is that categorical property instances are somehow
constitutive of dispositions - that what it is for an object O to have disposition
d is for such-and-such categorical properties to be instantiated. Or perhaps
the disposition in question could be identified with some set of categorical
property instances.13 In either case, it would seem legitimate to say both that
a categorical property instance c was the occupant of some causal role R, and
that d was the occupant of that role. Mumford would be guilty of equivocation,
however, since the sense in which c is the occupant of R is different from the
sense in which d is the occupant of R - just as the sense in which Mr Smith
has the job of keeping ACME Electricals’ accounts is different from the sense
in which Smith & Jones Accountancy has the job of keeping ACME Electricals’
accounts.
So much for ‘occupancy’. Time to say something more about ‘causal roles’.
3.3.6 The causal roles of dispositional and categorical
properties
If some disposition d did all and only the causal work done by some categorical
property c - if, that is to say, Mumford’s identity conditions for c and d were met
- then the discussion in sections 3.3.4 - 3.3.5 would get us precisely nowhere.
Such a case would be one where some categorical property c, all by itself,
made true the counterfactuals entailed by some disposition ascription; where c
was able to provide all the causal ‘oomph’ required (in addition to the ‘oomph’
provided by some stimulus event) to bring about the manifestation of the rel-
evant disposition. In a case like that, Mumford would be home and dry; there
13Note that in such cases, it need not (in principle) be the object to which the disposition is
ascribed which instantiates all the relevant categorical properties. To deny that a disposition
d of an object O must be identical with some intrinsic categorical property of O - and
Mumford does insist that it’s intrinsic properties of O we’re dealing with when we talk about
dispositions (see section 3.4) - is to open up the possibility that d has to do, somehow,
with properties of objects other than O. So these possible accounts of the relation between
dispositional and categorical property instances are more radically different from Mumford’s
identity-based account than they might at first appear. (More will be said about the way
the dispositions of one object are related to the categorical properties of other objects in
subsection 3.3.6 and in section 3.4.)
Considerations of parsimony might be thought to provide a prima facie reason to prefer
Mumford’s account to the sort of accounts just suggested (if, for instance, one found it
ontologically extravagant to bring an additional entity called a ‘set’ of property instances
into the picture). Equally, one might be inclined to prefer Mumford’s account on the grounds
of simplicity - identity being the simplest possible relation that could hold between one thing
and another. However, in subsection 3.3.6 I will argue that there are compelling reasons
to deny that a disposition of an object O could simply be identical with some categorical
property of O.
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just wouldn’t be any more to being d than there was to being c. We could, if
we liked, talk about c being a ‘part’ of d, but only in the sense that any object
considered as a whole is part of itself; we’d still be entitled just to identify c with
d.
The trouble is, there just aren’t any such cases. To see why not, consider
how everyday causal explanations typically work. Here are three alternative
answers to the question ‘Why does sugar dissolve in water?’, offered by mem-
bers of the public on a ‘Yahoo! Anwers’ web page (Anonymous, no date):
1. Sugar can be dissolved in water because it is soluble in water.
This is surely a paradigm of causal explanation in terms of an object’s dispo-
sitions. In Mumford’s view, the value of such an explanation is that it ascribes
a causally efficacious property, water-solubility, to the sugar. (That very same
property can also be characterized in categorical terms as a feature of sugar’s
molecular composition, though.)
2. The molecules of sugar bond with the water molecules. This is
because water is a solvent, which are substances that can bond to
another kind of subtances [sic] easily.
This answer tells us what sugar dissolving in water is - the bonding of sugar
molecules with water molecules - then moves on to offer a causal explanation
in terms of a dispositional property of the water - its propensity (as a solvent) to
bond with other substances. No properties are explicitly ascribed to the sugar.
3. Table sugar dissolves in water because when a sucrose molecule
breaks from the sugar crystal, it is immediately surrounded by water
molecules. The sucrose has hydroxyl groups that have a slight negative
charge. The positive charge of the oxygen found in the water molecule
binds with the sugar. As the hydration shell forms around the sucrose
molecule, the molecule is shielded from other sugar molecules so the
sugar crystal does not reform.
Here we’re told quite an involved story about the physical process through
which water and sugar molecules bond. The causally relevant property of the
sugar is said to be its possession of molecules having hydroxyl groups with a
negative charge (let’s call this property m3), and the causally relevant property
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of the water is said to be its possession of molecules having oxygen with a
positive charge (which we’ll call m4).
So we have three alternative explanations: one ascribing a dispositional prop-
erty to sugar, one ascribing a dispositional property to water, and one ascrib-
ing a categorical property to sugar and a further categorical property to water.
On Mumford’s view, the causal role conceptually occupied by sugar’s water-
solubility - the role that, prescientifically, we think and speak of as being occu-
pied by sugar’s water-solubility - should be the same as the causal role science
reveals in fact to be occupied by m3. (In the same way, the causal role occu-
pied by water’s sugar-solvency14 should be the same as the role occupied by
m4.) So - is it?
No, it’s not. For if sugar’s water-solubility conceptually occupies a causal role at
all, as we’re supposing, it occupies a role which is something like: ‘together with
the event of sugar being placed in water (in the relevant conditions), causes
sugar to dissolve in water’. (It provides all the causal ‘oomph’ required, in ad-
dition to that provided by the relevant stimulus event itself, to bring about its
manifestation.) It does not occupy a role something like: ‘together with the
event of sugar being placed in water (in the relevant conditions) and water’s
sugar-solvency, causes sugar to dissolve in water’, or ‘together with the event
of sugar being placed in water (in the relevant conditions) and m4, causes
sugar to dissolve in water’. Conceptually, no causal factor is required in addi-
tion to sugar’s water-solubility to bring about a dissolving-event when sugar is
placed in water (in the relevant conditions).
Similarly, no causal factor in addition to water’s sugar-solvency is required to
bring about the same sort of event in the same conditions. Conceptually, in
fact, water’s sugar-solvency would surely have to be taken to occupy the very
same causal role occupied by sugar’s water-solubility - the role ‘together with
the event of sugar being placed in water (in the relevant conditions), causes
sugar to dissolve in water’. Conceptually, for sugar to be disposed to dissolve
in water just is for water to be disposed to dissolve sugar; for sugar to be water-
soluble just is for water to be sugar-solvent. But clearly m3 and m4 occupy
distinct causal roles here, each of which must be occupied if a dissolving-event
is to occur.15
14This term has a slightly awkward ring to it, but the neatness of the analogy with ‘water-
solubility’ serves to remind us that the properties named by these terms, being disposed to
dissolve sugar and being disposed to dissolve in water, mirror one another in a particular
way when ascribed to water and to sugar respectively.
15Heather Logue (2010) has suggested (in personal communication) that distinguishing be-
tween sugar’s water-solubility and water’s sugar-solvency is a way of keeping track of the
distinct causal contributions made to dissolving events by sugar and by water - or, in Mum-
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What a conceptual analysis of paradigmatic causal explanations seems to re-
veal, then - at least if we take Mumford’s view that dispositions are causes of
their manifestations - is that sugar’s water-solubility occupies (at least) two dis-
tinct causal roles: the one occupied by m3, and the one occupied by m4. And
water’s sugar-solvency occupies (at least) those same two roles.
So Mumford’s claim that in causal explanation, dispositions ‘stand in’ for cate-
gorical properties - so that we might start out, prescientifically, by saying dis-
solving events are caused by sugar’s water-solubility, then work out that they’re
caused by m3, and so ultimately be in a position to say that the sugar’s water-
solubility just is m3 - just isn’t borne out by a consideration of paradigmatic
causal explanations. Water-solubility just can’t straightforwardly ‘stand in’ for
m3 in causal explanations of dissolving events.
The only way to make things appear otherwise is to perform a sleight of hand
when it comes to specifying what are to count as causes and what are to count
as background conditions. One can indeed say either of these two things:
(1) in the relevant conditions, an event of sugar being placed in
water, plus the sugar’s water-solubility, cause an event of the sugar
dissolving in water
(2) in the relevant conditions, an event of sugar being placed in
water, plus sugar’s possessing m3, cause an event of the sugar
dissolving in water
- and it certainly looks as if, in (2), a categorical property of the sugar has just
been straightforwardly slotted into the place occupied in an otherwise identical
explanation, (1), by a dispositional property of sugar. But where does water’s
sugar-solvency - or the categorical property Mumford would identify with it, m4
- fit into this picture? Mumford certainly wouldn’t want to deny that that property
is causally efficacious, or that it plays a role in the production of the specified
dissolving event.16 But it’s not mentioned explicitly in either of these putative
ford’s terms, of distinguishing between the causal role occupied by some property of the
sugar and the causal role occupied by some property of the water. However, I simply don’t
see how one could specify distinct causal roles occupied by sugar’s water-solubility and by
water’s sugar-solvency in a way that plausibly reflected our ordinary usage of those dispo-
sitional concepts. And I think any attempt to do so would necessarily involve a substantial
deviation from Mumford’s analysis of such concepts, since it appears inescapable on his
view (1998, p.89) that either of these dispositions on its own would suffice, in the right
conditions and in conjunction with the right sort of stimulus event, for the production of a
dissolving event. There is just no leftover causal role for the other disposition to fill.
Of course, Mumford wouldn’t want to deny that properties of sugar and of water have
distinct causal roles to play in the production of dissolving events; my point is just that it
only appears to be possible to specify what those distinct roles are if one characterizes
those properties in categorical rather than dispositional terms.
16Perhaps a defender of Mumford could argue that the event of the sugar’s dissolving in water
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causal explanations of that event. Where’s it hiding?
Well, in (2), I think water’s possession of m4 must be counted among the ‘rel-
evant conditions’. The causal picture being painted must look something like
this:
(2’)
Relevant conditions:
Obtaining background (environmental) conditions & water’s pos-
sessing m4
Stimulus event:
Sugar placed in water
Causally efficicacious property instance(s):
The sugar’s possessing m3
Effect:
Event of sugar dissolving in water
But according to the prescientific explanation offered in (1), surely, the picture
looks like this:
(1’)
Relevant conditions:
Obtaining background (environmental) conditions
Stimulus event:
Sugar placed in water
Causally efficicacious property instance(s):
The sugar’s water-solubility
Effect:
Event of sugar dissolving in water
In (1), then, sugar’s solubility is effectively ‘standing in’ not just for m3, but for
m4 too.
Suppose a defender of Mumford wanted to insist that water’s possession of m4
must be counted among the relevant conditions in (1) as well as (2), and so
the picture in fact looks like this:
is not identical with the event of the water’s dissolving the sugar, and that neither disposi-
tional nor categorical properties of the water are strictly causally relevant to the production
of the former event. I don’t believe that would be Mumford’s own view, and I won’t attempt
to construct such an argument on behalf of an imagined opponent who would be raising
metaphysical questions I could not pretend to find meaningful.
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(1”)
Relevant conditions:
Obtaining background (environmental) conditions & water’s pos-
sessing m4
Stimulus event:
Sugar placed in water
Causally efficicacious property instance(s):
The sugar’s water-solubility
Effect:
Event of sugar dissolving in water
This would be to insist that for a dissolving event to occur, it is necessary
not only that sugar possesses water-solubility, that the relevant background
conditions obtain, and that there occurs an event of sugar being placed in
water, but also that water possesses m4. But that just seems wrong: surely it’s
partly in virtue of water’s possessing m4 that sugar possesses water-solubility,
and so absurd to talk as if, once sugar’s water-solubility has been established,
there’s a lingering question as to whether water is going to hold up its side of
the bargain in bringing about some dissolving event.
Note that on Mumford’s view, to insist that m4 must be counted among the
‘relevant conditions’ in (1) is equally to insist that water’s sugar-solvency must
be counted among the relevant conditions. On Mumford’s view, therefore, (1”)
is equivalent to (1”’):
(1”’)
Relevant conditions:
Obtaining background (environmental) conditions & water’s sugar-
solvency
Stimulus event:
Sugar placed in water
Causally efficacious property instance(s):
The sugar’s water-solubility
Effect:
Event of sugar dissolving in water
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Again, this is intuitively at odds with the way we use dispositional concepts. If
sugar is water-soluble, then necessarily water is sugar-solvent; so there is just
no sense in insisting that if sugar is water-soluble and is placed in water, the
occurrence of a dissolving event is conditional upon its also being the case that
water is sugar-solvent. One might as well insist that in order for Bob to obtain
a Green Card, it is necessary not only that he should marry a US citizen, but
also that a US citizen should marry him.
But there’s another problem here: once we slot in that second dispositional
property - water’s sugar-solvency - we can’t help but start running in circles.
Both sugar-solvency and water-solubility, on Mumford’s account, are ascribed
to their possessors relative to some set of relevant conditions; and (1”’) ex-
presses the view that sugar is water-soluble relative to a set of conditions which
includes water’s being sugar-solvent. But if that’s right, it must surely also be
the case that water is sugar-solvent relative to a set of conditions which in-
cludes sugar’s being water-soluble. So we end up with a picture on which
sugar is water-soluble relative to conditions in which water is sugar-solvent
relative to conditions in which sugar is water-soluble relative to. . . and so on.
And what are we to say about the following disposition ascription?
Sugar and water are disposed to form a solution when mixed to-
gether.
Such uses of disposition ascriptions are by no means unusual (we can and do
say things like ‘piano and cello tend to sound good together’, or ‘Josh and Amy
are apt to make an awful mess if I leave them in the kitchen together’17). They
look distinctly awkward for Mumford, though. Conceptually, sugar and water
here seem to be sharing a single disposition between them. That would mean,
I think, that Mumford would have to say they jointly instantiate some categorical
property - a sort of ‘umbrella’ property, presumably, that includes the causally
relevant categorical properties of both sugar and water. And so we seem to be
back with the idea that some dispositions, at least, are somehow made up of
more than one distinct property instance (see subsections 3.3.4 - 3.3.5).
Alternatively, I suppose, Mumford could just insist that such locutions need to
be analyzed into ascriptions of two distinct dispositions: so ‘Sugar and wa-
ter are disposed to form a solution when mixed together’ becomes something
like ‘sugar is disposed to dissolve in water with which it is mixed and water is
disposed to dissolve sugar with which it is mixed’. But those two ostensibly
different disposition ascriptions just don’t seem to be telling us two different
17I’m assuming here that the pairing of Josh with Amy is what gives rise to their tendency to
make a mess; it’s not just that Amy has that tendency and so does Josh.
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things. They seem to express the very same fact about the way the world is,
in certain respects, with regard to sugar and water - just as surely as ‘Bob is
married to Bella’ and ‘Bella is married to Bob’ tell us the very same thing about
how the world is in certain respects with regard to Bob and Bella.
Am I, then, suggesting that dispositions are not intrinsic properties of objects
at all, as is usually supposed? Yes, I am. In fact dispositions seem to me to be
best characterized as extrinsic, relational properties18: to have such-and-such
a disposition is precisely to stand in such-and-such a relation to certain actual
and possible objects and events.
In section 3.4, I will argue that in spite of certain metaphysical misgivings, this
suggestion is not as controversial as it might appear.
3.4 Dispositional properties as relational
properties
Suppose that an objector, bridling at the suggestion that dispositional proper-
ties are not intrinsic properties of the objects of ascription, were to argue as
follows:
‘Intrinsic properties are properties an object has wholly in virtue of the way it
is in itself; extrinsic properties are properties an object has partly in virtue of
the way things are outside of itself. An object’s intrinsic properties can’t be
changed or got rid of by adjusting the rest of the world, and are possessed by
all duplicates of that object in different possible worlds; not so for its extrinsic
properties.
‘With that in mind, consider a duplicate of an actual-world sugarcube sitting
alone in an otherwise empty possible world. Unlike its actual-world counter-
part, it doesn’t have the relational properties of being the biggest sugarcube in
the bowl, of being the sugarcube nearest the teapot, or of being the the thing
that will sweeten my next cup of tea; there are just no other sugarcubes, or
teapots, or future cups of tea around in its environment for it to stand in such
relations to. But it does have the same intrinsic properties as its actual-world
counterpart: most obviously, it’s the same shape, has the same structure and
is made of the same stuff.
18Plausibly there are some properties that are relational in a sense, but that are nonetheless
intrinsic: ‘being wider at the top than in the middle’, for instance. Hence the need to make
explicit the claim that dispositional properties are extrinsic as well as being relational in
character.
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‘And of course it also has the same dispositional properties as its actual-world
counterpart. It’s still true even of this lonely sugarcube, for instance, that if it
were to be placed in water in actual-world conditions, it would dissolve. The
fact that actual-world conditions don’t obtain in its environment, and the fact
that there isn’t any water around in its environment for it to stand in any re-
lation to whatever, just don’t have any bearing on the truth of that conditional
(which, of course, entails its possession of the dispositional property ‘being
water-soluble’).
‘Furthermore, all duplicates of that sugarcube have just the same dispositional
property even in watery D-worlds with different natural laws from the actual
world. Even in worlds where those sugarcubes wouldn’t dissolve if placed in
water, they have the property named by ‘being water-soluble’ because, again,
it’s still true of them that if they were to be placed in water in actual-world
conditions, they would dissolve.
‘So there you have it: the dispositional property ‘being water-soluble’ must
be an intrinsic property, because it’s possessed by duplicates of actual-world
sugarcubes regardless of the way things are outside of themselves in the rest
of their environment.’
In light of the discussion in section 3.3.6, however, I would have to insist that
this lonely sugarcube and its D-world duplicates do not possess the property
‘being water-soluble’ wholly in virtue of the way they are in themselves, but
rather partly in virtue of the way water is (intrinsically, in any world) and partly in
virtue of the way the actual world is in general. There are, therefore, properties
which objects possess partly in virtue of the way things are in possible worlds
other than those in which those objects are situated; and these properties
are best characterized as extrinsic. While my imagined objector is broadly
correct in his statement of the instrinsic/extrinsic distinction, he is therefore
mistaken to think that none of the extrinsic properties possessed by an object
in one possible world are shared by its duplicates in other possible worlds; its
dispositional properties are important exceptions.
However strong one’s intuitions that dispositions just must be causally potent,
then - and however successful Mumford’s arguments to that effect - the claim
that dispositions are ‘instantiated properties which inhere completely within
the object of ascription’ (Mumford, 1998, p.74) just does not appear to be sup-
ported by an analysis of dispositional concepts as they feature in causal expla-
nation. Even ‘addicts of the superstition that all true indicative sentences either
describe existents or report occurrences’ (Ryle, 2000, p.119) are not, it seems,
obliged to conclude that the existents described in this case inhere completely
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within the object of ascription (because it could be that disposition-ascribing
true indicative sentences describe existents which do not inhere within that
object). To reach that conclusion, they must also make ‘the preposterous as-
sumption that every true or false statement either asserts or denies that a
mentioned object or set of objects possesses a specified attribute’ (Ryle, 2000,
p.115; my italics).
If all this seems rather controversial, it shouldn’t. We know perfectly well that
a scientist who wanted to know what ‘makes it true’ that sugar is disposed to
dissolve if placed in water - who wanted, that is, to discover the causal ground
of that disposition - would not restrict his investigations to the sugar. He would
also be looking for causally relevant features of the water, and indeed of the
environment in which sugar and water interact (such as temperature, gravity
or atmospheric pressure). If the causal ground of sugar’s water-solubility were
to be identified with a categorical property of anything, in fact, it seems to me
more plausible that it should be with a categorical property of the world as a
whole rather than with a categorical property of sugar itself.19 (Though note
that in possible worlds where sugar wouldn’t dissolve if placed in water, there
would be no possibility of identifying its water-solubility with any categorical
property of that world as a whole. The causal ground of that disposition, after
all, would be partly located not in that world, but in the actual world.)
So far, I have been describing cases in which it is reasonable to suppose that
an intrinsic, categorical property of the object of ascription plays some causal
role in bringing about a disposition manifestation (even if it does not play the
very causal role conceptually played by the disposition itself). But I think the
connection between an object’s intrinsic categorical properties and its disposi-
tional properties can be loosened still further; for it seems clear to me that we
can easily imagine cases in which it would be perfectly legitimate to ascribe a
disposition to an object even if none of its intrinsic properties played any causal
role in bringing about a manifestation of that disposition.
Suppose, for instance, that God got bored one day and decided that she was
going to turn any sugarcube placed in water into a diamond. All the sugarcubes
in the world, surely, would thereby gain the disposition to turn into a diamond if
placed in water.20 Yet none of their intrinsic properties would have changed at
19I am, therefore, not arguing (like Simon Blackburn (1991)) merely that dispositional ‘role
states’ of an object O may not be identified with categorical ‘realizing states’ of O; I am
arguing that there are no states of O (at least if by ‘state of O’ we mean something about
the way O is intrinsically) that stand in the relation of ‘role state’ to ‘realizing state’. It is the
way the world is quite generally, and not just the way sugar is (say), that ‘realizes’ sugar’s
water-solubility.
20Would they also lose the disposition to dissolve in water? One could argue that they
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all; they would simply stand in a somewhat different relation to things like God,
diamonds, water, and events of being placed in water.
This is a silly example, of course, but there’s surely no doubt that most of the
people who have successfully wielded dispositional concepts over the millen-
nia have believed in the reality of things like divine fiats, blessings, curses,
spells, fate, karma and so on. They have believed, that is, that sometimes
objects do the things they do not even partly in virtue of the way they are in-
trinsically, but wholly in virtue of the causal influence of supernatural forces.
(Depending on his understanding of or commitment to the claim that every-
thing is caused by God, a theist might even take this to be the rule rather than
the exception.) In light of that simple fact, however, and of the discussion in
sections 3.3.4 - 3.3.5, Mumford’s reasons for thinking that the concept of a
disposition is the concept of a causally efficacious property of the object of
ascription (see section 3.3.3) just don’t support the idea that these properties
must be intrinsic properties. Taking these reasons one by one:
1. ‘For there to be explanatory value in. . . [a] disposition ascrip-
tion. . . [it] would have to be taken as an ascription of something that
is causally efficacious of such behaviour in such conditions, namely,
a property of the object.’ (Mumford, 1998, pp.14-15)
What the discussion in sections 3.3.4. - 3.3.6 shows is that even if Mumford is
right that disposition ascriptions tell us about the causally efficacious properties
responsible for an object’s behaviour, it does not follow (and is not plausible)
that they tell us only about intrinsic properties of the object of ascription. Intrin-
wouldn’t, strictly speaking - it would still be as true as it ever was that they are disposed
to dissolve in water in the relevant conditions. It’s just that those conditions don’t include a
whimsical interventionist God. Similarly, I suppose one could insist that sugarcubes have
always been disposed to turn into diamonds following such a divine command, and so
wouldn’t, strictly speaking, gain any dispositions in the circumstances described. Still, it
surely isn’t the case that sugarcubes have always had that disposition even partly in virtue
of any of their intrinsic categorical properties; if they have always had it, they have always
had it solely in virtue of God’s power.
Picking up on that point, a defender of Mumford could just insist that in the circumstances
described, sugarcubes do not have (and never had) the disposition to turn into diamonds,
since any sugarcube-to-diamond transformation events are wholly caused by God and not
at all by intrinsic properties of diamonds. (Note that such events plausibly are (partly?)
caused by relational properties of diamonds: the property of being the subject of a relevant
divine decree, for instance.) This, of course, is just to insist that dispositions are intrinsic
properties of objects, which is the very point at issue.
In my view, any dispute as to whether or not sugarcubes had the disposition to turn
into diamonds when placed in water in such-and-such conditions could be settled conclu-
sively, without philosophical exertion, simply by placing some sugarcubes in water in those
conditions and seeing what happened. Someone who observed the sugarcubes turn into
diamonds and yet insisted that it might nonetheless be the case that they have no dispo-
sition (or tendency, or ability) to do so could not, I think, plausibly claim to be using such
terms in their ordinary senses.
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sic properties of water, for instance, must (on Mumford’s view) be taken to play
a causal role in the production of dissolving events, and so help make it true
that sugar is water-soluble. And the precise relation between certain proper-
ties of water and of sugar is crucial: it matters causally that sugar has hydroxyl
groups with a negative charge, while water molecules contain oxygen with a
positive charge.
2. We take precautions to prevent the breakage of fragile objects,
which shows that we take them to possess some relevant property
during times when the conditions for the manifestation of that prop-
erty are not satisfied.
Following on from the previous point, it’s worth noting that this argument is
rather less forceful if rather than thinking about cases in which we straightfor-
wardly ‘mask’ (Johnston, 1992) a relevant property of the object of ascription -
as when we wrap a vase in bubble-wrap, say - we think about cases in which
we take steps to modify the object’s environment. We could put cushions on
the floor around the table on which the vase stands, for instance, or (more
fancifully) create a low-gravity environment within which to display the vase -
which plausibly says more about our beliefs concerning the properties of hard
floors and normal-gravity environments than about the properties of the vase
itself.
More interesting is a case like the following. Suppose someone believes that
a previously robust vase - made out of titanium, perhaps - has been cursed
by a powerful warlock and, as a result, would break if dropped. So he takes
extra precautions to ensure that the vase is not dropped - putting it in a locked
cabinet, say. Now, this misguided soul does indeed think the vase possesses
some relevant property during times when the conditions for the manifestation
of that property are not satisfied. But the property in question is not an intrinsic
property of the vase, but its relational property of having been cursed by a
powerful warlock. So while this argument might do something to undermine a
simple conditional analysis of dispositions, it does nothing at all to support the
view that the concept of a disposition is the concept of a causally efficacious
intrinsic property of the object of ascription.
3. (The virtus dormativa point): to say that opium has the disposi-
tion to make one sleep is to say that it makes one sleep by virtue of
one of its properties; and this is to say something informative - that
sleep follows the ingestion of opium not because of divine interven-
tion, say, or by pure coincidence, but because of something about
the opium (Mumford, 1998, p.138).
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The crucial point here is just that we can perfectly well ascribe to opium the
disposition to make one sleep whether or not we think it’s some intrinsic prop-
erty of opium that’s doing the causal work. If a scientist with expertise in the
area of narcotics were to bump into someone who believed that opium pop-
pies had been blessed by the god of dreams, the two parties surely wouldn’t
disagree on the question of whether opium had the disposition to make one
sleep (although see footnote 20, above). Their disagreement would be over
the causal ground of that disposition: the scientist would point to the fact that
the drug (and the brain) have certain intrinsic, categorical properties, while his
opponent would point to the fact that the flower from which the drug is extracted
has the relational property of having been blessed by the god of dreams.
These examples are all rather fanciful, of course; things like curses and bless-
ings don’t really do any of the causal work that gets done in the actual world.
But I think they decisively undermine the claim that the very concept of a dispo-
sition is the concept of an intrinsic property of an object. For all that conceptual
analysis can tell us, dispositions might very well be relational properties even
if they’re causally efficacious properties of the object of ascription.
3.5 Some further concerns
Mumford urges ‘modest realism’ about subject-independent reality (Mumford,
1998, p.192); we should assume, he says, that there is such a reality, but not
be overconfident about our ability accurately to describe that reality. In partic-
ular, we should refrain from projecting our conceptual categorical/dispositional
distinction on to the world, and assume instead that there is really just one type
of property out there.
But what is modest about the claim that our pretheoretical disposition ascrip-
tions work by neatly ascribing, to precisely the right objects, precisely the prop-
erties that a completed science would appeal to in offering causal explanations
of everything that happens (albeit under merely functional characterizations)?
However ‘realist’ we are about causation, surely this can’t be right. Surely the
supposition that some mentioned object has some causally efficacious intrin-
sic property is not the only basis on which we could ever hand someone a
valid ‘inference-ticket’ (Ryle, 2000, p.117 et passim) - a licence to reason from
cause to effect and from effect to cause. Quite apart from the sort of fanciful
cases discussed in section 3.4, don’t we say, for instance, that the rate of in-
flation tends to rise when interest rates fall; that public confidence in the police
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is apt to drop when there are fewer bobbies on the beat; that the Conservative
Party is vulnerable to smear campaigns; that democracy in Iraq is still fragile?
These inference-tickets are perfectly valid; they license perfectly sound infer-
ences. But it’s not at all clear that we’re here talking about causally efficacious
intrinsic properties of ‘the rate of inflation’, ‘public confidence in the police’, ‘the
Conservative Party’ and ‘democracy in Iraq’. (Certainly such things don’t have
the sort of categorical properties - physical, microstructural properties - that
Mumford thinks are the causal grounds of dispositions.)
Perhaps Mumford would dismiss such cases as ‘atypical’ and hence beside the
point of a general theory of dispositions. This is something he does rather a
lot. ‘Abstract’ and ‘ungrounded’ dispositions, such as (respectively) the number
eight’s divisibility by two or the charge of a subatomic particle, also escape his
account; so too (or so it sometimes appears) do objects’ dispositions to affect
sentient beings in certain ways. Mumford suggests, for instance, that where an
object’s function is essentially dependent on our responses - like the function
of a road sign to instruct or of a flag to add grandeur - ‘it would seem a mis-
take to ascribe a disposition to such an object’ (Mumford, 1998, p.203). Sim-
ilarly, Mumford warns against generalizing from the case of provocativeness
- the disposition a red cape has to anger a bull - as this ‘should be classed
among judgment- or response-dependent dispositions’; the ‘extra element of
response-dependence’ in such cases apparently makes it fundamentally dif-
ferent from cases like that of solubility (Mumford, 1998, p.205).
Mumford is, of course, using the term ‘response-dependence’ to mean a de-
pendence on the responses of sentient beings. But it is worth noting that
all dispositions, on Mumford’s account, are response-dependent in a perfectly
good sense: they are dependent on the ‘responses’ of objects to events and
to the instantiation of certain properties. If water molecules did not respond to
the presence of sugar in a certain way, sugar would not be soluble; if vases
did not respond to being dropped in a certain way, vases would not be fragile;
and yes, if bulls did not respond to the presence of a red cape in a certain way,
red capes would not be provocative. Mumford presumably thinks there’s some-
thing especially contingent about the responses of sentient things like human
beings and bulls, as opposed to things like vases and water molecules, but so
far as I can see he does not do anything to back up this intuition. And since
he endorses the Humean principle that the laws of nature are contingent - it is
always a contingent matter what follows what - I fail to see how he could do so.
Even if Mumford has an answer to this point, however, note that he apparently
excludes a huge range of dispositions from his account; an account which, as
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we have just noted, already seems unable to accommodate many everyday
uses of disposition ascriptions. The points he makes about provocativeness
and the functions of flags and road signs seem to apply equally to the dis-
positions things might have to look, taste, feel, smell or sound a certain way
to human or non-human subjects, to produce aesthetic, emotional, intellectual
or sexual responses in human or non-human subjects, and so on. In fact it
looks very much as if psychologists, social scientists, anthropologists, zool-
ogists, aestheticians, perfume designers, economists, animal trainers, chefs
and anyone else who is not concerned strictly and solely with the interaction of
unconscious lumps of matter is going to have to look elsewhere for an account
of the way the disposition ascriptions they use every day actually work.
Mumford’s treatment of ‘ungrounded’ dispositions is also of concern. Such
cases - which Mumford concedes may very well lie at the end of any chain of
explanation, once we get down to the level of subatomic particles with no struc-
tural properties - are indeed atypical; but they are also absolutely fundamental.
In saying that most dispositions have categorical bases and so our theory of
dispositions should be shaped accordingly, Mumford seems to me rather like
the man who insists that the earth is supported ‘all the way down’ by a tower
of turtles; the fact that such a ‘support from below’ theory has to accommo-
date only one, atypical, unsupported turtle at the bottom of the tower does not
make it any more appealing. If we recognize that there can be objects that are
unsupported from below, plainly we may as well skip the turtles entirely and
theorize that the earth is itself unsupported from below. Similarly, if we recog-
nize that we are perfectly able usefully and correctly to ascribe dispositions to
objects even if we do not take those dispositions to be causally grounded in
categorical properties of those objects, there is just no compulsion to identify
dispositions with their categorical bases in order to explain the evident value of
disposition ascription in causal explanation.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have left a number of threads hanging. Having granted to
Mumford, for the sake of argument, that there may be property instances which
are causally efficacious of events in the physical world, I have been obliged to
leave open the possibility that dispositions may be identical with things like
sets of property instances (subsection 3.3.5), or categorical properties of the
whole world (section 3.4), as well as the possibility that relational properties of
objects may be causally efficacious (section 3.4). I hope, however, that I have
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succeeded in closing off the possibility that dispositions are simply identical
with - or, I think, constituted by or realized in - intrinsic, categorical properties
of objects, ‘instantiated properties which inhere completely within the object of
ascription’ (Mumford, 1998, p.74); that view, I have argued, is one that we have
good reasons to reject even if we judge Mumford’s property instance ontology
to be acceptable.21
This is emphatically not to reject the view that dispositions are properties of
the objects to which they are ascribed; they are. It’s just that they are rela-
tional, and not intrinsic properties of those objects. To have such-and-such
a disposition, as I suggested in section 3.4, is just to stand in such-and-such
a relation to certain actual and possible objects and events. The relationship
between the dispositional and categorical properties of objects, I suggest, is
perhaps best understood in terms of what we might call transglobal superve-
nience rather than identity; once the Gods of all possible worlds have dished
out to all the objects in those worlds all their categorical properties, fixed the
laws of nature in those worlds, and promised not to interfere in the day-to-day
running of things, the question of what dispositions objects have has been set-
tled. In Chapter 4, I will consider some of the implications for the philosophy
of mind of taking this sort of relational view of the mental states we ascribe to
one another.
21My own inclination would be to refrain from attributing causal efficacy to properties and their
instances (whether dispositional or categorical), while asserting their causal relevance.
On this view, it certainly matters causally to certain dissolving-events both that this sug-
arcube instantiates the property m3, and that this sugarcube instantiates the property of
being water-soluble; but neither property instance should be credited with causing those
dissolving-events. The question is not, therefore, what roles are played by dispositional and
categorical property instances in generating events, but rather what roles are played by as-
criptions of dispositional and categorical properties in explaining and predicting events.
These themes are explored in more detail in Chapter 4.
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4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that dispositional properties are not, as is
often supposed, intrinsic properties of the objects to which they are ascribed.
Rather, they are relational properties of those objects: to have such-and-such
a disposition is to stand in such-and-such a relation to certain other actual or
possible objects and events. It is therefore a mistake to think that the categor-
ical features of the world which are the causal ground of a given dispositional
property must all be intrinsic features of the object of ascription. Rather, they
may be widely distributed. An object’s dispositional properties supervene not
‘locally’ on its own categorical properties, but ‘transglobally’ on the categorical
properties of objects in its own world as well as in other possible worlds.
In this chapter, I want to consider the implications all this has for the philos-
ophy of mind. If mental properties such as believing that P are dispositional
properties, and if these dispositional properties are relational properties, and
if these relational properties supervene partly on the categorical properties of
objects other than the object of ascription - in this case, the subject who is said
to have such-and-such beliefs, etc. - well, what then? In what sense, if any, are
things like beliefs and desires states of the subject to which they are ascribed?
Are explanations of subjects’ behaviour which cite their mental states causal
explanations? Are a subject’s beliefs and desires the causes of her behaviour?
In section 4.2, I will try to get clear on what the dispositionalist should say
about the relationship between subjects’ mental states and their brain states, in
light of my rejection in Chapter 3 of Mumford’s functionalist position identifying
dispositional properties with categorical properties of the object of ascription.
Then, in Section 4.3, I will draw on Lynne Rudder Baker’s ‘Practical Realism’
to show how I think the dispositionalist can reconcile a rejection of functionalist
arguments with a defence of the reality and causal relevance of mental states
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- without invoking any ‘ghosts in the machine’.
4.2 Occupants of causal roles again
In Chapter 2, I suggested that if one takes dispositional properties to be the
occupants of causal roles, phenomenal dispositionalism is essentially a vari-
ant of functionalism. Having considered Mumford’s ‘functionalist’ account of
dispositions in Chapter 2, it should now be easy to see why this is so.
Consider this influential functionalist argument for the identity of mental states
and brain states:
Mental state M = the occupant of causal role R (by definition of M).
Neural state N = the occupant of causal role R (by the physiological
theory).
[Therefore:] Mental state M = neural state N (by transitivity of =).
(Lewis, 2002, p.88)
As noted in Chapter 3, this argument is simply what one gets if one applies
Mumford’s general ‘argument from identity of causal role’ to the particular case
of dispositional mental states and categorical brain states. Someone who sub-
scribed to Mumford’s view of the relationship between dispositional and cat-
egorical properties in general would, I think, have no difficulty in subscribing
to Lewis’s view of the relationship between mental states and brain states in
particular. (I’m not sure much turns here on whether one runs the argument in
terms of properties, like Mumford, or in terms of states, like Lewis.)
In light of the discussion in Chapter 3, it should be clear that phenomenal
dispositionalism, as I understand it, is not a functionalist position. In putting
forward his particular argument from identity of causal role, Lewis makes, in
my view, precisely the mistake Mumford makes in his more general argument.
The problem, again, is that - as I put it in Chapter 3 - ‘the concept of occupancy
is, in general, such that if x and y can both be legitimately described as being
“the occupant of Z”, and if there aren’t two wholly distinct things which are the
occupant of Z, then it may nonetheless be that x is not identical with y’. So the
conclusion simply does not follow from the premises. It is perfectly consistent
with those premises that M is (for instance) part of N, or partly constitutive of
N; or conversely, that N is part of M, or partly constitutive of M.
If we are to treat dispositional mental states just as we treat dispositional states
in general - which seems a reasonable starting point, at least - I think what
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we should say is going on here is this: just as the water-solubility of sugar
is causally grounded in features of sugar, of water, and of the environment in
which sugar and water interact (or would interact in some circumstances), so
dispositional mental states are causally grounded in features of the subject to
which those states are ascribed, of objects including, but not limited to, the
objects those states are ‘about’, and of the environment in which the subject
interacts (or would interact in some circumstances) with those objects and
others.
Consider a paradigmatic dispositional mental state: Bob’s lifelong fear of spi-
ders. Just as we can prescientifically predict and explain sugar’s interactions
with water by appealing to its water-solubility, so we can prescientifically predict
and explain Bob’s interactions with spiders by appealing to his fear of spiders.
Functionalist arguments of the Lewis/Mumford sort invite us to think of Bob’s
fear of spiders as being identical with some state of Bob’s brain. But if - in
light of the discussion in Chapter 3 - we ask ourselves what is the categor-
ical basis of Bob’s fear of spiders, a different picture suggests itself. For of
course it is flatly false that certain categorical properties of Bob’s brain are the
only properties of anything that are causally relevant to the production of such
manifestation events as Bob’s running away when he sees a spider. Certain
categorical properties of the spider are relevant, for starters - the spindliness
of its legs, say. So too are some quite general properties of the environment -
e.g. the presence of light, which enables Bob to see the spider.
An objector might be inclined here to argue that it is only insofar as features of
Bob’s environment, including the spindliness of the legs of any spiders in that
environment, are represented in Bob’s brain, that those features play a causal
role in producing his behaviour. To this I would say two things. Firstly: the most
this argument could hope to establish is that the proximal or immediate causes
of Bob’s behaviour are his brain states rather than features of his environment;
and this by no means demonstrates that features of, or events occurring in,
his enviroment play no causal role in the production of his behaviour. If the
presence of a spider causes Bob to acquire a mental representation of a spider
in front of him, and if that mental representation plays some causal role in
producing spider-avoidance behaviour in Bob, then the presence of the spider
plays a causal role in producing spider-avoidance behaviour in Bob. And it is in
virtue of certain categorical properties of the spider, and certain features of the
environment, that the presence of the spider plays that role. (The evidence for
this is just that Bob responds differently to the presence of spiders in different
environments, e.g. pitch black rooms, and to the presence of objects with
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categorical properties different from those of spiders, e.g. kittens or cream
cakes.) And secondly: since Bob’s behaviour is embedded in his environment,
the manifestation events for Bob’s fear of spiders will be the events they are
in virtue of features of that enviroment and not simply in virtue of what’s going
on inside Bob. If Bob squashes the spider that scares him, it is in virtue of the
weakness of the spider’s body, as well as the force with which Bob strikes, that
that event occurs; whether or not the spider’s body is represented in Bob’s brain
as being weak is irrelevant. So it would not be right to say even that features
of Bob’s environment can only be relevant to the occurrence of fear-of-spiders
manifestation events if they are represented in Bob’s brain.
Of course, the causal role played by intrinsic properties of Bob’s brain in the
production of such manifestation events is distinct from the causal role played
by intrinsic properties of spiders. But for the reasons set out in Chapter 3, it
would be a mistake to think that we can pick out the occupants of these distinct
causal roles simply by ascribing distinct dispositions to Bob and to spiders. In
fact, just as for sugar to be water-soluble just is for water to be sugar-solvent,
so for Bob to be afraid of spiders just is for spiders to inspire fear in Bob (or: to
be capable of inspiring fear in Bob, or: to be disposed to inspire fear in Bob).
These two dispositions do not play distinct causal roles at all, and each of them
is causally grounded in the very same categorical properties of Bob, of spiders,
and of the world in general.
This has some interesting implications for philosophical questions concerning
intentionality. Consider, first of all, the question: how is it that a state of some-
one’s brain - a purely physical arrangement of stuff - can be about anything?
This is a question that confronts anyone who thinks that a mental state such
as Bob’s fear of spiders is a brain state. But to someone who thinks that Bob’s
fear of spiders is not an intrinsic brain state at all, but rather a relational, dis-
positional state that is (in part) causally grounded in categorical properties of
spiders, it ought to appear quite unmysterious that that state of Bob’s is about
spiders. It is about spiders just because it has to do with spiders in the right
way - spiders play a particular role in the production of relevant manifestation
events.
It might be felt that the anti-functionalist thrust of this discussion, and of the dis-
cussion in Chapter 3, seriously threatens the important principle that subjects’
behaviour can be causally explained by citing their mental states. In section
4.3, I will draw on Lynne Rudder Baker’s (1995) work in developing the position
she calls ‘Practical Realism’ in an attempt to demonstrate that this is not the
case.
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4.3 Baker’s Practical Realism
Lynne Rudder Baker’s (1995) critique of what she calls the ‘Standard View’ has
clear parallels with Ryle’s critique of the ‘Official Doctrine’ (2000) (see Chapter
2). Indeed, Baker goes so far as to say that the Standard View - roughly, the
view ‘that the attitudes, if there are any, are (or are constituted by, or are real-
ized in) particular brain states’ (1995, p.5) - ‘may be thought of as “Descartes
without dualism”’ (1995, p.6). Philosophers who subscribe to the Standard
View make - in Baker’s view, and in mine - the Cartesian error of construing
the mind as a causal system of internal states of subjects.1
Baker’s ‘Practical Realist’ alternative to the Standard View is also distinctly
Rylean:
If Practical Realism is correct, beliefs are not theoretical entities,
like electrons; they are not spatiotemporal entities or internal states
at all. Since the term ‘belief’ is just a nominalization of ‘believes
that’, S has a belief if and only if there is some proposition p such
that S believes that p. Whether S believes that p depends solely
on what S would do, say, and think in various circumstances. Al-
though S may not always manifest beliefs in behaviour, there must
be some circumstances in which S’s belief makes a difference to
what S would do, say, or think. . . The Practical Realist view of belief
is this: S believes that p if and only if there are certain counter-
factuals true of S, where the content of the counterfactuals may be
intentionally characterized.
(Baker, 1995, p.21)
Note that although she sticks to the language of counterfactuals in her (1995),
Baker is clear that ‘one may speak instead of dispositions, provided that dis-
positions are construed relationally and intentionally’ (1995, p.21n.41). In her
(2001a), Baker seems rather happier to express her claims in explicitly dispo-
sitional language - suggesting, for instance, that there is ‘a set of dispositions
that constitute [a subject’s] believing that there is beer in the fridge’ (2001a,
p.186, my italics). It seems clear enough to me, then, that Baker’s Practical
Realism is a dispositionalist position. However, Baker doesn’t see herself as
1I don’t propose to get into the scholarly question of whether Descartes did or did not in fact
endorse an Official Doctrine view of the mind as characterized by Ryle; if the ‘Cartesian’
views Ryle, Baker and I have in our sights are rooted in familiar caricatures or misrepre-
sentations of Descartes’ thought, then the label ‘Cartesian’ should simply be taken with a
pinch of salt.
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offering a Rylean account of belief and other attitudes. This is because she as-
serts something Ryle denies: that belief explanations are causal explanations.
‘Causal explanation’ is a slippery phrase, though, and Ryle has a quite spe-
cific sort of explanation in mind when he denies that belief explanations are
causal explanations. Taking ‘causal explanations’ to mean ‘explanations citing
causes’, and ‘causes’ to be happenings or events, what Ryle in fact denies
is just that belief explanations (and motive explanations, etc.) cite particu-
lar events that stand to other events in the relation of cause to effect (2000,
p.86 et passim). Baker seems to be aware of this - she points (1995, p.27) to
Ryle’s assertion that ‘Motives are not happenings and are not therefore of the
right type to be causes’ (2000, p.109) - yet also thinks Ryle would assent to
the proposition that ‘Unless beliefs were brain states, they could not causally
explain behaviour’ (Baker, 1995, p.17; pp.27-28). However, states are not hap-
penings any more than motives are happenings. Hence I think it’s clear that
Ryle would deny that brain state explanations are causal explanations, for just
the same reason he denies that motive explanations are causal explanations.
In the sense in which Ryle denies that belief explanations, motive explanations
and so on are ‘causal explanations’, I think Baker also denies that they are
causal explanations. After all, Baker agrees with Ryle that such explanations
do not explain by citing internal mental events like volitions or pangs of desire
that precede and are the causes of people’s actions; and Ryle would surely
agree with Baker that equally, such explanations do not explain by citing events
internal to the brain that precede and are the causes of people’s actions.
The real question, then, is whether Ryle is being too restrictive in his use of the
term ‘causal explanation’. Do some explanations citing things other than events
- things like dispositions and background conditions, perhaps - nonetheless
deserve to be called ‘causal’? Nested within this question is a further question:
do all explanations deserving to be called ‘causal’ cite things that deserve to
be called ‘causes’ (where a ‘cause’ is a bearer of causal efficacy)?
To the first of these questions, I am inclined - with Baker - to answer ‘yes’.
If I explain that the vase broke because the hammer hit it, I have cited two
events that stand in the relation of cause to effect; if I explain that the vase
broke because it was fragile, I have cited a disposition of the vase to break in
response to stimuli such as being struck with a hammer. These are certainly
different sorts of explanation, but they are nonetheless two sides of the same
coin, part and parcel of the same successful explanatory practice. The latter
explanation makes sense of the former; it is precisely because we know that
the vase was fragile that we can recognize the events of its being struck and of
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its breaking as standing in a relation of cause to effect.
If this seems less than obvious, suppose we witness the following events occur
simultaneously in Bob’s living room: the dog barks, the light flickers, and Bob
presses the power button on his TV remote. A moment later, a picture appears
on the TV screen. What enables us to identify Bob’s pressing of the power
button, rather than the barking of the dog or the flickering of the light, as having
caused the picture to appear on the TV screen? The answer, surely, is our
knowledge that the TV is disposed to display a picture when the power button
is pressed (but not when the dog barks or when the light flickers). Without
that knowledge of the TV’s dispositional properties, we just have one event
following a bundle of other events.
So to insist that explanations are causal only insofar as they cite particular
events standing in the relation of cause to effect is to insist that insofar as
they are causal, explanations are always incomplete - not just in the harmless
sense that they do not cite each and every link in a causal chain of events,
but in the pernicious sense that they remove any element of generality from
such explanations, any attempt to fit particular pairs of events into intelligible,
predictable patterns. I think it’s reasonable, therefore, to regard both types of
explanation as belonging to the same family - causal explanations. Both types
of explanation draw our attention to what is ‘causally relevant’ to the occurrence
of actual or possible events.
When it comes to the second question - do all explanations deserving to be
called ‘causal’ cite things that deserve to be called ‘causes’? - I am more hesi-
tant. So long as one is not one of Ryle’s ‘addicts of the superstition that all true
indicative sentences either describe existents or report occurrences’ (2000,
p.119), there can be no objection in principle to the everyday use of a locu-
tion such as ‘a desire for money is the cause of many betrayals’; that is a good
enough way to assert the causal relevance of certain people’s desire for money
to certain events of betrayal, putting us in a position to predict, explain, prevent,
or, if we like, promote such events.2 But addiction to that superstition remains
widespread, and so I think that to talk of beliefs and desires as ‘causes’ - as
bearers of ‘causal efficacy’ - invites the sort of mistaken thinking both Ryle and
Baker set out to undermine. It invites us to reify attitudes, to think of them as
2Baker argues, rightly I think, that ‘we know that we have an adequate causal explanation
when it affords control over phenomena of the type explained’ (1995, pp.121-122). For
instance: if we know that we can change people’s behaviour in a certain way by changing
their beliefs, we know we have an adequate causal explanation of that sort of behaviour in
terms of that sort of belief. Beliefs are ‘real’, in Baker’s view and in mine, just because ‘what
is causally explanatory is real’ (1995, p.217). (See section 4.4, however, for some concerns
about the detail of Baker’s account of causal explanation and ‘control over phenomena’.)
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entities occupying the same field of causes and effects as spatiotemporally lo-
cated, physical events such as a vase’s breaking or the taking of a £20 note
from someone’s wallet. Without wanting to refute Baker’s claims for the reality
of (unreified) attitudes, therefore, I will avoid such locutions myself and take
the line that mental states such as the belief that P are causally relevant to
(and so causally explanatory of) the occurrence of certain events, but are not
themselves the causes of any events.3
I would like explicitly to endorse Baker’s account of the sense in which things
like beliefs are states of a person. This is another locution that has, in my view,
invited much confusion by leading philosophers to think of beliefs in terms of
internal states of their bearers - particular arrangements of the stuff of which
their bearers are made.
According to Baker:
a belief is a global state of a whole person, not of any proper part of
the person, such as the brain. . . An attitude is a state in the attenu-
ated sense in which a state of financial health. . . is a state. . . there
are genuine facts about financial health even though ‘state of finan-
cial health’ does not refer to anything inside a person or to anything
inside an institution like a Savings and Loan (S & L). . . The state of
an S & L’s financial health cannot be identified with any particular in-
ternal state; financial health is a state of the S & L as a whole. . . So,
if a state of belief is like a state of financial health, then we should
not expect to identify it with any particular internal state of the be-
liever.
(Baker, 1995, p.154)
The typical rationale for identifying a belief with an internal state of a person
(say, brain state S) is, I take it, the same as the rationale for identifying a belief
with an intrinsic, categorical property of a person (say, being in brain state S). In
each case, it is the causal role occupied by the relevant state or property that is
thought to make it a token belief with some given content. So it is interesting to
3The distinction made here between causally efficacious states or properties on the one hand,
and causally relevant or explanatory states or properties on the other, has been made even
in a functionalist context - notably by Jackson and Pettit (1988, pp.395-396 et passim),
who regard dispositional explanations as functional state explanations and functional state
explanations as ‘programme explanations’ that work by citing a causally explanatory but
inefficacious state of some object (e.g. fragility) the presence of which ‘programmes for’ the
presence of some causally efficacious categorical state or other of that object occupying
the appropriate causal role. In light of the discussion in Chapter 3, it should be clear that
the use I am making of the distinction is very different from the use made of it by Jackson
and Pettit.
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consider cases like these in the light of my critique of Mumford’s ‘argument from
identity of causal role’ in Chapter 3: if we ask ourselves what is the ‘categorical
basis’ of an S & L’s good state of financial health, the answer is not going to be
‘such-and-such an internal arrangement of S & L stuff’; we are going to have to
cast our net much more widely and recognize that the financial health of the S
& L supervenes on a great many categorical properties of a great many things
(e.g. the structural properties of its mortgage holders’ homes).
It must be emphasized that none of this is to deny the reality, the causal efficacy
or the causal relevance of internal states of believers, including brain states. Of
course states of subjects’ brains make a difference to the way they act, think
and feel, and of course these states can be the subject of legitimate scientific
inquiry (just as the internal states of an S & L’s mortage holders’ homes can
be the subject of legitimate scrutiny by property surveyors, say). The point is
just that the ordinary language we use to ascribe mental states, or states of
financial health, does not work by picking out and naming particular internal
states of the object of ascription (or anything else) playing particular causal
roles.
4.4 Elugardo’s challenge to Baker on causal
explanation
Elugardo (2001, pp.114-115) offers a counterexample to Baker’s ‘Control The-
sis’ (which spells out a sufficient condition for the the occurrence of an event
F causally to explain the occurrence of an event G). I don’t think Baker’s at-
tempted refutation of this counterexample (2001a, p.189) works - rather, I think
it opens her conception of causal explanation up to serious objections - and so
I want to offer my own thoughts on where it leaves the Control Thesis, and how
the dispositionalist should respond to it.
Here is Baker’s Control Thesis:
An occurrence of F in context C causally explains an occurrence
of G if: (i) if an F had not occurred in C, then a G would not have
occurred in C; and (ii) given that F did occur in C, an occurrence of
G was inevitable.
(Baker, 1995, p.122)
Elugardo suggests the following as a counterexample:
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Suppose that my brother and I live in the same apartment. He is
blind but can hear; I am deaf but am sighted. To help us know
when someone is at the door, the apartment is electrically wired in
such a way that our doorbell will ring when and only when the light
bulb in our doorway, which is always on, glows dim and bright in
an alternating pattern. Because of the internal circuitry, the corre-
lation between the doorbell ring and the light bulb glowing holds as
a matter of law. Consequently, you cannot cause the light bulb to
alternate between dim light and bright light by pressing the doorbell
button without also bringing about a situation in which my brother’s
eardrums vibrate (when he is home, within earshot, etc.). For, as a
matter of law, doing the first is nomically correlated in this context
with causing the doorbell to ring, which in turn normally causes my
brother’s eardrums to vibrate. We may suppose that the doorbell
ringing is the only cause of the vibrations in this context. There-
fore, given the facts of the case, if the lightbulb had not dimmed
and then glowed brightly, my brother’s eardrums would not have vi-
brated. And, given that the lightbulb did glow in this pattern, the
vibration of my brother’s eardrums was inevitable.
(Elugardo, 2001, pp.114-115)
Elugardo argues (2001, p.115) that, contrary to the Control Thesis, the light-
bulb’s glowing dim and bright in an alternating pattern does not causally explain
the vibrating of his brother’s eardrums when the doorbell is pressed. This, he
says, is because ‘there is no causal path that traces the second kind of event
back to the first without bypassing the causal connection between the sound
of the doorbell ringing and my brother’s eardrums vibrating’ (2001, p.115).
Let us be clear on the imagined scenario here. No doubt there are various
ways in which one could rig up a system in which the pressing of a button
caused both a characteristic glowing of a light bulb and the ringing of a bell
(so that there was a nomic correlation between these two events). One could
set things up so that the pressing of the button closed an electrical circuit,
causing the glowing of a lightbulb, while a separate device detected that glow
and triggered the ringing of the doorbell. Or one could set things up so that
the pressing of the button closed an electrical circuit, causing the ringing of
the doorbell, while a separate device detected that ringing and triggered the
glowing of a lightbulb. Or one could set things up so that the pressing of the
button closed two circuits A and B simultaneously, with the closing of circuit
A causing the lightbulb to glow and the closing of circuit B causing the bell to
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ring.
In the first of these possible scenarios, plainly one can trace a causal path back
from the vibrating of eardrums to the glowing of a lightbulb without bypassing
the causal connection between doorbell ringing and eardrums vibrating (a path
that, traced forwards, looks like this: lightbulb glows > light detected > doorbell
rings > eardrums vibrate). So clearly Elugardo does not have a scenario like
this in mind.
In the second scenario, there’s a causal path that looks like this: doorbell rings
> sound detected > lightbulb glows. But if one wanted to add “> eardrums
vibrate” to the end of that path, thereby asserting a causal connection between
lightbulb glowing and eardrums vibrating, the (shorter) path back from the latter
event to the former would not include the ringing of the doorbell. The causal
connection between doorbell ringing and eardrum vibrating is therefore missing
from that shorter path, and in that sense ‘bypassed’.
In the third scenario, two distinct causal paths can be traced forwards from
the pressing of the button: button pressed > circuit A closed > lightbulb glows;
and button pressed > circuit B closed > doorbell rings. To trace a (supposed)
causal path back from the vibrating of eardrums to the glowing of the lightbulb,
one would have to add “> eardrums vibrate” to the end of the former path. And
that, again, would be to bypass the causal connection between doorbell ringing
and eardrums vibrating.
Having spelled that out, I want to consider Baker’s response:
The eardrums’ vibrating is caused by the doorbell’s ringing, which
is caused by ([nomically]4 connected to) the alternating dimming
and brightening of the light, which is caused by the pressing of the
doorbell.
Since we are taking the peculiarities of the wiring to be part of the
context (and thus fixed), any event along this path is a causal ex-
planation of the eardrums’ vibrating in this context. We have here a
predictive/explanatory pattern (i.e., a counterfactual-supporting pat-
tern). As Dennett has said, when one finds a certain kind of pre-
dictive pattern, ‘one has ipso facto discovered a causal power - a
difference in the world that makes a subsequent difference testable
by standard empirical methods of variable manipulation.’
4In the text as published, this word is rendered as ‘nominally’. It is clear from the context,
however, that ‘nomically’ is correct; and indeed, this is how the word is rendered in what I
take to be Baker’s final draft of the same chapter (2001b, p.9), made available by Baker on
her website.
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(Baker, 2001, p.189; Dennett, 1998, p.112.)
To my mind, there is a distinct tension in what Baker says here. On the one
hand, we have what looks like a bullet-biting assertion that the doorbell’s ring-
ing’s being nomically connected to the lightbulb’s dimming-and-brightening suf-
fices for its being caused by the lightbulb’s dimming-and-brightening. (After all,
Baker surely isn’t assuming that the context here is something like the first
scenario just discussed, with the dimming-and-brightening somehow trigger-
ing the doorbell’s ringing. And her Control Thesis can certainly be read, as it
is by Elugardo, as entailing just such an assertion.) Yet on the other hand, we
have an endorsement of ‘standard empirical methods of variable manipulation’
by which we test what is causing what to happen.
Here is how I think the tension creeps in. It’s true enough that in Elugardo’s
counterexample - let’s assume scenario 3 is what he has in mind - we have a
predictive and counterfactual-supporting pattern such that if the lightbulb glows
in a certain way, we can be sure that his brother’s eardrums will vibrate. And
the inference-ticket also covers the return journey; if the brother’s eardrums
vibrate (in the relevant way), we can be sure that the lightbulb has glowed in a
certain way. Still, this does not amount to an explanatory pattern. This ought
to be evident if one considers that there is a perfectly analogous predictive
and counterfactual-supporting pattern relating the ringing of the doorbell, rather
than the glowing of the lightbulb, to the vibrating of the brother’s eardrums: if
the doorbell rings, we can be sure that the brother’s eardrums will vibrate, and
if the brother’s eardrums vibrate (in the relevant way), we can be sure that the
doorbell has rung. For according to the assumptions underpinning ‘standard
empirical methods of variable manipulation,’ the claim that the vibrating of the
brother’s eardrums is causally explained by the glowing of the lightbulb is in
competition, in the imagined scenario, with the claim that the vibrating of the
brother’s eardrums is causally explained by the ringing of the doorbell. Both
claims are based on the recognition of a predictive, counterfactual-supporting
pattern of nomic connections between the glowing of the lightbulb, the ring-
ing of the doorbell and the vibrating of the brother’s eardrums. Yet one of
those claims might be right and the other wrong. By manipulating variables -
e.g. removing the lightbulb or muffling the doorbell - we can work out whether
the glowing of the lightbulb really does cause the vibrating of the brother’s
eardrums, or whether it is just nomically correlated, for some reason, with ring-
ings of the doorbell or vibratings of the brother’s eardrums.
So Elugardo’s criticism of Baker’s Control Thesis hits its target, I think: there is
a difference, not captured by that thesis, between nomic correlation and causal
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explanatoriness. The former does not suffice for the latter, although it does
license the making of predictions that such-and-such an event will happen or
inferences that such-and-such an event has happened.
It seems to me, however, that Practical Realism - and dispositionalism more
broadly - can survive this attack. In fact, I think the failure of the Control Thesis
reflects a failure to give dispositions their due by focusing too narrowly on the
particular context of a causal explanation. If the occurrence of F in context C
is causally to explain the occurrence of G in that context, it is not sufficient that
some nomic correlation between Fs and Gs exists in just that context (as it
does between glowings of the lightbulb and vibrating of the brother’s eardrums
in the scenario considered above); rather it must exist in some suitable range
of contexts of the sort we might create if we were manipulating variables in or-
der to settle on a correct causal explanation. That the brother’s eardrums are
disposed to vibrate when and only when the lightbulb glows in just that context
tells us nothing about the role of the lightbulb glowing in causal explanations of
his eardrums vibrating; only by learning what his eardrums are disposed to do
in other contexts can we find our way to the right explanation. Once we under-
stand that these particular eardrum-vibration events fit into a pattern of sim-
ilar eardrum-vibration events accompanying doorbell-ringing events, and not
a pattern of similar eardrum-vibration events accompanying lightbulb-glowing
events, then we have a causal explanation of the eardrum-vibrating events that
passes Baker’s own test of ‘afford[ing] control over phenomena of the type ex-
plained’ (1995, pp.121-122) in a meaningful way. We now know, for instance,
that we can bring about similar eardrum-vibrating events by sounding a similar
bell, but not by creating a similar lightshow.
According to the version of phenomenal dispositionalism I am advocating, the
causal explanation of a subject’s actions, thoughts and feelings in terms of her
dispositional mental states is similarly all about fitting her particular actions,
thoughts and feelings into patterns - about building up intelligible pictures of
how she typically responds to situations like this, and this, and this. To get
the pattern wrong - to be wrong about the relevant features of the subject’s
dispositional profile (see Chapter 7) - is to get the explanation wrong.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that dispositional mental properties, just like
other dispositional properties, can and should be conceived of as relational
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properties - and that conceiving of them as such does not threaten their causal
relevance to subjects’ actions (and thoughts and feelings). Things like beliefs
and desires do not conceptually occupy causal roles that are in fact occupied
by certain states of subjects’ brains; rather, to have the mental states one has
is just to be disposed to act, think and feel certain ways in certain circum-
stances. The causal grounds or categorical bases of these dispositions, far
from being wholly located within the subject to which they are ascribed, are
widely distributed. Nonetheless, dispositional mental states are real states of
subjects that can serve causally to explain why those subjects act, think and
feel as they do.
This chapter marks the end of what has been a groundwork-laying phase of
this thesis. In the next chapter, I will turn to a detailed consideration of the
phenomenal dispositionalist position itself - as formulated, in the first instance,
by Eric Schwitzgebel (2002).
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Dispositionalism
5.1 Introduction
I suggested in Chapter 2 that the dispositionalism of Ryle (2000) is consider-
ably more liberal than has generally been recognized; far from trying to reduce
ascriptions of mental states to ascriptions of dispositions to exhibit certain ob-
servable behaviour in certain circumstances, Ryle in fact acknowledges that
being in such-and-such a mental state might involve being disposed not just
to act a certain way, but also ‘to make certain theoretical. . . and imaginative
moves [and] to have certain feelings’ (Ryle, 2000, p.129).
Schwitzgebel (2002) offers an account of belief in this liberal tradition. On
his phenomenal dispositionalist view, believing that P is a matter of having
not just certain behavioural dispositions, but also certain cognitive dispositions
and certain phenomenal dispositions - dispositions, respectively, to reason in
certain ways and to have certain sorts of conscious experiences.
In sections 5.2 and 5.3, I want to set out Schwitzgebel’s position in some detail
and with a minimum of criticism and commentary (though I will clarify or ex-
pand on certain points as I feel appropriate - notably in section 5.3, in which I
will consider Schwitzgebel’s response to an apparent tension between dispo-
sitionalism and externalism about mental content. I think this response invites
several objections that are worth seeing off in order to defend phenomenal dis-
positionalism against the charge that it cannot be reconciled with externalism
and so must be false). There is, in my view, much of value in Schwitzgebel’s
account, and it is well worth following his line of thinking in an unbroken way.
Once we have a clear picture of how that account is supposed to hang together,
however, I will go on to argue (in Chapter 6) that one of the pillars of that ac-
count - the ‘dispositional stereotype’ - will not bear the weight Schwitzgebel
places upon it.
I should note that Schwitzgebel has recently (2013) generalized his phenome-
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nal dispositionalist account of belief to cover attitudes in general - and not only
propositional attitudes such as believing and desiring, but also a whole range
of other attitudes such as resenting, appreciating, loving and valuing.1However,
I think it will be beneficial in this chapter to take a relatively narrow but deep
view of his position by looking at his account of belief in particular, rather than
a relatively broad but shallow view by looking at his account of attitudes in gen-
eral. We will not, I think, misunderstand Schwitzgebel’s current position if we
treat his (2002) as a case study of belief qua paradigmatic attitude, rather than
as an account of belief qua belief.
5.2 Schwitzgebel’s account of belief
In his (2002), Schwitzgebel offers a phenomenal dispositionalist account of
belief as a pragmatic alternative to prevailing representationalist accounts -
accounts, that is, according to which ‘to believe something is to have a rep-
resentation of some sort in one’s mind’ (Schwitzgebel, 2002, p.249). I say
‘pragmatic alternative’ because Schwitzgebel does not set out to tell us what
beliefs ultimately are, metaphysically speaking; rather, he sets out to tell us
something about the way belief ascription works (or ought to work) in practical
terms when we ask ourselves whether some particular subject does or does
not have some particular belief. Nor does Schwitzgebel put forward his ac-
count as being preferable to representationalist accounts simply by virtue of
being right where they are wrong; rather, he suggests only that a phenomenal
dispositionalist approach might be more useful to adopt in certain contexts:
Representational approaches to belief have played an important
role in cognitive science, and this account is not meant to displace
them, but to supplement or complement them. In some contexts,
I believe, the present account will prove more useful; in others, a
representational approach will work as well or better.
(Schwitzgebel, 2002, p.270.)
So Schwitzgebel makes fairly modest claims for phenomenal dispositionalism;
it’s supposed to be a way of thinking about belief ascription that might some-
times be useful, and that’s all. The claims I am making in this thesis are less
modest. I am claiming that the identification of states like belief with internal
1Schwitzgebel also assumes that character traits can similarly be analyzed in dispositional
terms. So his account is intended, I think, to cover the same ground as mine, although I
have chosen to lump attitudes and character traits together under the heading of ‘(disposi-
tional) mental states’.
88
5.2 Schwitzgebel’s account of belief
states of the subject of ascription - whether those states are characterized as
representations having a certain content, in terms of their causal role, or in any
other way - is a simple mistake. It must be emphasized that this is not to claim
that there are no internal states of subjects that might be usefully and correctly
characterized by cognitive scientists in terms of their causal role or represen-
tational content; that is for those scientists themselves to decide. It is to claim
only that our ordinary, folk psychological language of mental states does not
work by picking out these very states, providing us with a ready-made taxon-
omy that we can be assured will bear up under scientific scrutiny. Rather, that
language works by helping us to identify and describe predictable, intelligible
patterns of behaviour, of reasoning and of conscious experiences.
Schwitzgebel’s central claim is expressed in the following passage:
To believe that P. . . is nothing more than to match to an appropriate
degree and in appropriate respects the dispositional stereotype for
believing that P. What respects and degrees of match are to count
as “appropriate” will vary contextually and so must be left to the
ascriber’s judgment.
(Schwitzgebel, 2002, p.253.)
Something needs to be said, then, about just what a dispositional stereotype is
supposed to be and just how it is that the appropriateness of belief ascription
is supposed to vary contextually.
Schwitzgebel defines a stereotype as ‘a cluster of properties we are apt to
associate with a thing, a class of things, or a property’ (2002, p.250). By way
of example - adapted from Putnam (1975, cited in Schwitzgebel, 2002, p.250) -
he suggests that stereotypical properties of tigers include such things as being
striped and being four-legged. A tiger that is not striped or four-legged deviates
in those respects from the stereotype for being a tiger.
A dispositional stereotype for having the belief that P, then, is a cluster of dis-
positional properties we are apt to associate with the possession of that belief.
(The ‘are apt to’ here is important, as we shall see in Chapter 6.) Crucially,
dispositional stereotypes for beliefs do not include only behavioural disposi-
tions. They also include cognitive dispositions, characterized as ‘dispositions to
draw conclusions entailed by the belief in question or to acquire new desires or
habits consonant with the belief’, and phenomenal dispositions, characterized
as ‘dispositions to have certain sorts of conscious experience’ (Schwitzgebel,
2002, p.252). Taking the belief that there is beer in the fridge as an exam-
ple, Schwitzgebel suggests that the following dispositional properties should
be seen as belonging to the stereotype for the possession of that belief:
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the disposition to say, in appropriate circumstances, sentences like
‘There’s beer in my fridge;’ the disposition to look in the fridge if one
wants a beer; a readiness to offer beer to a thirsty guest; the dis-
position to utter silently to oneself, in appropriate contexts, ‘There’s
beer in my fridge’; an aptness to feel surprise should one go to the
fridge and find no beer; the disposition to draw conclusions entailed
by the proposition that there is beer in the fridge (e.g., that there is
something in the fridge, that there is beer in the house); and so
forth.
(Schwitzgebel, 2002, p.251)
Note that we do not need consciously to have made an association between
the possession of the belief that P and the possession of some dispositional
property in order for that property to belong to the dispositional stereotype for
believing that P. It may never have occurred to us to associate believing that
P with acting, thinking or feeling thus-and-so in such-and-such circumstances.
It may never have occurred to us, after all, that someone who believes that
P might find themselves in those circumstances; indeed, it may never have
occurred to us that someone might believe that P in the first place. This is why
the properties within a dispositional stereotype must be properties we are apt
to associate with the possession of a particular belief, and not simply properties
we do associate with it - properties included on a determinate mental ‘checklist’
we carry around in our heads.
Some of the properties belonging to a dispositional stereotype are, according
to Schwitzgebel, more ‘central’ to it than others, in the sense that there would
be wide agreement that the possession of those dispositional properties is part
and parcel of believing that P. Others will be more marginal. For instance, it
might seem obvious to almost everyone that someone who believes that there
is beer in the fridge is thereby disposed to look in the fridge if he wants a
beer; but it might seem less than obvious to some people that someone who
believes there is beer in the fridge is thereby disposed to offer beer to a thirsty
guest. (Perhaps they think people are generally selfish, or think it’s usual to
offer tea or coffee to a thirsty guest rather than beer.) In assessing whether or
not someone has the belief that there is beer in the fridge, therefore, his having
or lacking the former, more central dispositional property carries more weight
than his having or lacking the second; we would be fairly quick to conclude that
someone who fails to look in the fridge for a desired beer did not believe that
there was beer in the fridge, but would hesitate to conclude that someone who
offered a thirsty guest tea rather than beer lacked that belief.
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Schwitzgebel acknowledges that ‘the dispositions in belief stereotypes hold
only ceteris paribus’ (2002, p.253). A subject will in fact only be disposed to of-
fer beer to a thirsty guest if various conditions hold: if he realizes that his guest
is thirsty, if he is not a generally miserly individual, if his route to the fridge is not
blocked, and so on. If those conditions don’t hold, then his failure to offer beer
to a thirsty guest cannot be seen as counting against his possessing the belief
that there is beer in the fridge; rather, the non-manifestation of that disposition
must be seen as being appropriately excused. The non-manifestation of that
particular disposition on that particular occasion does not, after all, give us any
reason to think that the subject deviates from the dispositional stereotype for
believing that P in any systematic, general way.
Schwitzgebel resists the idea that we must be able to spell out just what are
the ‘excusing conditions’ for the non-manifestation of a given disposition - the
conditions in which ‘the ceteris paribus clause is sprung’ (2002, p.256) - sug-
gesting that this is something best grasped intuitively. It is, after all, impossible
in general fully to specify the conditions in which an ordinary or scientific gen-
eralization will hold, yet such generalizations can still reasonably and usefully
be made. (To take an example from Schwitzgebel: ‘Rivers erode their outside
bank at a bend if the river is not frozen, if the bank is made of an erodible
material, if there isn’t a powerful fan in place preventing the river from touch-
ing the outside bank, etc.’ (2002, p.254, Schwitzgebel’s italics).) The central
point here is familiar enough, and was touched on in Chapter 2: nobody has a
particular, specifiable set of dispositions simply by virtue of having a particular,
specifiable belief. What dispositions they have will depend on the complex re-
lations between that belief and their other beliefs and desires, as well as their
intellectual capacity, habits of thought, character traits and so on. As we have
seen, this is one of the reasons for the failure of the behaviourist attempt to
reduce all talk about the mind to talk about outwardly observable behaviour.
Schwitzgebel (2002, p.258) emphasizes the point that phenomenal disposi-
tionalism serves no such reductive agenda, and that in saying what it is for a
subject to believe that P, appeal to other features of his mental life are therefore
perfectly permissible.
The foregoing has hopefully served to clarify just what a dispositional stereo-
type is supposed to be. Now I want to say something about the grounds on
which we might judge the ascription of a particular belief to a particular subject
to be either appropriate or inappropriate.
Schwitzgebel emphasizes the fact that the grounds on which we make judge-
ments about the appropriateness of belief ascription vary contextually - from
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one set of circumstances to another. But before I go on to talk about how
that is, I would like to make explicit a point which is made only implicitly in
Schwitzgebel’s paper (and in the foregoing discussion). The point is that the
grounds on which we make judgements about the appropriateness of belief
ascription also vary from one subject to another. We have already considered
a case in which it seems equally appropriate to ascribe the very same belief
to two subjects whose dispositional profiles differ greatly, and in ways that are
clearly relevant to their possession of that belief.2 (A subject’s ‘dispositional
profile’ is just the set of all her behavioural, phenomenal and cognitive dispo-
sitions. I shall argue in Chapter 6 that phenomenal dispositionalism is best
formulated in terms of dispositional profiles themselves, rather than in terms
of dispositional stereotypes against which subjects’ dispositional profiles are
judged; but let us not get ahead of ourselves.) And this case is by no means
exceptional; clearly, subjects differ from one another with respect to what we
might call their ‘fine-grained’ mental properties - their beliefs, desires and so
on, as characterized in terms of their particular content - as a matter of course.
When one considers in addition the sort of ‘coarse-grained’ differences there
are between subjects belonging to different broad types - between a credulous
child and a sceptical adult, a hot-tempered criminal and a cool-headed lawyer,
a self-assured businessperson and a self-absorbed poet - it’s abundantly clear
that the dispositions we’d expect to go along with any given belief will vary
enormously from subject to subject.
Moving on to the question of context: why might it be correct to ascribe the
belief that P to a subject, S, in one context but not in another? If we’re seri-
ous about analyzing belief in dispositional terms, after all - and hence about
thinking of beliefs as things that stick around, waiting to manifest themselves,
while their possessors go from one situation to another - surely we don’t want
to suggest that some long-held belief of a subject might be routinely popping
in and out of his head as he goes about his business?
Well, no, we don’t want to say that. Schwitzgebel’s suggestion is not that S
might believe that P in one context and yet fail to believe that P in another.
Rather, the picture looks like this: S has some particular dispositional pro-
file, and this doesn’t change from one context to the next.3But the people with
2Relevant, that is, in terms of the degree to which, and the respects in which, they conform
or fail to conform to the dispositional stereotype for that belief.
3This is a simplification, of course. No doubt subjects’ dispositional profiles are changing all
the time; someone might suddenly acquire a new disposition upon learning a new fact, or
gradually lose a disposition as she cultivates different habits. But for present purposes,
we may suppose that S’s dispositional profile stays the same in all respects relevant to the
ascription of the belief that P for some prolonged period of time.
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whom S interacts - and who will hence sometimes be concerned to understand
something about the way S can be expected to act, think and feel in this or that
situation - just aren’t in a position to know everything pertinent that there is to
know about that dispositional profile. Indeed, even if they were in that position,
it would hardly be practical to tip one another off about all the pertinent features
of that profile one by one. (‘Should you give the job to Bill? Well, you should
bear in mind that in circumstances C1, he’s disposed to A; in circumstances
C2, he’s disposed to B. . . ’) But as natural-born experts in interpreting one an-
other’s behaviour, with an instinctive grasp of the way certain dispositions go
together, they have no trouble at all in identifying - in a rough-and-ready, provi-
sional way - the sort of patterns into which S’s behaviour seems to fit. That is
to say, they have no trouble at all in identifying the dispositional stereotypes to
which S more or less closely conforms.
It’s clear from Schwitzgebel’s account that a typical subject S will fail perfectly
to conform to very many dispositional stereotypes. He might act, think and feel
just as we would expect someone who believed that P to act, think and feel in
circumstances C1 and C2, say, but deviate from expectations in circumstances
C3. His dispositional profile hasn’t changed, though; he has the very same dis-
positions on each occasion. It’s just that the dispositions which are manifested
in circumstances C3 are surprising in a way that those manifested in C1 and C2
are not.
It will be helpful, I think, to put some flesh on these bones in the form of an
example. Suppose Bill is a civil servant advising the government on transport
policy, and has all the relevant facts at his fingertips regarding the relative
dangers of different forms of transport. On the basis of these facts, he affirms
in written reports that plane travel is safer than train travel. Outside of work,
too, if someone asks him what’s the safest way to travel from London to Paris
- train or plane - he’ll reply, quite sincerely: ‘plane’. And if he knows a family
member is travelling by plane, he feels less anxious about their safety than he
does if they’re travelling by train. Still, when he’s travelling by plane himself,
he feels more anxious than he does when he travels by train; he finds himself
imagining the plane crashing, and tries to distract himself by doing crossword
puzzles and watching films. Sometimes he even avoids plane travel because
it just doesn’t feel safe, and takes the train instead.
Here, then, we have someone who in very many circumstances acts, thinks
and feels just as we’d expect someone who believes that plane travel is safer
than train travel to act, think and feel. Indeed, being an expert on these matters,
he’s more confident in this belief - in one sense - than many of the people with
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whom he shares it. Yet in certain other circumstances, he doesn’t act, think
and feel as we’d expect someone with that belief to act, think and feel at all.
In those circumstances, indeed, he might strike us as someone who conforms
quite nicely to the dispositional stereotype for believing that train travel is safer
than plane travel.
Now, we could just say that Bill’s beliefs change from moment to moment; the
belief that plane travel is safer than train travel simply pops out of his head
sometimes, is temporarily replaced by a contrary belief, and then pops back in
again. The trouble with this, though - as Schwitzgebel points out (2002, p.261)
- is that we typically think of beliefs as persisting between their manifestations.
We think that Bill believes something about the relative safety of travel by train
and by plane even while he’s asleep, or while his mind’s on other things. Be-
liefs are usually seen, after all, if not explicitly as dispositions then at least
as persistent mental states of some sort. And it’s not as if Bill’s dispositions
are actually changing in relevant ways from one situation to the next; it’s still
true of Bill even while he’s writing a report affirming the relative safety of plane
travel that he has the disposition to become anxious when travelling by plane,
to travel instead by train when possible, and so on. And it’s still true of Bill,
even while he’s sitting on a plane fretting about the availability of parachutes,
that he has the disposition to recommend to his daughter, when he talks to her
later that month, that she take the plane back from Paris.
There are number of ways in which a well-informed interpreter of Bill might try
to sum up what’s going on in his case. She might say, for instance:
• He knows deep down that plane travel’s safer than train travel, but he
doesn’t quite believe it.
• He believes that plane travel’s safer than train travel, although sometimes
he doesn’t quite feel convinced of it.
• On a rational level, he believes that plane travel’s safer than train travel,
but on a gut level, he doesn’t.
• When he thinks about it, he believes that plane travel’s safer than train
travel, but instinctively, he just ‘knows’ it isn’t.
• He believes that plane travel’s safer than train travel, but he only partly
believes it.
• He’s torn between believing that plane travel’s safer than train travel, and
believing the exact opposite.
. . . as well as:
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• Sometimes he believes that plane travel’s safer than train travel, and
sometimes he doesn’t.
Some of these might strike us as coming nearer the mark than others, and
each of them could clearly be made more illuminating by being supplemented
with some additional information about Bill’s dispositional profile - about his
disposition to feel anxious when flying, for instance. But what they all show,
I think, is that it’s simply not appropriate, when discussing Bill’s case from a
general perspective, either to ascribe to him or to refuse to ascribe to him -
without qualification - the belief that plane travel is safer than train travel. His
dispositional profile is such that he is ‘in between’ having that belief, and lacking
it (Schwitzgebel, 2002, p.261 et passim; 2001).
So much for the general perspective. What about other perspectives? If Bill’s
boss wants to know his opinions on the relative safety of plane and train travel,
should we hesitate to tell him quite straightforwardly that Bill believes the for-
mer is safer than the latter? No. Why would we? We can tell him everything
he wants to know about Bill’s dispositional profile - about the sort of advice
he’s disposed to include in written reports, etc. - just by making that simple,
unqualified belief ascription. It’s just not to the point to allude to certain dispo-
sitions of Bill’s that are at odds with that belief. If, on the other hand, a friend of
Bill’s wants to know his views on the matter in order to begin planning a holiday
together, we may very well want to refrain from making that belief ascription, at
least in an unqualified form; in that context, after all, the respects in which Bill
deviates from the dispositional stereotype for the belief in question are clearly
relevant.
It’s worth noting that there’s nothing especially puzzling about the fact that Bill
deviates from the dispositional stereotype for believing that plane travel is safer
than train travel in the ways he does. We understand very well that people don’t
always act, think and feel as it appears they ought to act, think and feel if they
believe what they say they believe (or what their behaviour in general suggests
they believe). Indeed, Schwitzgebel identifies several familiar patterns of devi-
ation from dispositional stereotypes, which I will briefly run through here:
• Modularized believing - as when a subject has procedural rather than
declarative knowledge in a certain domain, so that she might fail to as-
sent to the proposition that P even though some of her behaviour clearly
conforms to the dispositional stereotype for believing that P. For instance,
a person may speak in a way that suggests she grasps some rule of
grammar, yet fail to assent to the proposition that such a rule obtains.
• Unconscious beliefs - as when aspects of a subject’s behaviour (perhaps
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even, in special circumstances such as hypnosis, verbal behaviour) are
consonant with the belief that P, but the subject refuses in normal circum-
stances to acknowledge even to herself that she believes that P.
• Low confidence - when a subject is uncertain whether P, she can be
expected to deviate from the dispositional stereotype for believing that P
in certain ways; e.g. she may hesitate to act on the basis that P where
the stakes are high, or feel little surprise when it turns out that not-P.
• Self-deception - cases of self-deception, Schwitzgebel suggests, may be
a subset of cases of unconscious believing, with a subject refusing to as-
sent to a proposition which certain of her dispositions suggest she takes
to be true. It’s not clear to me, though, that this is the only way in which
someone might be self-deceived. It seems plausible, for instance, that a
subject might convince herself that certain of her earlier actions were not
based on the belief that P, when in fact they were based quite consciously
on that belief at the time.
• Unreflective inconsistency - sometimes a subject just ‘fails to put two
and two together’ (Schwitzgebel, 2002, p.264). Someone might some-
times say he believes, and in some respects act as if he believes, that
birds are the only animals that lay eggs (say), and yet acknowledge when
prompted that reptiles lay eggs too.
• Peripheral ignorance: if a subject just doesn’t know certain facts related
to the belief that P, she will deviate from the dispositional stereotype for
that belief in predictable ways. For instance, someone who believes that
Joe plays the clarinet but doesn’t know the clarinet is a reed instrument
will not have the disposition to assent to the proposition that Joe plays a
reed instrument.
• Developing beliefs: while a subject is in the process of acquiring knowl-
edge in some particular domain and fitting together the knowledge she
has, she may deviate from the dispositional stereotypes for beliefs con-
cerning that domain for the sort of reasons just discussed (in relation to
unreflective inconsistency and peripheral ignorance).
• Partial forgetting: a subject may be part-way towards forgetting a once-
familiar fact - the PIN on a debit card she no longer uses very much, say
- such that she fails to conform neatly to the dispositional stereotype for
believing that the PIN in question is 7701. Maybe she can no longer recall
the number when she looks at the card, for instance, but is still disposed
to enter it correctly when she puts the card into a cash machine.
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Those who are inclined to reify propositional attitudes as causally efficacious
‘token states’ of subjects are seemingly obliged to insist that in all such ‘in-
between’ cases, a subject either determinately has or determinately lacks the
belief in question, and to go on from there to explain why that subject has
certain surprising dispositions - presumably in terms of a causal story invoking
other of their token mental states.4 Schwitzgebel’s response to such cases is
quite different:
Talk about belief is useful because people with some of the disposi-
tions in a stereotype will tend to have many of the other dispositions
in that stereotype. Such regularities allow us to make generaliza-
tions and inductions on the basis of these stereotypes, and it is
enormously convenient, even indispensable, to appeal to beliefs in
describing our mental lives. Still, when there is a breakdown in
the match between stereotype and the actual dispositional set of a
subject, as will often happen in cases of the sort described above,
simple belief talk may no longer be appropriate, and appeals to
the stereotype may have to be replaced with more complicated ap-
peals to specific dispositions or sets of dispositions or to recogniz-
able patterns of deviation. On the [phenomenal dispositionalist] ac-
count. . . once the dispositional profile of the subject is made clear,
it is a mistake to think that there is still some further question to be
answered, namely, what does the subject really believe?
(Schwitzgebel, 2002, p.266, Schwitzgebel’s italics)
5.3 Phenomenal dispositionalism and externalism
There is a good sense in which phenomenal dispositionalism is an externalist
position. On the view I am proposing, it is certainly not true that the contents of
a subject’s mental states are determined merely by the way things are ‘in her
head’; it matters too how things are in her environment.
However, Schwitzgebel (2002) notes an apparent tension between externalist
and dispositionalist accounts of mental content. He expresses this tension by
considering Wayne, an occupant of Earth, and Dwayne, his counterpart on
Twin Earth - a planet that is identical to Earth save for the fact that in place
4These states might or might not be states our everyday language has a name for; in Chapter
9, I will consider Tamar Gendler’s (2008a) argument for the recognition of a mental state
type she calls ‘alief’, which she believes can explain a large range of behaviour that is not
explicable in terms of familiar states such as belief and imagining.
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of water (H2O), it has twin water (XYZ) (Putnam, 1975, cited in Schwitzgebel,
2002, pp.266-267). Being molecule-for-molecule identical (if we ignore the
difference between the water in Wayne’s body and the twin water in Dwayne’s),
isn’t it the case - assuming physicalism - that Wayne and Dwayne must have
the very same dispositions? If so, a dispositional account of belief is surely
bound to ascribe to Wayne and Dwayne beliefs with the very same contents,
even when this runs contrary to externalist intuitions that their beliefs have
different contents.
To put a little flesh on these bones: according to the dispositionalist, for Wayne
to believe that water is potable is just for him to be disposed, in certain circum-
stances, to assent to the statement ‘water is potable’, to pour himself a glass of
water, and in general to act, think and feel much as we would expect someone
who had that belief to act, think and feel. But since Dwayne is physically identi-
cal to Wayne, he must also be disposed to do those same things in those same
circumstances: if he were standing in Wayne’s shoes, on Earth, he would act,
think and feel just as Wayne would. So the dispositionalist is seemingly obliged
to say that Dwayne, right now, sitting on his sofa on Twin Earth, believes that
water is potable. And this runs contrary to the externalist intuition that Dwayne
can’t possibly have any beliefs about water, since he has never encountered it.
In response to such concerns, Schwitzgebel insists that there are, in fact, cer-
tain dispositional properties Wayne and Dwayne do not have in common. This
is because ‘dispositional properties may themselves be defined in part “ex-
ternally,” i.e., with reference to the organism’s past or its environment’ (2002,
p.267). Schwitzgebel gives as examples Wayne’s disposition to regard a present
instance of water as an instance of the same sort of stuff Wayne drank as a
child, and Dwayne’s disposition to use the word ‘water’ with the intention of
referring to the same stuff people in his Twin-Earth linguistic community refer
to by using that word. He further notes that if one accepts semantic external-
ism (that is, externalism about the meaning of utterances as opposed to the
content of mental states), there are other externally-individuated dispositions
Wayne and Dwayne do not share: dispositions to utter sentences with certain
meanings. Wayne isn’t disposed to utter any sentences about twin water, and
Dwayne isn’t disposed to utter any sentences about water.
An objection that suggests itself here is that the role of indexicality in these
examples is problematic. Dwayne does not, indeed, share Wayne’s disposition
to regard a present instance of water as an instance of the same sort of stuff
Wayne drank as a child; but he does have the disposition to regard a present
instance of water as an instance of the same sort of stuff he, Dwayne, drank
98
5.3 Phenomenal dispositionalism and externalism
as a child, for if presented with a glass of H2O, he would mistake it for a glass
of XYZ. And surely (our imagined objector might insist) that means he has
the ‘same’ disposition as Wayne in the relevant sense; each of them has the
disposition to regard a present instance of water as an instance of the same
sort of stuff he drank as a child.
Our objector might press the point as follows. Suppose Wayne and Dwayne
are each disposed to tie their shoelaces before leaving the house. Following
Schwitzgebel’s example, we could identify two distinct dispositional properties
of Wayne and Dwayne here: Wayne has the disposition to tie the shoelaces in
Wayne’s shoes (or: the same shoelaces Wayne tied last week), and Dwayne
has the disposition to tie the shoelaces in Dwayne’s shoes (or: the same
shoelaces Dwayne tied last week). But surely it would be mere sophistry
to suggest that this could have any bearing on such questions as whether
Dwayne shares Wayne’s belief that tying his shoelaces before leaving the
house means he is less likely to trip on his front steps. When we ask such
questions, it’s simply beside the point that Wayne’s shoes are Wayne’s shoes
and Dwayne’s front steps are Dwayne’s front steps. In the sense that interests
us, Dwayne does share Wayne’s belief.
Schwitzgebel’s second example, our objector might suggest, involves a similar
piece of sophistry or sleight-of-hand. Once again, we could indeed identify two
distinct dispositional properties of Wayne and Dwayne here: Dwayne has the
disposition to use the word ‘water’ with the intention of referring to the same
stuff people in his linguistic community refer to by using that word, while Wayne
has the disposition to use the word ‘water’ with the intention of referring to the
same stuff people in his linguistic community refer to by using that word. But for
the purposes of belief ascription, surely these ought not to be regarded as dif-
ferent dispositions any more than Wayne’s disposition to tie Wayne’s shoelaces
and Dwayne’s disposition to tie Dwayne’s shoelaces ought to be regarded as
different dispositions.
Finally, our objector might have this to say in response to Schwitzgebel’s point
about semantic externalism: suppose that on Earth, ‘water is potable’ means
that water is potable, while on Twin Earth, ‘water is potable’ means that twin
water is potable. And suppose that Wayne and Dwayne are each disposed, in
certain circumstances, to say ‘water is potable’. Is it true to say that Wayne is
not disposed to utter a sentence that means that twin water is potable, and that
Dwayne is not disposed to utter a sentence that means that water is potable?
No, it is not. Each of them is in fact disposed to utter a sentence that means,
on Earth, that water is potable and, on Twin Earth, that twin water is potable.
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Perhaps there is a Wacky Earth where ‘water is potable’ means that water
is poisonous, in which case Wayne and Dwayne are also disposed to utter a
sentence that means (somewhere in the universe) that water is poisonous. It’s
only if one smuggles in an indexical element - supposing that ‘utter a sentence
with a certain meaning’ means ‘utter a sentence with a certain meaning in
one’s own linguistic community ’ - that one is entitled to describe Wayne and
Dwayne as being disposed to utter sentences with different meanings.
I raise these objections because I think Schwitzgebel’s argument on this point
has an air of ‘cheating’ about it. It feels intuitively wrong in some way, and my
imagined objector has had the task of putting his finger on why it feels wrong.
The intuition driving his objections, I think, is this: if we’re trying to specify
what dispositions someone has - how she is disposed to act, think and feel in
a range of circumstances - we ought to respect her point of view in a certain
way. If the environmental stimuli to which Wayne and Dwayne are exposed,
and their behavioural, cognitive and phenomenal responses to those stimuli,
are subjectively indistinguishable, then we ought to say they have the same
dispositions. We should not specify their dispositions in terms of the God’s-
eye-view of a thought-experimenter who knows the environmental causes of
their subjective experiences to be different in some way. Hence if there are
mental states the content of which must be specified in external, God’s-eye-
view terms, a dispositionalist account of these states is bound to fail.
What I think we must bear in mind here is that - as we saw in section 5.2 -
phenomenal dispositionalism is supposed to be pragmatic in a certain way. In
Schwitzgebel’s view (and in mine), it is senseless to look for a binary yes-or-no
answer to the question of whether a subject has a belief that P. What a subject
has is a dispositional profile, and it may be that in certain contexts, ascribing
the belief that P to that subject is a useful way to build up a picture of that
dispositional profile.
Consider again the suggestion that Dwayne, right now, sitting on his sofa on
Twin Earth, believes that water is potable. Ought we to ascribe this belief
to Dwayne? One way to approach this question is to ask how his disposi-
tional profile differs from that of Wayne (who certainly does believe that water
is potable). If we allow ourselves to define dispositional properties partly in ‘ex-
ternal’ terms, it will certainly differ in some respects: for instance, as we have
just seen, Dwayne does not have the disposition to regard a present instance
of water as an instance of the same sort of stuff Wayne drank as a child, or as
an instance of the sort of stuff referred to in his linguistic community as ‘wa-
ter’. However, there will be relevant dispositions Wayne and Dwayne do have
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in common: for instance, just as Wayne would, if thirsty, drink a glass of water
that was presented to him, so would Dwayne.
So, which similarities and differences between Dwayne’s dispositional profile
and Wayne’s dispositional profile are the ones that matter for the purposes of
deciding whether or not to ascribe to Dwayne the belief that water is potable?
It depends, as we might expect, on the context of ascription. For as long as
Dwayne is minding his own business on Twin Earth, never having encountered
water and destined never to do so, it would serve no predictive or explanatory
purpose to ascribe to him the belief that water is potable. We should therefore
deny that he has that belief; his dispositional profile is not that of someone who
believes that water is potable in the respects that are relevant in that context.
However, we can imagine circumstances in which it would make good sense to
ascribe to Dwayne the belief that water is potable. If Dwayne were to be tele-
ported to Earth, for instance, we would struggle to predict and explain much of
his behaviour (and many of his thoughts and feelings) if we were not prepared
to ascribe to him various beliefs and desires concerning water. (I think this
view is compatible with the common-sense view that in those circumstances,
Dwayne’s beliefs and desires concerning water would be explained by his mis-
taken belief that water was twin water. Dwayne would believe that water was
potable, for instance, because he believed that twin water was potable and that
water was twin water.)
In concluding this section, I want to consider how all this relates to non-mental
dispositional properties such as solubility. Do we have a consistent picture
here, or do mental dispositional properties require special treatment?
Consider a Twin Earth sugarcube. In terms of its intrinsic properties, it is iden-
tical to an Earth sugarcube. It would dissolve both if placed in twin water and if
placed in water; so it has the dispositional properties being water-soluble and
being twin water-soluble. It has these properties partly in virtue of the way it
is intrinsically, partly in virtue of the way twin water and water are intrinsically,
and partly in virtue of the way things are in Earth and Twin Earth environments
generally.
Still, ascribing water-solubility to a sugarcube on Twin Earth is a useless thing
to do in terms of predicting and explaining its behaviour. It’s only if such a sug-
arcube were to be transported to Earth (or some water were to be transported
to Twin Earth) that the ascription of water-solubility would serve any purpose.
Now consider Dwayne once again. In terms of his intrinsic properties, he is
identical to Wayne (if we ignore the difference between the water in Wayne’s
body and the twin water in Dwayne’s). He would (e.g.) drink a glass of wa-
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ter if presented with one while thirsty, and also drink a glass of twin water if
presented with one while thirsty. He therefore has the dispositional properties
being disposed to drink water when thirsty and being disposed to drink twin
water when thirsty. He has these properties partly in virtue of the way he is
intrinsically, partly in virtue of the way twin water and water are intrinsically,
and partly in virtue of the way things are in Earth and Twin Earth environments
generally.
Still, ascribing the disposition to drink water when thirsty to Dwayne. an inhabi-
tant of Twin Earth, is a useless thing to do in terms of predicting and explaining
his behaviour. It’s only if he were to be transported to Earth (or some water
were to be transported to Twin Earth) that the ascription of that disposition
would serve any purpose.
Fundamentally, then, we have here a consistent account of mental and non-
mental dispositions. It’s only when we consider the complexities of disposi-
tional stereotypes and the practical purposes of mental state ascription that
we become tempted to treat subjects differently from (mere) objects.
One final thought in response to the fundamental externalist intuition that it
is flatly illegitimate to ascribe to subjects mental states that are ‘about’ things
they have not had the right causal interactions with (so that, for instance, David-
son’s ‘swampman’ (1987) - a randomly-generated physical duplicate of David-
son who acts just like him - cannot have beliefs about Davidson’s friends since
it has never met them). If we set sci-fi thought experiment scenarios aside, I
think there are everyday cases we can point to in which it makes good sense to
ascribe such states to subjects. Consider Bob, who (as we learned in Chapter
4) is afraid of spiders. Suppose he is also afraid of beetles, of centipedes, and
so on. There is no ‘natural kind’ to which all and only such things as spiders,
beetles and centipedes belong. Yet surely it make sense to ascribe to Bob a
fear of creepy-crawlies in general - meaning he is afraid of a great many kinds
of creature he has had no causal interactions with. (Perhaps he even has cer-
tain beliefs about creepy-crawlies in general - that they spread diseases, say.)
If I notice a thumbnail-sized, hairy, many-legged creature crawling up Bob’s
arm, I don’t need to know whether Bob has encountered a creature of the very
same natural kind - species, genus, whatever - to know that Bob is afraid of
such things; he’s afraid of all things that are superficially like that one in certain
respects. So why should we refrain from ascribing to Dwayne, upon his arrival
on Earth, mental states that are ‘about’ water - a substance that is like twin
water, a substance he encounters every day, in all respects but one? Similarly,
why should we refrain from ascribing to him mental states that are ‘about’, say,
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Wayne’s mother? If the ascription of such states helps us make sense of other-
wise inexplicable behaviour, thoughts and feelings on the part of Dwayne, we
should go ahead and ascribe those states. (Caveat: the logic of expressions
such as ‘remembering that P’ and ‘recognizing person A’ means that an excep-
tion must be made in these cases. Dwayne might mistake Dwayne’s mother
for his own mother and so believe that she plays the flute, or he might realize
that Wayne’s mother does everything his own mother does and so infer that
she plays the flute, but he cannot recognize Wayne’s mother and remember
that she plays the flute.)
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have set out Schwitzgebel’s version of phenomenal disposi-
tionalism, based as it is around the notion of dispositional stereotypes for the
possession of particular mental states - stereotypes to which subjects might
conform in various respects and to various degrees, making the ascription to
them of those mental states more or less appropriate in various contexts. I
have also tried to shore up Schwitzgebel’s response to the anticipated charge
that phenomenal dispositionalism is incompatible with externalism about men-
tal content.
As I noted at the beginning of section 5.2, Schwitzgebel is not concerned to say
anything about the metaphysics of belief, or of dispositions in general. Much
of the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 was intended pre-emptively to answer
some of the metaphysical questions left unanswered in his setting out of the
phenomenal dispositionalist position. So let me now try to sketch a provisional
picture of phenomenal dispositionalism in the round, metaphysics and all -
a picture that learns the lessons of earlier chapters and applies them to the
account just set out.
Provisionally, then - pending some revisions to the position, which I shall make
in Chapters 6 and 7 - what phenomenal dispositionalism claims is this:
• To believe that P is to have some set of behavioural, phenomenal and
cognitive dispositions such that one conforms, to an appropriate degree
and in appropriate respects, to the dispositional stereotype for believing
that P. (Roughly: it is to have dispositions to act, think and feel much as
we would expect someone with the belief that P to act, think and feel in a
range of circumstances.)
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• These ‘dispositions’ one must have in order to be said to believe that P
are not to be identified with their categorical bases. Dispositional proper-
ties are not categorical properties; nor are they role properties with corre-
sponding categorical realizer properties; nor are they intrinsic properties
of the subjects to which they are ascribed. They are relational properties;
to have such-and-such a disposition is just to stand in such-and-such a
relation to certain actual or possible objects and events.
• The holding of this relation in a given instance has counterfactual impli-
cations. For S to have the dispositional property believing that P is for
certain counterfactuals about how S would act, think and feel in a range
of circumstances to hold true. This relational, dispositional property of S
supervenes on certain intrinsic, categorical properties of S, but also on
intrinsic, categorical properties of other things.
• Nonetheless, dispositional mental states of subjects are both real and
causally relevant. To explain that S took action A in circumstances C
because she was in such-and-such a mental state is causally to explain
why S took action A, just as surely as to explain that Lehmann Brothers
collapsed in circumstances C because it was in such-and-such a state of
financial health is causally to explain why Lehmann Brothers collapsed.
The fact that no internal state of S is, or realizes, her mental state, and
that no internal state of Lehmann Brothers is, or realizes, its state of finan-
cial health, is neither here nor there, so long as something, somewhere
is doing the causal work required to make the right counterfactuals hold
true.
Two significant problems remain. Firstly, Schwitzgebel’s account of the role of
dispositional stereotypes in belief ascription does not - for reasons I will set
out in Chapter 6 - bear up under scrutiny. And secondly - as will become
clear during that discussion - the dispositionalist still has questions to answer
about how mental states interact with one another. I shall address this issue in
Chapter 7.
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to Dispositional Profiles
6.1 Introduction
We saw in Chapter 5 that Schwitzgebel’s notion of a dispositional stereotype
is central to his phenomenal dispositionalist account of belief and other atti-
tudes. ‘To believe that P. . . ,’ according to Schwitzgebel, ‘is nothing more than
to match to an appropriate degree and in appropriate respects the dispositional
stereotype for believing that P’ (Schwitzgebel, 2002, p.253).
In this chapter, I will argue that while this claim cannot be accepted just as it
stands, a similar but broader claim can be preserved in a new formulation of
phenomenal dispositionalism; a version of the theory that takes the question
of what mental states a subject has to be a question not of which dispositional
stereotypes she conforms to, but simply of what dispositional profile she has.
To be a subject in such-and-such an overall mental state - a subject with all of
these beliefs, these desires, these character traits, and so on - is (I suggest)
just to be a subject with all of these behavioural, phenomenal and cognitive
dispositions (that is, a subject with this particular dispositional profile); but there
is just no saying what it is to be a subject who has any given mental state
considered in isolation.
In my view, one of Schwitzgebel’s central claims - about just what a disposi-
tional stereotype includes - invites two different readings. In sections 6.2 and
6.3, I will argue that whichever of these readings one accepts, the overall ac-
count cannot be made to hang together: on one reading, it’s simply implausible
that beliefs may only be ascribed to subjects on the basis of their conformity to
a dispositional stereotype, while on the other reading, there appears to be no
sense to Schwitzgebel’s idea that deviations from the stereotype for a partic-
ular belief may be excused in certain conditions. In section 6.4, I will suggest
that the phenomenal dispositionalist should move away from the idea that hav-
ing each of the mental states one has is a matter of conforming to each of a
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series of dispositional stereotypes, and towards a more holistic approach of
the sort suggested in the previous paragraph.
6.2 ‘Aptness to associate’: first reading and
associated problems
Recall that Schwitzgebel, in resisting the idea that there is any determinate
‘checklist’ of dispositions a subject must have in order to be said to believe that
P, characterizes the dispositional stereotype for believing that P as a cluster of
dispositional properties that we are apt to associate with the possession of that
belief.
One could take that to imply that we ought to be ‘ultra-liberal’ in accepting
dispositional properties as belonging to that stereotype. Consider again the
belief that there is beer in the fridge. Certainly I am apt to associate with that
belief the disposition to offer beer to a thirsty guest, in this sense: if I take a
subject, S, be at least moderately generous, to believe that his guest is thirsty
and that his route to the fridge is clear, and so on, I am apt to think that S will
offer his guest a beer if he believes that there is beer in the fridge. Similarly,
however, I am apt to associate with that belief the disposition to conceal from
a thirsty guest the fact that there is beer in the fridge: if I take S to be a miserly
individual, or his guest to be a recovering alcoholic, I am apt to think that S will
conceal the fact that there is beer in fridge if he believes that there is beer in
the fridge.
This exercise could be continued ad infinitum. I am, for instance, apt to asso-
ciate with the belief that there is beer in the fridge the disposition to attempt to
stand on one’s head and sing My Way : if I took S to believe that a million-dollar
prize was available to anyone who both had beer in the fridge and was able
to stand on his head and sing My Way, I am apt to think that S will attempt
to stand on his head and sing My Way if he believes that there is beer in the
fridge.
As we shall see in section 6.3, this reading may in fact be close to what
Schwitzgebel has in mind. However, I want to consider an alternative reading
first, because I think it sits more comfortably alongside Schwitzgebel’s com-
ments about deviations from stereotypes and the ways in which such devia-
tions may be excused in certain conditions. As such, it is arguably a more
natural reading and a more promising way to make sense of Schwitzgebel’s
overall position.
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This alternative reading takes its cue from the fact that Schwitzgebel wants to
say that someone who offers beer to a thirsty guest conforms in that respect to
the dispositional stereotype for believing that there is beer in the fridge, while
someone who conceals from a thirsty guest the fact that there is beer in the
fridge deviates in that respect from that dispositional stereotype (although that
deviation may be excused). If we take the sort of ‘ultra-liberal’ approach just
sketched, that claim looks false; on that view, after all, both the disposition to
offer beer to a thirsty guest, and the disposition to conceal from a thirsty guest
the fact that there is beer in the fridge, belong to the dispositional stereotype
for believing that there is beer in the fridge (because under certain conditions,
we are apt to associate both of those dispositions with that belief). In fact,
then, it seems natural to conclude that Schwitzgebel conceives of a disposi-
tional stereotype not as a cluster of properties that we are apt to associate
with a given belief simpliciter, but as a cluster of properties that we are apt to
associate with a given belief by default - in the absence of any supplementary
information about a subject’s character, their other beliefs and desires, enviro-
mental factors, and so on.
Note that in the case of the belief that there is beer in the fridge, this cluster
of properties looks fairly ‘well-rounded’. If we make some reasonable assump-
tions about what people are generally like - e.g. that they are basically rational,
that they are more likely to tell the truth than to lie, that they are not so miserly
as to withhold beer from a thirsty guest, etc. - we have a pretty good idea
of how the typical believer-that-there-is-beer-in-the-fridge is going to act, think
and feel in a range of circumstances.
But I think Schwitzgebel’s choice of example tends to obscure the fact that
there are many beliefs for which the range of ‘default’ assumptions about how
someone with that belief is typically going to act, think and feel will be much
more restricted. The problem, I think, is this: in all the respects that matter for
the purposes of deciding whether or not it’s appropriate to ascribe to someone
the belief that there is beer in the fridge, pretty much everyone is going to act,
think and feel pretty much the same way. So long as someone is not mute,
pathologically miserly or inclined to lie, etc., it doesn’t matter if they’re male or
female, under fifty or over fifty, politically left-leaning or right-leaning, religious
or non-religious, somewhat dimmer than average or somewhat brighter, in the
bottom half of the income distribution or in the top half, and so on; they are still
going to be disposed to offer beer to a thirsty guest, etc.
By way of contrast, consider the belief that Jill is single. What does the dis-
positional stereotype for this belief look like? What dispositions are we apt to
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associate, by default, with that belief? Well, there’s the disposition to assert,
when prompted, that Jill is single; the disposition to feel surprise upon learn-
ing that Jill is in fact married; and so on. No doubt we could go on expanding
this list indefinitely, with a little imagination. Still, it seems to me that the dis-
positional stereotype for that belief is doomed always to look rather thin, in
a way that the dispositional stereotype for the belief that there is beer in the
fridge is not. If we ask ourselves how a subject, S, who believed that Jill was
single, would typically act if Jill was coming round for dinner, how they would
typically feel if they became aware that Jill’s hand was resting on their thigh,
or what they would typically infer if Jill mentioned how much she had enjoyed
their company, answer comes there none. It all depends, we want to say. How
old is Jill? Twenty-five? Seventy-five? How old is S? Is S a man or a woman?
Is S married? Without at least a little such background information, there’s
just no saying how S would ‘typically’ act, think and feel in a whole range of
circumstances.
To approach this same point from a different angle: suppose that just as ‘Joe
believes that there is beer in the fridge’ means something like ‘ceteris paribus,
Joe is disposed to assent to the proposition that there is beer in the fridge, to
offer beer to a thirsty guest, to look in the fridge if he wants a beer, etc.’, so ‘this
vase is fragile’ means something like ‘ceteris paribus, this vase is disposed to
break if dropped, if thrown against a wall, if struck with a heavy object, etc.’.
Now suppose that on some particular occasion, a fragile vase is dropped but
fails to break because there happens to be a large cushion on the floor just at
the point of impact. On Schwitzgebel’s account, as I understand it, the pres-
ence of the cushion excuses the non-manifestation of the vase’s disposition to
break if dropped. In just the same way, according to Schwitzgebel, we can see
the presence of a desire to keep all one’s beer to oneself as excusing the non-
manifestation of Joe’s disposition to offer beer to a thirsty guest. Just as the
vase would have broken had the cushion not been there, so Joe would have
offered his thirsty guest a beer had that desire not been there.
I think Schwitzgebel overlooks an important disanalogy here. If a vase is
dropped but does not break - if, instead, it does something else, such as com-
ing to rest or bouncing away or turning into a mermaid - one would never seek
to explain what had happened, or failed to happen, by appealing to the vase’s
fragility. Its disposition to come to rest upon landing on a cushion, to bounce
upon landing on a trampoline, or to turn into a mermaid upon landing in a magic
lake might be relevant, but its fragility certainly would not be. Its behaviour in
those cases, after all, is no more consistent with its being fragile than with its
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being robust; so nothing about its behaviour on that occasion would justify the
ascription of fragility to that vase. But if a thirsty friend visits Joe and Joe fails
to offer him a beer - if, instead, he does something else - one might nonethe-
less seek to explain Joe’s actions, thoughts and feelings by appealing to his
belief that there is beer in the fridge. Why does Joe tell his friend he’s out of
beer, reassure himself that the risk of his lie being discovered is small, and feel
anxious when his friend walks towards the fridge as if to open it? Precisely be-
cause, we might think, he believes that there is beer in the fridge and desires
to keep it all to himself. His actions, thoughts and feelings are more consistent
with his having the belief that there is beer in the fridge than with his lacking
that belief; and so they justify the ascription to him of that belief.
It seems rather odd, then, to talk in terms of the non-manifestation of a dispo-
sition to offer beer to a thirsty guest being ‘excused’ by the presence of Joe’s
desire to keep all his beer to himself, and in terms of Joe ‘deviating’ from the
way we would expect somebody with that belief to act, think and feel. If we
know that Joe is miserly where beer is concerned, we don’t regard his failure
to offer beer to a thirsty guest as an anomaly that cries out for explanation.
We aren’t puzzled by a failure of Joe to fit into a recognizable, comprehensible
pattern of actions, thoughts and feelings.
Consider the case of a twenty-five-year old single man who is introduced to a
twenty-five-year-old woman, Jill (whom, we may suppose, he finds attractive).
Suppose we are concerned to decide whether or not the belief that Jill is single
can be attributed to this man. We are satisfied that he has such dispositions
as the following: the disposition to ask Jill if she would like to go out for dinner
some time; the disposition to wonder if he is Jill’s type; the disposition to get
his hopes up when Jill returns a phone call. Intuitively, it seems to me, his
possession of those dispositions counts in favour of his possessing the belief
in question: his actions, thoughts and feelings are, in those respects, more
consistent with his having that belief than with his lacking it. Yet so far as I can
see, on our present reading of Schwitzgebel’s account, this man’s possession
of these dispositions counts for nothing - because someone who possesses
them conforms no more closely to the dispositional stereotype for that belief
than someone who lacks them. Such dispositions, after all, cannot belong to
that stereotype - which only includes those dispositions we would expect pretty
much any person with that belief to have, and not dispositions that we would
expect only people of a certain age or a certain gender, or having a certain
‘type’, to have.
One final example to drive the point home. Consider the belief that the winning
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National Lottery numbers this week are 4, 7, 14, 34, 35 and 40. What sort
of dispositions are typically associated with this belief, and so (on our present
reading of Schwitzgebel’s position) earn a place in the dispositional stereotype
for that belief? The disposition to assert that those are the winning numbers, no
doubt; but also, surely, the disposition to acquire the belief that once again, one
has failed to win the lottery, to bin one’s Lottery ticket, to feel slightly deflated,
and so on. That’s how people with that belief would typically act, think and
feel. Roughly one person in fourteen million, though, will be disposed to act,
think and feel quite differently: to experience a sense of elation, to phone their
friends and tell them they’ve won the Lottery, to infer that they can afford to
give up work, and so on. Doesn’t it seem rather beside the point to note that
the non-manifestation of a disposition to feel slightly deflated is excused, in the
case of such an individual, by the presence of a belief that their own lottery
numbers are 4, 7, 14, 34, 35 and 40? Doesn’t it seem that they deviate from
the dispositional stereotype for that belief in a profound, systematic, general
way - and yet that we have perfectly good grounds for ascribing to them that
belief? Ascribing that belief to them, indeed, is the only way to make sense of
their actions, thoughts and feelings.
On this reading of Schwitzgebel’s position, then, he faces two very serious
problems. Firstly, in a great many cases it is just not possible to make the sort
of assumptions we would need to make about the beliefs, desires, character
traits etc. of a typical believer that P in order to have a useful dispositional
stereotype available to us; there are too many pertinent respects in which too
many people will differ too often. And secondly, it is not enough simply to
allow that lacking some of the dispositions in the stereotype for believing that
P does not always count against someone’s having that belief; we also need
to allow that sometimes, having dispositions not in the stereotype for believing
that P counts in favour of someone’s having that belief. We can’t settle the
question of whether or not somebody believes that P on the basis of how many
dispositions they have in common with a typical believer-that-P, but only on the
basis of whether, given that they have such-and-such other (typical or atypical)
beliefs, desires, character traits etc., they have the sort of dispositions we’d
expect them to have if they also believed that P.
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6.3 ‘Aptness to associate’: second reading and
associated problems
One response to the concerns expressed in section 6.2, a response sug-
gested (in personal communication) by Schwitzgebel himself (2011), would
be to adopt something like the ‘ultra-liberalism’ referred to at the beginning of
that discussion. On this view, dispositions to act, think and feel in ways that
are quite atypical of subjects who believe, say, that there is beer in the fridge,
may nonetheless be seen as belonging to the dispositional stereotype for that
belief, because the necessary conditionality is built in to those dispositions.
For instance: the disposition to stand on one’s head and sing My Way, if one
believes that a million-dollar prize is available to anyone who both has beer in
the fridge and can stand on their head and sing My Way, should be seen as
being included in the stereotype.
Let me note a couple of consequences of adopting this view. Firstly, it means
that the dispositional stereotype for having a given belief very plausibly includes
dispositions to act, think and feel any way that’s nomologically possible in a
given set of external circumstances, since there’s no limit to the variety of ‘if’
clauses we could generate involving more or less eccentric sets of desires,
beliefs, character traits etc. that a subject might, in principle, have. There’d
always be some story we could tell about the eccentric beliefs, desires, ways
of thinking etc. that a subject could have alongside the belief that P, and that
would mean we were apt to expect that subject, in such-and-such external
circumstances, to act, think and feel thus-and-so. The story about the man
who believes he can win a million dollars by standing on his head and singing
My Way is just one example.
Secondly, it makes it very hard to see just what use we could have for the
idea that there are conditions in which deviations from a stereotype might be
excused. Recall that on this reading of Schwitzgebel’s position, it appears to be
the case that both a subject who offers a beer to a thirsty guest, and a subject
who conceals from a thirsty guest the fact that he has beer, conform equally
well to the stereotype for believing that there is beer in the fridge - if the former
is moderately generous, and/or feels morally obliged to offer his guest a beer,
or whatever, while the latter is somewhat miserly, and/or believes his guest to
be a recovering alcoholic, or whatever. The failure of the former to manifest a
disposition to conceal from his guest the fact that he has beer, and of the latter
to manifest a disposition to offer his guest a beer, could (I suppose) both be
seen as being ‘excused’ by their possession of certain beliefs and character
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traits. But the things that are here being excused cannot be these subjects’
deviations from the relevant stereotype, for on this reading of Schwitzgebel’s
position, neither of the subjects we’ve been considering does deviate from that
stereotype: each of them acts, thinks and feels much as we would expect
them to, given the other beliefs and desires they have. So far as I can see, on
this reading of Schwitzgebel’s position, a subject could only deviate from the
stereotype for believing that P if he failed to act, think and feel as we would
expect him to act, think and feel if he believed that P and had all the other
beliefs, desires etc. he does in fact have. But in that case there would be no
question of his deviation being ‘excused’ by his other beliefs, desires etc.
Nor, I think, would there be any question of a subject’s deviations being ex-
cused by external conditions. Someone who fails to offer a beer to a thirsty
guest because his route to the fridge is blocked is, after all, surely acting as
we would expect someone who believed that there was beer in the fridge, was
moderately generous, etc., to act if his route to the fridge was blocked. So if
such conditionals are built in to the dispositional stereotype for believing that P,
there seems to be no reason to see that subject as deviating from that stereo-
type.
Essentially, it appears to be impossible, on this reading of Schwitzgebel’s po-
sition, for someone who acts, thinks and feels as we would expect him to if
he believed that P, if he had the other mental states he does in fact have, and
if external conditions were as they in fact are, to deviate from the stereotype
for believing that P. That seems fair enough, in a sense - it fits the overall pic-
ture of believing that P being a matter of having the dispositions we are apt
to think someone ought to have if they believe that P1 - but it seems to leave
the idea of ‘excusing conditions’ without any work to do. On this ultra-liberal
view, people who deviate from the stereotype for believing that P can, I think,
straightforwardly be seen as failing to believe that P.
In another response (in personal communication) to the concerns raised in
section 2, Schwitzgebel (2011) suggests that the picture we work with should
be one of ‘mini-stereotypes’ for different types of subject. The idea here is that
the dispositional stereotype for believing that P will include not just a general
1Something like Davidson’s ‘principle of charity’ (1973) is at work here. Since we are in
the business of making sense of people, we are hardly likely to refrain from ascribing the
belief that P to someone whose actions, thoughts and feelings would strike us as being
more rational and more coherent if we did ascribe that belief to them. Schwitzgebel is,
of course, aware of the need to accommodate this sort of consideration, but seems to be
torn between doing so by conditionalizing the dispositions within a stereotype (enabling
us to regard more people as conforming to that stereotype), and doing so by allowing for
‘excusing conditions’ (enabling us to regard people who do not conform to a stereotype as
having the belief associated with that stereotype nonetheless).
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pool of dispositions we are apt to think all believers-that-P will have, but also
clusters of dispositions that are specific to particular types of subject: in the
case of the belief that Jill is single, for instance, we might be on the lookout for
clusters of ‘pursuer dispositions,’ ‘avoider dispositions,’ ‘envious woman dispo-
sitions,’ ‘flirter dispositions,’ etc.
In pragmatic terms - in terms of how we might actually go about deciding
whether such-and-such a subject has or lacks such-and-such a mental state
- this suggestion doubtless has some merit. But at this point, I think it must
be acknowledged that we are straying further and further from the idea that
there is any such thing as a unique dispositional stereotype for believing that P,
to which anyone who believes that P ought to conform unless their deviations
from that stereotype are appropriately excused by the presence of certain un-
usual conditions (e.g. their physical limitations or possession of an odd belief,
or some peculiarity of their environment). Instead we seem to be moving to-
wards a picture on which there are a multitude of stereotypes for believing that
P: one for believing that P and also having this set of other beliefs, desires,
character traits, etc., one for believing that P and also having that set of other
beliefs, desires, character traits, etc., and so on. And although it may be very
useful to sort people into general ‘types’, what matters in ascribing beliefs to a
subject, S, is ultimately not whether S acts, thinks and feels as a subject typi-
cal of some general type ought to act, think and feel if they believed that P, but
whether S acts, thinks and feels just as she herself ought to act, think and feel
if she believed that P and had all the other beliefs, desires, character traits etc.
she actually has - with these being as specific, individual, and even eccentric
as you please.
6.4 Dispositional profiles
In the course of the discussion in sections 6.2 and 6.3, the idea that a sub-
ject’s possession of some particular mental state is a matter of his conform-
ing (in appropriate respects, and to an appropriate degree) to a dispositional
stereotype for the possession of just that state - an idea that is at the heart of
Schwitzgebel’s formulation of phenomenal dispositionalism - has come to ap-
pear less and less tenable. We have found ourselves edging closer and closer
to the view that the dispositional stereotype a given subject must conform to
in order to be said to have such-and-such a belief (say) is not a stereotype for
the possession of that belief itself, but rather a stereotype for the possession
of that belief plus whatever other beliefs, desires, character traits and so on we
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take that particular subject to have. And this, surely, is no ‘stereotype’ at all;
the concept has been stretched past breaking point.
So this talk of dispositional stereotypes is going to have to go, and with it the
whole idea that mental state ascription can proceed on a one-at-a-time basis.
As Stout argues (see Chapter 2), a successful dispositionalism must take the
holism of the mental seriously. We must accept that there is no one general
way of acting, thinking and feeling that is characteristic of having a given belief;
rather, there are many particular ways of acting, thinking and feeling that are
characteristic of having that belief together with other possible sets of beliefs,
desires, character traits and so on.
In my view, then, phenomenal dispositionalism should be formulated not in
terms of dispositional stereotypes, but in terms of dispositional profiles. A sub-
ject’s dispositional profile, recall, is just his overall set of behavioural, phenom-
enal and cognitive dispositions. (It therefore excludes those of his dispositions
which are not behavioural, phenomenal or cognitive: the dispositions to drown
if submerged in water or to dissolve if submerged in acid, for instance. Such
dispositions are real enough, but to seek to explain or predict events by appeal-
ing to facts about such dispositions is not to seek to explain or predict events by
appealing to facts about subjects’ mental states.) On Schwitzgebel’s account,
every subject has such a profile - of course - but these profiles are not really
something we ever look at in the round. Since mental state ascription proceeds
in a one-at-a-time fashion, based on the respects in which, and the degree to
which, a subject is judged to conform to each of a series of stereotypes for dis-
crete mental states, we are only ever interested in looking at certain aspects of
a subject’s dispositional profile at any one time. This makes sense in pragmatic
terms, of course, since we’re just not in a position to know everything there is
to know about the dispositional profile of every subject we encounter; we have
no choice but to make assumptions about what sort of person we’re dealing
with, what knowledge they’re likely to have or lack, etc., in order provisionally
to ascribe large sets of mental states to them (a process to which I will return
in Chapter 7.) But it does not make sense in terms of the ‘shape’ of a theory
about what it is to have mental states. A theory with that shape just is not able
properly to accommodate the interdependence of mental states - the holism of
the mental.
A version of phenomenal dispositionalism with dispositional profiles at its cen-
tre, however, has a quite different shape. Rather than asking whether a subject
has the right dispositions for someone who believes that P - say - it invites us
to ask whether a subject’s dispositional profile is, all things considered, that
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of someone who has that belief along with these other beliefs, these desires,
these character traits, and so on. Such a theory claims a constitutive link not
between a subject’s possession of particular mental states and her possession
of particular dispositions, but between her possession of all the mental states
she has and her possession of all the behavioural, phenomenal and cognitive
dispositions she has.
6.5 Conclusion
If phenomenal dispositionalism is to accommodate psychological holism, I think
it will have to move decisively away from the idea that questions about what
mental states someone has can be settled on a one-by-one basis by asking
whether that person conforms to each of a series of stereotypes. What we
are trying to do when we ascribe a mental state to a subject S is, in my view,
to build up a picture of that person’s dispositional profile. We may not be ex-
plicit about the other mental states we take them to have, but tacitly we make
various more or less justified assumptions - either very general assumptions
about the beliefs, desires, habits of thought etc. that pretty much everyone
has in common, somewhat general assumptions about the beliefs, desires etc.
that subjects of a general type to which S belongs have in common, or more
specific assumptions based on what we know about S as an individual. Ulti-
mately, to be a person with such-and-such a set of mental states is just to be a
person with such-and-such a dispositional profile; but to be a person with any
particular mental state is not to have any particular dispositions. In Chapter
7, I will argue that when it comes to accommodating psychological holism, the
phenomenal dispositionalist can learn from Dennett’s (2002) version of inter-
pretationism.
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7 Dispositional Profiles and the
Intentional Stance
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 6, I argued that a subject’s having some particular belief (or desire,
or character trait, or whatever) cannot be - as Schwitzgebel suggests - a matter
of that subject’s conforming to a dispositional stereotype for the possession
of that particular belief. We should, I suggested, take a more holistic view,
according to which a subject’s having a certain overall set of mental states is a
matter of his having a certain dispositional profile.
In thus seeking to accommodate the holism of the mental, phenomenal dis-
positionalism takes a step closer to interpretationism - already, in my view, its
closest relative among contemporary positions in the philosophy of mind (es-
pecially in the avowedly Rylean form defended by Daniel Dennett). When we
adopt what Dennett calls (2002) the ‘intentional stance’ towards a subject, we
ascribe a whole system of beliefs and desires to that subject and seek to pre-
dict and explain their behaviour with reference to that whole system. There is
no attempt to ascribe mental states to a subject one at a time, either on the ba-
sis that the subject has some determinate set of dispositions the possession of
which constitutes his having that mental state (as per logical behaviourism), or
on the basis that the subject more or less conforms to a dispositional stereo-
type for the possession of that belief (as per Schwitzgebel’s version of phe-
nomenal dispositionalism).
There are, however, important differences between interpretationism and phe-
nomenal dispositionalism. In this chapter I want to spell out what the phenome-
nal dispositionalist can take from Dennett’s interpretationism and what he must
reject. I will argue that the interpretationist tendency to boil mental life down to
practical reasoning based on beliefs and desires serves to obscure the impor-
tant role of ascriptions of other mental states - including non-intentional states
- in predicting and explaining subjects’ behaviour.
117
7 Dispositional Profiles and the Intentional Stance
7.2 The intentional stance
Dennett (2002) describes the intentional stance as an alternative to two other
stances we can adopt towards systems when we seek to predict and explain
their behaviour: the ‘physical stance’, and the ‘design stance’. To seek to pre-
dict a system’s behaviour from the physical stance is to ‘determine its physical
constitution. . . and the physical nature of the impingements upon it, and use
your knowledge of the laws of physics to predict the outcome for any input’
(Dennett, 2002, p.557). However, even if it’s possible in principle to predict
the behaviour of any system in any circumstance using this strategy, it’s not
possible in practice most of the time. In our day-to-day interactions with things,
we just aren’t in a position to acquire and apply all the knowledge we’d need to
have about their physical constitution, about the physical nature of the impinge-
ments upon them, and about the laws of physics. We can’t pause to dismantle
the ticket machine at the train station on our way to work, examine all its parts in
microsopic detail, and map out the detailed causal chain that would be initiated
if one were to press the button marked ‘Print ticket’. We would, instead, seek
to predict that system’s behaviour from the design stance, ‘where one ignores
the. . . details of the physical constitution of an object, and, on the assumption
that it has a certain design, predicts that it will behave as it is designed to be-
have under various circumstances’ (2002, pp.557-558, Dennett’s italics). On
that basis, we would predict that the ticket machine, having been designed to
print a ticket when someone presses the “Print ticket” button, would, in those
circumstances, do just that. The strategy can also work, Dennett suggests, for
many biological systems - ‘plants and animals, kidneys and hearts, stamens
and pistils’ (2002, p.558). If we assume that animals are ‘designed’ to preserve
their own lives, to reproduce, etc., and that hearts are ‘designed’ to pump blood
around the body as needed, we will very often be able correctly to predict what
they’ll do in various circumstances without having any deep understanding of
their physical constitution.
The possibility of taking the intentional stance provides us with a third strategy
for predicting systems’ behaviour. This is how Dennett suggests the strategy
works:
first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted
as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought
to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure
out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and
finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals
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in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen
set of beliefs and desires will in many - but not all - instances yield a
decision about what the agent ought to do; that is what you predict
the agent will do.
(Dennett, 2002, p.558)
Our starting point in deciding what beliefs and desires an agent ought to have
- if that agent is a human being, anyway - is that people generally acquire
true beliefs about things they have suitable experience of, and people gener-
ally have certain basic desires (for food, pleasure etc.) in common. So if, for
instance, we encounter someone who hasn’t eaten for a week and who has
just been presented with a tuna sandwich just like the ones he has eaten a
hundred times before, we will think he ought to believe that the sandwich is
edible and desire that his hunger be satisfied, and so predict that he will eat
the sandwich. We also start out by assuming that people are perfectly rational
(Dennett, 2002, p.560). All this is only a starting point; we can accommodate
the fact that people sometimes have false beliefs, or fail to see the implica-
tions of their beliefs, if there’s a suitable explanation. But we have to assume
that ‘true believers mainly believe truths’ (Dennett, 2002, p.559), and are in
the main rational, or the whole strategy collapses (cf. Davidson’s ‘principle of
charity’ or ‘principle of rational accommodation’ (1973)).
So far, this could all be taken as a sort of ‘how-to’ guide on the practical ap-
plication of a Standard View theory of mind. No Standard View theorist would
want to deny, after all, that we use something very like Dennett’s intentional
strategy when we ascribe mental states to people in order to predict and ex-
plain their behaviour. But there are two features of Dennett’s account that set
his interpretationist view apart from Standard View theories like functionalism
and representationalism.
Firstly, Dennett asserts that ‘What it is to be a true believer is to be an in-
tentional system, a system whose behaviour is reliably and voluminously pre-
dictable via the intentional strategy’ (2002, p.557, Dennett’s italics). Being in-
terpretable as a system with propositional attitudes is thus held by Dennett to
be constitutive of having those attitudes. This is quite distinct from the claim
that being a true believer is a matter of one’s brain being in such-and-such
a functional state, or containing such-and-such representations, even though
it might, as a matter of fact, follow from such claims that true believers are
amenable to interpretation via the intentional strategy.
Secondly (and relatedly), Dennett sounds a note of caution over an influen-
tial line of thinking that can be considered as a response to the question:
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why does the intentional strategy work? (this being understood as a ques-
tion about ‘how the machinery which Nature has provided us works’ (Dennett,
2002, p.566)). The line of thinking, which starts out generically functionalist
and ends up recognisably representationalist, runs like this:
the account of how the strategy works and the account of how the
mechanism works will (roughly) coincide: for each predictively at-
tributable belief, there will be a functionally salient internal state of
the machinery, decomposable into functional parts in just about the
same way the sentence expressing the belief is decomposable into
parts - that is, words or terms. The inferences we attribute to ra-
tional creatures will be mirrored by physical, causal processes in
the hardware; the logical form of the propositions believed will be
copied in the structural form of the states in correspondence with
them. This is the hypothesis that there is a language of thought
coded in our brains, and our brains will eventually be understood as
symbol manipulating systems in at least rough analogy with com-
puters.
(Dennett, 2002, p.566, Dennett’s italics).
Dennett thinks some version of this view will probably turn out to be right (2002,
p.566), but cautions that it only appears obviously or inevitably correct if one
confuses two distinct empirical claims: the claim that ‘intentional stance de-
scription yields an objective, real pattern in the world,’ and the claim that ‘this
real pattern is produced by another real pattern roughly isomorphic to it within
the brains of intelligent creatures’ (2002, p.566, Dennett’s italics). The first
claim is plainly true, but its truth is independent of the truth of the second claim
- which has yet to be established.
7.3 Beyond the intentional stance
It should be clear from the above that Dennettian interpretationism and phe-
nomenal dispositionalism share a good deal of common ground. Both are
broadly Rylean positions that deny a constitutive link between having such-
and-such a propositional attitude and being in such-and-such an internal, phys-
ical state, and instead think of having such-and-such a propositional attitude
as being more a matter of responding to situations in a way that fits a recog-
nizable, interpretable pattern.
The crucial divergence between the two positions is over the question of what
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types of responses are relevant to the question of what propositional attitudes
a subject has. The interpretationist admits only the behavioural responses ob-
servable by an interpreter; in this, he is very much the heir to that semi-mythical
figure, Ryle the Behaviourist. The phenomenal dispositionalist admits cogni-
tive and phenomenal responses in addition to behavioural responses, viewing
these as crucial to the characterization of the patterns into which interpreters
attempt to fit subjects. There could, on a phenomenal dispositionalist view,
be cases in which there were no good behavioural grounds to justify interpret-
ing someone as having the belief that P, but in which her internal utterances
(say), or the occurrence ‘in her head’ of certain inferential chains, nonetheless
meant that her dispositional profile was, all things considered, that of someone
who believed that P. (Of course, interpreters are not in a position directly to
learn about subjects’ cognitive and phenomenal responses, as they are in a
position directly to learn about subjects’ behavioural responses; but that they
nonetheless interpret subjects as having such responses, predict and explain
their behaviour on the basis of assumptions about these responses, and re-
gard having such responses as being part-and-parcel of having mental states,
could hardly be clearer (in my view) from a consideration of the use made by
interpreters of mentalistic language.)
Interpretationism also has a narrower focus than phenomenal dispositional-
ism. The intentional strategy is a way of predicting and explaining people’s
behaviour by ascribing intentional states to them - propositional attitudes that
are about something. As such, it reflects a distinctly rationalistic understand-
ing of human thought and action: people are to be understood as systems that
have beliefs about the way things are, desires about the way things should be,
and some natural machinery or other that equips them to make rational deci-
sions about how to pursue those desires in light of those beliefs. Phenomenal
dispositionalism, on the other hand, seeks to offer an account not just of the in-
tentional mental states, or propositional attitudes, that are the stuff of practical
reasoning, but also of many non-intentional features of mental life. Character
traits are a prime example. We regularly seek to predict and explain people’s
behaviour, and to figure out what’s going on ‘inside their heads’, by appealing
to facts about their beliefs and desires alongside facts about their possession
of character traits such as being quick-witted, short-tempered, or lacking in
empathy. Jack might very well desire a chocolate bar and believe that the way
to get one is to queue at the counter, but if we know him to be terribly impatient
we might be inclined to predict that he’ll drop out of the queue before he gets
as far as buying anything. Adopting the intentional stance towards Jack - treat-
ing him as a rational agent with beliefs and desires about the world and the
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capacity to work out how to pursue his goals in light of his beliefs - is central
to that attempt at understanding and interpreting him, but it is by no means the
whole story. His impatience is not a belief or a desire; it is not about anything
at all.
Perhaps it will be objected that in ascribing impatience to Jack in order to pre-
dict his behaviour, we are in fact doing nothing more than ascribing additional
beliefs and desires relevant to his likely behaviour in that context: say, a desire
not to waste time and a belief that to queue for longer than a minute would
be to waste time. I think there are good reasons to reject this view, however.
Firstly, it fails to capture the psychological reality that Jack’s behaviour may not
be the result of rationally weighing up the costs and benefits of queueing vs.
not queueing; rather, it may be the impulsive result of a feeling of frustration
that even Jack recognizes as standing in the way of his doing what he ought,
rationally, to do. Secondly, it fails to fit Jack’s behaviour on this occasion into
a broader pattern of impatient behaviour. Why did Jack give up piano lessons
after a few weeks, even though he is otherwise best interpreted as having a
long-standing desire to play the piano and a sincere belief that nothing could
be a more worthwhile use of one’s time than nurturing one’s musical abilities?
No doubt we could dream up another ad hoc belief-desire explanation, but it
would be highly unlikely to further our general understanding of Jack in the way
that a simple ascription of a non-intentional mental state, impatience, does. To
limit oneself, as an interpreter, to ascriptions of beliefs and desires - whether
made explicitly in those terms or not - is to miss opportunities to flesh out one’s
understanding of subjects’ dispositional profiles, and so to leave oneself blind
to real patterns in the world of just the sort that a competent interpreter should
be in the business of spotting.
As well as the paradigmatic intentional states we call ‘propositional attitudes’
(e.g. the belief that P), and states that we do not characterize with reference
to any intentional, propositional content (e.g. the state of being impatient), we
ascribe mental states to people that seem to have both intentional and non-
intentional elements. If I seek to explain Jill’s behaviour by telling you that she
loves her cat, part of what I’m trying to get across to you is, very plausibly, that
she desires that her cat should be healthy and content (or something along
those lines). But I might also be trying to get across the fact that, say, Jill finds
it upsetting to see her cat suffer, or finds it hard to be parted from her cat for any
length of time, or enjoys spending time with her cat, or tends to show affection
to her cat. What I’m doing is inviting you to make a whole family of assumptions
about Jill’s dispositional profile. I’m not simply asking you to assume that Jill
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will act to further her desire for her cat’s well-being in light of her beliefs about
the prerequisites of feline flourishing.1
Even when it comes to propositional attitudes, we would do well to remember
that the clear-cut beliefs that P and desires that Q invoked in philosophical ac-
counts of practical reasoning are idealizations. When we seek to predict and
explain one another’s behaviour through the ascription of doxastic states and
‘pro-attitudes’, we invoke not just beliefs that P, but also hunches that P, mount-
ing suspicions that P, uneasy feelings that P, and unshakeable convictions that
P; not only desires that Q, but also deep-seated yearnings that Q, half-wishes
that Q, and reluctant acknowledgements of the necessity that Q. This is not
simply a matter of needless linguistic extravagance; talk conducted in these
terms cannot be reduced, without loss of predictive and explanatory power, to
talk conducted in terms of a manageable number of real, fundamental, canon-
ical state types. The subtle distinctions made by ordinary interpreters, and the
nuances of the expressions they use, are indispensable parts of the business
of building up complex pictures of one another’s dispositional profiles. Some-
one who feels in his gut that P really can be expected, in certain circumstances,
1Nor, of course, am I alerting you to the presence of an internal state of Jill playing a particular
causal role. It’s worth pausing briefly to reconsider this point. What sort of ‘causal role’
could we take Jill’s love for her cat to play, and how could we individuate the internal state
of Jill’s brain playing that role? Presumably, the idea would be that there is some state of
Jill’s brain that occupies a certain position in the causal chains leading from certain sensory
inputs to certain behavioural outputs. When Jill sees her cat limping and telephones the
vet, what’s happening is something like this: her perception of the limping cat activates her
love for the cat, which activates her desire for her cat’s well being, which looks around for
relevant beliefs about what can be done to promote the well-being of limping cats, finds the
beliefs that vets treat cats with problems such as limps and that vets can be contacted by
telephone, and together with those beliefs causes Jill to telephone the vet. And when Jill’s
cat jumps up on to her lap, that activates her love for the cat, which activates a desire to
show affection for the cat, which interacts with the beliefs that cats are animals and that
stroking an animal is a way of showing it affection to produce cat-stroking behaviour.
On a phenomenal dispositionalist view, it’s a matter of complete indifference whether or
not cognitive science confirms the truth of such ‘just so’ stories by producing a taxonomy
of brain states corresponding to the dramatis personae of those stories. If it turns out that
there just isn’t any indentifiable state of Jill’s brain that occupies the causal role her love for
her cat is supposed to occupy in both of those scenarios, that is no threat to the truth of the
claim that Jill loves her cat - for her dispositional profile remains that of someone who loves
their cat.
Dennett makes a similar point in his (1978), in which he notes that the behaviour of a
chess-playing computer program might be successfully predicted and explained by ascrib-
ing to it the belief that it should get its queen out early, even though the program does
not include any representation with the content ‘I should get my queen out early’ (p. 107).
The point is made in response to representationalist theories in particular and so is made
in terms of representational content, but I think it could equally well be made in terms of
causal or functional role: the behaviour of a chess-playing computer program might be
successfully predicted and explained by ascribing to it the belief that it should get its queen
out early, even though the program does not include any line of code (or whatever) that
does the job reserved for the belief that one should get one’s queen out early in the sort of
functionalist ‘just so’ stories just referred to.
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to act, think and feel differently from someone who accepts, rationally, that P
must be the case.
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to think that the richness of ordi-
nary language induces commitment to the existence of a bewildering variety
of mental state types crying out for investigation by cognitive psychologists or
neurobiologists. No doubt there are salient neurological differences between
someone whose dispositional profile is such as to justify the ascription to him
of a gut feeling that P and someone whose dispositional profile is such as
to justify the ascription to him of a rational acceptance that P, and these dif-
ferences might well merit scientific investigation; but this does not mean that
neuroscience must ultimately either identify tokens of the gut feeling that P and
the rational acceptance that P in subjects’ brains, or else conclude that there
are no such phenomena as gut feelings and rational acceptances. The ordi-
nary interpreter and the neuroscientist are in quite different lines of business
and should not expect their different theories to map neatly on to one another;
the former is trying to fit subjects into interpretable patterns of interaction with
the world, while the latter is trying to work out what brain states and processes
underpin the existence of those patterns.
7.4 Profile building
Hopefully the foregoing has given a sense of where I find Dennettian interpre-
tationism helpful and where I find it wanting. Here, then, is a sketch of what I
think is going on when we ascribe mental states to subjects.
Our starting point is, as Dennett suggests, to assume that subjects believe
what they ought to believe and desire what they ought to desire, given their
place in the world and their purpose. Crucially, however, there is much more
going on here than the mere attribution of rationality to subjects. It is not merely
qua rational being that someone acquires a belief that his mother has just
walked into the room, but qua being with a certain array of sensory equipment
and a certain range of tendencies and capacities to process and respond to
certain sorts of sensory input in certain ways - e.g. to attend to certain details
of one’s environment while filtering out irrelevant ‘noise’, to recognize faces,
to respond emotionally to the presence of loved ones.2Among the relevant
2It has been suggested (Ellis and Young, 1990) that the presence of such an emotional re-
sponse is what makes the difference between a normal subject acquiring the belief that his
mother has just walked into the room, and a sufferer of the Capgras delusion acquiring the
belief that an imposter who looks just like his mother has just walked into the room.
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tendencies and capacities are, of course, tendencies and capacities to make
certain rational inferences. But at bottom, deciding what a subject ‘ought’ to
believe and desire, for the purposes of predicting or explaining her behaviour,
is a matter not of recognizing that reason demands she believe this or that, but
of being familiar with the ways in which subjects typically think and feel and
interact with their environment - of being familiar, that is, with the dispositional
profiles of typical subjects.
We do our interpreting in the full knowledge that people’s dispositional profiles
are not those of perfectly rational beings. People are good at seeing what
follows from what in some cases but not in others, so what inferences we as
interpreters think they ‘ought’ to make will depend on our assessment of their
capacities. In some contexts we will soon go wrong if we assume, for instance,
that everyone has a solid grasp of probability.
Consider the famous ‘Monty Hall Problem’. The problem goes like this: a
contestant on a game show hosted by Monty Hall is asked to choose one
of three doors. Behind one door, he is told, is a car; behind each of the other
two doors is a goat. Once the choice has been made, round one of the game
is over and Monty opens one of the remaining two doors to reveal a goat. (We
are to suppose that Monty knows but will not reveal the location of the car; that
if the contestant has chosen the door with the car behind it, Monty decides at
random which of the other doors to open; and, of course, that the contestant
grasps all this.) The contestant is then asked, in round two, if he would like
to switch to the other remaining door, or stick with his original choice. If the
contestant wants to maximize his chance of finding the car, should he switch
or stick?
The answer is that the contestant should switch in order to double his chances
of winning the car from one in three to two in three. And the reason for this
is not, on the face of it, especially hard to grasp; it certainly doesn’t require
mastery of any advanced mathematics.3 Assuming not much more than basic
rationality, people really ‘ought’ to be able to see it for themselves. But as a
matter of fact, most people - including many people with a mastery of advanced
mathematics (vos Savant, no date) - can’t. Most people think it makes no
difference if the contestant switches or sticks, since his chances of winning
must be fifty-fifty in either case: either the car is behind the door he has already
3Here’s a simple, non-technical explanation: if the contestant chooses the door with a car
behind it in round one, he’ll win if and only if he sticks. But if he chooses a door with a goat
behind it in round one, he’ll win if and only if he switches. Since there are twice as many
‘goat’ doors as ‘car’ doors, he’s twice as likely to have chosen a ‘goat’ door in round one
and therefore to win by switching.
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chosen, or else it’s behind the other door - right?
So if we want to predict the behaviour of that contestant, it’s no use crediting
him with the beliefs he ‘ought’ to have if only he can, so to speak, put two and
two together. Better to play the odds and assume he’s one of the majority of
people who will believe their chances are fifty-fifty either way, in spite of the fact
that that belief is incompatible with other beliefs they hold (e.g. that the initial
choice was twice as likely to have been a goat as a car).
And note that even if we make that assumption, we still risk being led astray if
we reason that the contestant is as likely to switch as to stick (since he thinks
he’s equally likely to win in either case). In fact we need to bear in mind that
the contestant is going to be asking himself: how would I feel if I stuck and
then lost? How about if I switched and then lost? Would I feel worse if I ‘had’
the prize and let it slip through my fingers, than if I just never had it? We need
to bear in mind that his thinking will be affected by the pressure he’s under,
by his emotional responses to imagined scenarios, by hunches he knows are
irrational, and so on. My money would be on the contestant sticking with his
original choice; but that is not a prediction easily arrived at simply by crediting
the contestant with a desire to win a car, a (false) belief that his chance of
doing so is one in two whether he switches or sticks, and a capacity to use
practical reasoning to settle on a course of action. In making it, I draw on a
host of intuited assumptions - available to me not because I have crunched
the practical-reasoning numbers, but just because I know what people are like
(and what being a person is like)4 - about what will be running through the
contestant’s head.
A competent interpreter grasps the sort of distinctions mentioned in section
7.3 - between feeling in one’s gut that P and accepting rationally that P, for
instance. He understands that a subject who feels in her gut that horse riding
is dangerous can be expected to act, think and feel differently from a subject
who accepts (on the basis of statistical evidence, say) that horse riding is dan-
gerous. (Just assuming that both of them believe horse riding is dangerous
4This is not intended to be an endorsement of simulationism (Goldman, 2006; Gordon, 1986);
I don’t mean to claim that my ability to put myself in other subjects’ shoes (in some sense)
provides my sole or primary route to successful explanation and prediction of their actions.
Rather, I mean to claim that that ability serves to extend my understanding of subjects be-
yond the mere recognition ‘from the outside’ of behavioural patterns into which they can
be fitted (plus inferences from their observed behaviour to their possession of beliefs and
desires that make sense of it). In particular, it puts me in a much stronger position to make
assumptions about subjects’ phenomenal dispositions and about cognitive dispositions for
which we may lack behavioural evidence. It is what enables me, in this case, to hypoth-
esize that a contestant might choose to stick with their original door simply because her
affective reaction to an imagined ‘switch and lose’ outcome is much more unpleasant than
her affective reaction to an imagined ‘stick and lose’ outcome.
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will not get him very far in predicting and explaining their behaviour.) And he is
adept at sorting people into types; he understands that there are very general
differences between the actions, thoughts and feelings of impatient, uninhib-
ited, quick-witted, passionate people and those of serene, reserved, slightly
dim and rather frosty ones. And no doubt he makes use of stereotypes, in the
everyday sense of the word, too; by considering the accent, or age, or attire, or
religious affiliation of the person he’s interpreting, he can take some short-cuts
to some provisional assumptions about their attitudes and character traits.
‘Provisional’ is a key word. Interpretation is a process of perpetual revision,
as old assumptions get dropped and new ones get made in light of new infor-
mation. In trying to predict and explain the behaviour of someone we know
little or nothing about, we have little choice but to base our cautious predictions
and explanations on the assumption that their dispositional profile is roughly
that of a ‘typical’ person - or perhaps a ‘typical’ person of their sex, age, ap-
pearance, or whatever else we have to go on. But as we learn more about
them - by paying attention to what they say and do in a range of situations -
our assumptions about their dispositional profile are being refined all the time.
We ascribe to them a new belief, desire, fear, hope, or character trait, and a
ripple effect changes our whole picture of them in subtle or not-so-subtle ways.
The holism of the mental is in this sense ‘in the eye of the interpreter’. The
right place to look for ‘interactions’ between mental states is, therefore, not in
a causal system of brain states responsible for producing behaviour, or in an
abstract practical-reasoning system for rationalizing or recommending courses
of action; it is within the pictures of subjects’ dispositional profiles we build up
for ourselves, as interpreters, using the language of mental states.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have endorsed the Dennettian interpretationist’s insistence
that the ascription of mental states to subjects must proceed holistically; mak-
ing sense of a subject necessarily means ascribing whole sets of mental states
to them at once. Someone might have or fail to have the dispositional profile of
a subject with all of these beliefs, these desires, and so on, but (for the reasons
set out in Chapter 6) there is no dispositional stereotype for the having of any
particular belief or desire considered in isolation - pace Schwitzgebel - and so
no question of a subject conforming or failing to conform to such a stereotype.
I have argued, however, that to adopt Dennett’s ‘intentional stance’ towards
subjects, by ascribing beliefs and desires to them and predicting that they will
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generally act as practical reasoning dictates, is to frame the business of in-
terpretation in unduly rationalistic terms. Interpretation must be grounded in
matters of fact about the tendencies and capacities subjects actually have: to
acquire or to fail to acquire certain beliefs about their environment, to make or
to fail to make certain inferences, to act ‘against their better judgement’ under
the influence of certain feelings, and so on. Interpreters who focus unduly on
beliefs, desires and practical reasoning will leave themselves blind to the sub-
tleties and complexities of individual subjects’ dispositional profiles - subtleties
and complexities that are intuitively grasped by interpreters who use everyday
language to ascribe a richer range of intentional and non-intentional mental
states to subjects.
128
8 Functionalism, Phenomenal
Dispositionalism, and
Theological Language
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I want to offer a ‘case study’ illustrating how a phenomenal
dispositionalist account of mentalistic language might be applied to special-
ized questions in the philosophy of mind and related areas. The nature of the
question being addressed also means we will be able to get an idea of what
phenomenal dispositionalism has to say about the sort of atypical agents1 that
populate the philosophy of mind literature - Martians (Lewis, 1980), ‘super-
Spartans’ (Putnam, 1963), ‘Blockhead’ systems (Block, 1981), and so on.
The question I want to address is this: how (if at all) is it possible to speak of
God using terms derived from our everyday discourse about human persons?
This question has long troubled theists. God, after all, is supposed to be wholly
other than human persons; surely, then, it cannot be legitimate to conceive of
him as having features in common with them?
In his (1989), William Alston proposes that it may indeed be legitimate so to
conceive of God, provided that the ‘common abstract features’ (Alston, 1989,
pp.66-67) he is thought of as sharing with human beings are realized in suitably
different ways in the divine and in the human case. His central thesis is that
if the functionalist analysis of mental state concepts is correct (or even partly
correct (1989, p.70)) in taking them to be concepts of functional roles, then
these common abstract features may include mental states. And if this is right,
then we can apply psychological terms univocally to human beings and God
without having to worry about failing to respect God’s radical otherness.
1I use the term ‘agents’ rather than ‘subjects’ so as not to beg the question against someone
who wonders whether some such system might be capable of acting even though it had no
thoughts and feelings. (To be an agent, I take it, is just to be something that acts, while to
be a subject is to be something that thinks and feels - that has a conscious mental life.)
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In this chapter, I will argue that while Alston’s functionalist account of mental
state concepts is ill-equipped to accommodate a number of important theistic
convictions concerning the nature of God, a phenomenal dispositionalist ac-
count might do rather better. The univocal application of psychological terms
to human beings and God may, I suggest, be possible on the basis that the
‘common abstract features’ these subjects share could include behavioural,
phenomenal and cognitive dispositions.
I will begin, in section 8.2, by briefly considering the historical background to
the problem under discussion. This is intended simply to give a sense of certain
important currents in theistic thought, currents we will continue to feel pulling in
this direction or that, as the main discussion proceeds. Section 8.3 will consist
of an assessment of Alston’s account, in the course of which it will become
clear that it is vulnerable to a number of objections falling into two broad cat-
egories: those which take it to be repugnant to God’s otherness, and those
which take it to be repugnant to God’s personhood. In section 8.4, I will ar-
gue that a phenomenal dispositionalist account of the meaning of mental state
terms answers all of these objections - though not without inviting objections of
its own from theists with certain convictions.
I should make it clear that it is not my intention in this chapter to take sides
in pertinent theological controversies concerning whether or not God is atem-
poral, or perfectly simple, or possesses libertarian free will, and so on. I have
no theological convictions of my own and no reason to favour one theist’s con-
victions over another’s (though I will assume it’s the God of Christian theism
we’re talking about). Just as some theists would find Alston’s functionalism a
poor fit for the God they believe in, there is no escaping the fact that others
would have similar reservations about phenomenal dispositionalism. What fol-
lows, then, should be seen as an exercise in comparing and contrasting an
attempt to show how claims about God’s mental states might be understood
in functionalist terms, with an attempt to show how those claims might be un-
derstood in phenomenal dispositionalist terms - an exercise that will, I hope,
help to illuminate the important differences between these positions. I shall not
make it my business to assess such claims about God’s mental states, beyond
noting the respects in which they might strike someone as being concordant or
discordant with this or that conviction concerning the nature of God.
It is also worth making the point that the question under discussion here is
not only of interest to theists. Anyone who is concerned to understand theistic
claims - including those who seek to challenge those claims - also has good
reason to try to pin down the meanings of the terms in which those claims are
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made.
8.2 Personhood and otherness in the theistic
tradition
Let’s begin by considering the problem under discussion in a little more depth.
In speaking of a personal God, the theist typically uses the very same terms
she would use to speak of human persons; call them ‘personalistic’ predicates,
or ‘P-predicates’ (a term Alston borrows from Strawson (1959)) (Alston, 1989,
p.41). Thus God is said, for instance, to be just and good, to love his children,
and to have knowledge and desires concerning his creation. But just what
should we take such terms to mean, when applied to God? After all, God is
supposed to be something quite different from a human person: where we are
embodied, finite, and flawed, God is incorporeal, eternal, omnipotent, omni-
scient and morally perfect. God’s mind must therefore be quite different from
ours, and if this radical otherness of the divine is to be respected – if we are to
avoid sliding into anthropomorphism – it seems we have reason to be wary of
taking our P-predicates to have just the same meanings when applied to God
that they have when applied to human persons.
But here the theist faces an immediate problem. For what meanings, other
than the everyday meanings they have when we use them to speak about one
another, are available for our P-predicates? Mill presses the point as follows:
Language has no meaning for the words Just, Merciful, Benevo-
lent, save that in which we predicate them of our fellow-creatures;
and. . . if in affirming them of God we do not mean to affirm these
very qualities, differing only as greater in degree, we are neither
philosophically nor morally entitled to affirm them at all. . . If in as-
cribing goodness to God I do not mean. . . the goodness of which
I have some knowledge, but an incomprehensible attribute of an
incomprehensible substance. . . what do I mean by calling it good-
ness?. . . To say that God’s goodness may be different in kind from
man’s goodness, what is it but saying. . . that God may possibly not
be good?
(Mill, 1999, pp.249-250)
Thus the theist is presented with an apparent dilemma: accept that P-predicates
can be truly and univocally predicated of God and human persons (and hence
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that God is not so radically other as all that), or deny that they can be so pred-
icated (and hence accept that God is just so radically other that we have no
way of saying what his attributes are).2
Those theists who have responded to this dilemma have typically opted for its
second horn. Being unable to say anything about the positive attributes of God
is, they have pointed out, perfectly consistent with being able to say all sorts
of genuinely informative things about what God is not, and Maimonides (1999,
pp.92-98) goes so far as to assert that talk about God should be conducted
strictly within the limits of this via negativa (or negative path).
Still, the majority of theistic thinkers have been unwilling to go that far, and
indeed have placed considerable weight upon the idea that God shares cer-
tain features with human beings. The teleological argument for the existence
of God, for instance, rests on the idea that our orderly, efficiently-functioning
world must have been caused to exist by something which reasons, desires,
purposes and acts much as we do – something, that is, with ‘a mind like the
human’ (Hume, 1998, p.35, Hume’s italics). The fourth of Aquinas’ ‘five ways’
to demonstrate the existence of God, meanwhile, rests on the idea that God
and his creatures have certain properties – ‘perfections’ – in common, God
having these most fully and causing his creatures to possess them in lesser
degrees (1999, p.106). In a somewhat similar vein, Descartes (1996, pp.39-40)
argues that knowledge of the divine nature can be acquired by recognizing the
weakness and limitations of our own faculties – e.g. understanding, memory,
imagination – and going on to form an idea of these same faculties as they are
possessed in a perfected form by God. Nor can the philosophically inclined
Christian theist afford to lose sight of the fact that the God of the Bible is a
personal agent in a very strong sense: someone who commands and forgives,
makes promises, exhibits jealousy and anger, and so on.
Of course, the history of theistic thought on this subject is not the history of
two warring factions, ‘mystics’ and ‘anthropomorphites’ perhaps (to borrow the
terms Hume’s Cleanthes and Demea apply pejoratively to each other (Hume,
1998, p.28 et passim)), affirming God’s radical otherness and his personhood,
respectively. Rather, it is (by and large) the history of theists attempting to show
that there can be a sense in which God is both a person and radically other
than human persons. Aquinas, for example, maintains that while the via neg-
ativa does indeed offer one route to knowledge about God, the via anologica
also makes possible the positive application of P-predicates to God, in senses
2cf. Soskice’s (1987, pp.143-144) characterization of the empiricist’s challenge to theism:
‘the would-be theist must claim to know too much of God, or claim to know nothing of him
at all’.
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analogous to those in which they are used of human persons (2008, First Part,
q.13, a.5; a.6). Other thinkers have emphasized the role of metaphor or sym-
bolism in religious discourse.3In Alston’s view, however, theistic thinkers have
typically been too hasty in ruling out the possibility that terms may be applied
univocally to human beings and God without compromising God’s otherness
(1989, p.67). It is this relatively neglected possibility4 that he sets out to ex-
plore.
8.3 Alston’s functionalist account of theological
language
8.3.1 The account
In summarizing Alston’s position, I will restrict myself to considering those as-
pects of his account which either motivate the objections we will be considering
in subsections 8.3.2 and 8.3.3, or which I will later make use of in offering my
own phenomenal dispositionalist account in section 8.4. I will also be restrict-
ing myself, at this stage, to considering the account just as Alston offers it in
‘Functionalism and Theological Language’ (1989, pp.64-80) rather than incor-
porating the modifications he makes to it in ‘Divine and Human Action’ (1989,
pp.81-102). This will, I think, make for a more satisfying dialectic when we
come to consider objections to Alston’s position.
Since both functionalism and the divine nature may be conceived of in a num-
ber of different ways, it seems prudent to begin by identifying the conception of
each with which Alston is working. Two features of Alston’s conception of the
3Such thinkers have differed widely, however, in their assessment of just what the role of
metaphor is. Swinburne (1992, pp.157-162) argues that the ability to convey information
through the use of metaphor is one of the features of human language which makes pos-
sible the revelation of propositional truths about God, and gives a number of examples of
how careful interpretation allows us to pin down the meaning of metaphorical statements
concerning God. Soskice (1987, pp.148-153), on the other hand – taking experience of
God rather than propositional revelation about God to be of prime importance to the theist
– argues that the use of metaphor allows us to communicate something about such expe-
rience which could not otherwise be communicated, and hence to speak genuinely of God
without having to pin down what we are saying to some sort of claim about how God is to
be defined.
4The possibility has certainly not been wholly ignored; for instance, Swinburne (1992, pp.150-
154) argues that P-predicates such as ‘good’ and ‘wise’ are univocally applicable to human
beings and God. What makes Alston’s account truly distinctive is not, therefore, the claim
that God has general personality traits (such as being wise) just as we do; rather, it is the
claim that this is so because God also has particular mental states with particular contents
(such as beliefs or desires that P) just as we do.
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divine nature are noteworthy. Firstly, he denies that God is perfectly simple.
This is controversial, but (as we shall see) essential to getting a functionalist
account of the divine mind off the ground. Secondly, he takes God to be atem-
poral rather than eternally enduring. This too is controversial, although in this
instance (again, as we shall see) the implications for the applicability of func-
tionalism to the divine mind are not so serious. Alston also, of course, takes
God to be incorporeal, omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect.
The version of functionalism with which Alston is concerned (1989, pp.67-68)
is the familiar analytic functionalist position which takes our ordinary folk psy-
chological concepts of mental states to be concepts of states occupying certain
causal or functional roles. The great virtue of this position, from Alston’s per-
spective, is that it takes our everyday psychological concepts, and hence the
terms which express them, to be wholly neutral with regard to what sort of
states actually play these functional roles. So even if the state playing some
causal role in the divine psychology is constituted quite differently from the
state playing that same role in the psychology of a human person, it will be
perfectly legitimate for us to use the same term to refer to both. From this,
Alston’s central thesis follows quite naturally: insofar as the way in which such-
and-such a mental state is realized in God may be quite different from the way
in which it is realized in a human being, we can legitimately maintain that God
is so radically other than human beings that we cannot know what it is (or, es-
pecially, what it is like) for God, say, to believe or desire that P; yet insofar as
such mental states play the same functional role in the divine mind that they
play in the human, we can maintain with equal legitimacy that P-predicates are
applicable to God and to human beings in just the same, readily understand-
able sense5 (Alston ,1989, p.69).
Of course, this line of reasoning will only bear fruit if the divine and human psy-
chologies can in fact have functional properties in common. Alston therefore
argues at some length that such commonality is not ruled out by the differ-
ences between God and human beings. Rather than follow his line of thought
in detail, I will simply note some of the most important points he makes:
• Since the preeminent functional role played by mental states is the pro-
duction of overt behaviour, and since in the human case this involves
bodily movement, we need to make sense of the idea that an incorporeal
being is capable of such behaviour (is capable, that is, of acting). This we
5Note, however, that this sense need not be just the established, everyday sense a P-
predicate already has. Alston is arguing not for the possibility of that sort of ‘straight univoc-
ity’, but rather for the possibility of ‘modified univocity’, i.e. the possibility that terms may be
devised which are applicable univocally to God and human beings (1989, pp.65-67; p.73).
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can do simply by recognizing that what is central to our concept of action
is not bodily movement, but the intentional bringing about of changes in
the world. (Alston, 1989, p.72)
• Since performing a function involves temporal duration, and since causal-
ity may be thought to imply temporal succession, we should conceive of
functional psychological concepts in terms of lawlike connections rather
than causal roles in order to make them applicable to an atemporal God
(Alston, 1989, pp.72-73).
• The divine psychology is vastly simpler than the human psychology. The
whole range of human goal-setting states (desire-like states) can be re-
placed in the divine case with a a single state appropriate to a being
which is not subject to things like ‘biological cravings’, ‘gusts of passion’,
‘uncontrollable longing’, or indeed any kind of desire which runs contrary
to what is recognized to be right; this state could be termed ‘Recognizing
that it is good that p’. Similarly, with regard to cognitive guidance states
(belief-like states), God will not have ‘degrees of belief’ as human be-
ings do, or indeed any beliefs which do not count as knowledge. For any
true proposition p, God will (since he is omniscient) have the ‘intuitive’
knowledge that p. Thus God’s cognitive guidance states do not, as ours
do, play a role in inferential processes. They do, however, have ‘lawlike
connections’ to other such states, these connections being logical rela-
tionships. (Alston, 1989, pp.75-78)
• If God is omnidetermining – if, that is, his only overt action is the creation
of a universe of which every detail is fixed – then cognitive guidance
of his behaviour will consist solely in his evaluative apprehension of the
differing possibilities he could choose to actualize. If God leaves some
details of creation undetermined, however – viz. the choices made by
free agents and the effects of their making those choices – there will be
actions taken by God which are guided by his knowledge of states of
affairs which do not obtain solely in virtue of his own creative activity.
(Alston, 1989, pp.76-77)
Clearly, then, there will only be a limited degree of commonality between the
divine mind and the human, and in this sense there will only be a ‘core of
meaning’ (Alston, 1989, p.79) which is shared by psychological terms as they
apply to God and to human beings. This core of meaning can be identified,
according to Alston, by starting with a human psychological concept and then
stripping away everything that has to do with human limitations, until what’s left
is a psychological term that is literally applicable to God. Does this mean that
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God’s mental life will appear enriched as we proceed to do for our concepts
of love, hope, sorrow and so on what Alston has done for belief and desire?
To think so would be to miss Alston’s point about the simplicity of the divine
psychology. The functionalist is, after all, only interested in identifying those
mental state concepts required to explain the full range of an agent’s possible
behaviour; and we have already seen that the full range of God’s possible
behaviour can, on Alston’s view, be explained entirely in terms of a single goal-
setting state (recognizing that it would be best that p) and a single cognitive
guidance state (knowing intuitively that p). So on Alston’s view, any P-predicate
which can legitimately be applied to God must - in the final analysis - be telling
us something about just those states.
8.3.2 Objections from divine otherness
8.3.2.1 The objection from divine simplicity
Since Alston sets out to provide us with an account of how P-predicates can
be applied to God in a way that respects both his radical otherness and his
personhood, it seems appropriate to divide objections to his account into those
which take him to have failed to respect one or other of these things. I will begin
by considering three objections which take Alston’s account to be repugnant to
God’s otherness.
The objection from divine simplicity is motivated by the following consideration.
In order for a functionalist account to be applicable to an incorporeal being,
some account must be available of what it is for such a being to be in this or
that state. Now, for a physical thing like a brain to be in this state rather than
that is, on a typical functionalist understanding, for it to have some particular
set of physical features rather than another such set; to have some particu-
lar structure or composition, perhaps, or to exhibit some particular pattern of
physical activity. For an incorporeal being to be in this state rather than that,
then, is presumably for it to have some analogous set of nonphysical features,
features that we can conceive of as playing a role in explanations of that be-
ing’s mental activity and behaviour. Thus we might think of such a being as
possessing some particular set of ideas, or mental pictures, or propositions,
or whatever, which might be stored or accessed in a certain way or manifest
themselves in certain patterns of thought (e.g. perhaps two particular ideas
might be recalled from memory, ‘held before the mind’s eye’ and compared).
This sort of picture, though, is flatly inapplicable to a being which is perfectly
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simple, and to which, therefore, no sort of structure or composition or arrange-
ment of parts whatsoever may be attributed. Alston is perfectly well aware of
this, and makes it clear from the outset (1989, pp.64-66) that his account is not
intended to be applicable to a perfectly simple God. I mention it here simply
to make clear that the theist who conceives of God in this way has reason to
reject Alston’s account outright.
8.3.2.2 The objection from divine omniscience
Central to a functionalist account of mind and action is the identification of two
distinct types of mental state, goal-setting states and cognitive guidance states.
Now, in the human case, cognitive guidance states – beliefs – are taken to be
functionally related not just to behavioural ‘outputs’, but also to sensory ‘inputs’;
paradigmatically, a belief is acquired by a subject in response to information
taken in through her senses, and then plays a role in the production of her
behaviour. God, of course – since he just doesn’t have senses as we do –
can’t be thought of as acquiring beliefs in response to sensory input. However,
since an omniscient God knows that p for any true proposition p, there will
be a lawful co-variation between his cognitive guidance states and facts about
the world. Alston proposes, therefore, that we can simply think of all the true
propositions there are - or all the facts about the world - as constituting input to
the divine mind (1989, p.96).6
Laura Garcia, whose (1992) includes a sustained critical assessment of Al-
ston’s position, rejects this proposal on the following grounds (1992, pp.207-
208). For any given action taken by God, there will be certain facts about the
world – certain contingently true propositions – which are true as a result of
that action. And God’s knowledge of those facts can’t possibly play a role in
the production of that very action; it would be absurd to suggest that God’s
knowledge that p is (in part) responsible for his bringing it about that p. So in
considering any given action of God, it just doesn’t seem possible to think of
all the true propositions there are as constituting input to the divine mind.
6I am sidestepping a terminological issue here. Alston’s stated intention (1989, p.70) is to
leave functional concepts having to do with inputs entirely out of the picture; hence he
maintains that true propositions, or facts about the world, provide us only with an analogue
of input in the divine case (1989, p.96). I will not persist with this distinction between
inputs and analogues of inputs. Certainly the picture of some sort of perceptual fact being
physically inserted into someone’s head via the sense organs doesn’t carry across from
the human to the divine case; but if we’re serious about adopting a functionalist account
of the meaning of mental-state terms, and believe that we have identified something which
plays essentially the same functional role in the divine case that input plays in the human,
I think we may as well go ahead and call it ‘input’.
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This is only a problem, however, if Garcia is correct in supposing that on Al-
ston’s view, all the true propositions there are must be thought of en masse as
constituting input to the divine mind in considering any given action taken by
God. And it is easy to see why the theist might want to make just that assump-
tion: an omniscient God can’t strictly be lacking any items of knowledge when
he acts. However, theists have often felt it important (in order to maintain that
human beings are genuinely free agents, and that God is not culpable for creat-
ing individuals who do evil) to preserve the notion that God can, in some sense,
acquire ‘new’ information stemming from the free choices we make. Thus Al-
ston distinguishes clearly between God’s original creative activity, which is not
guided by his knowledge of the choices made by free agents and the states of
affairs which obtain in virtue of their making those choices, and those aspects
of divine activity which are guided by such knowledge – knowledge which God
has only because he ‘looks and sees’ how things turn out (1989, p.77).
In light of Garcia’s critique, it appears that God’s knowledge of contingent truths
resulting from his own actions must likewise be conceived of as ‘new’ informa-
tion, knowledge God has because he looks and sees how the world is. (This
seems a little odd, since God must know very well, in taking some given ac-
tion, what the world will be like as a result of that action; but I think there is
a legitimate distinction to be drawn between God’s knowledge that his action
will bring it about that p, and his knowledge that p.) This ‘new’ information,
along with ‘new’ information stemming from the free choices made by human
agents, may then be conceived of as playing a functional role in the production
of a certain class of divine actions: those which consist in God’s ‘responses’
to contingent states of affairs, rather than his original creation of the world ex
nihilo.
If God is taken to be omnidetermining, however, the implications of Garcia’s
critique are much more serious. For if God performs just one overt action, the
creation of a universe of which every detail is fixed, then there is no behaviour-
production role which could possibly be played by his knowledge of contingent
truths resulting from that action (as distinct from his knowledge that those con-
tingent truths will result from that action). And since on a functionalist account,
for an agent to know something just is for her to be in some state which plays
a functional role in the production of behaviour or at least would play such a
role in certain circumstances - it appears that on such an account, God just
doesn’t have that knowledge. Since God is necessarily omniscient, therefore,
a functionalist account of cognitive guidance states is flatly inapplicable to an
omnidetermining God.
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8.3.2.3 The objection from divine freedom
In offering an account of mentalistic language on which mental events and
states are conceived of as figuring in a causally cohesive, broadly naturalistic
picture of the world – a picture within which everything that happens can be
explained in terms of lawlike regularities – functionalism has often been thought
to advance a physicalist agenda (Armstrong, 1993; Lewis, 2002). But perhaps
it need not do so at all. Perhaps the physical realm is not causally closed, and
there are nonphysical things that can interact with physical things in lawlike
ways.7 In that case there could be, as Alston proposes, states of an incorporeal
being which play a functional role in a causal chain leading from facts about the
world (‘inputs’) to changes intentionally effected in the world (‘outputs’). Still,
the theist may very well find himself wondering just where this gets us – for this
is not at all the way that God, who is supposed to be a supernatural, perfectly
free being who creates natural laws rather than being subject to them, fits into
the theistic world view.
And indeed, in his ‘Divine and Human Action’, Alston acknowledges (1989,
p.91) that his account in ‘Functionalism and Theological Language’ is defec-
tive precisely in that it makes God subject to natural laws, thus removing his
freedom of choice.8 Garcia (1992, p.206) draws attention to Alston’s attempt to
modify that account by bringing ‘agent causation’9 into the picture, his proposal
being that an agent’s mental states do not strictly determine that she will act
thus-and-so, since her free volition may intervene between those states and
her behaviour (1989, pp.92-95).
7Thus ‘functionalism is compatible with the sort of dualism that takes mental states to cause,
and be caused by, physical states’ (Levin, 2013, section 1) – i.e. with the sort of interac-
tionism proposed by Descartes (1996). Many have wondered, of course, just how things
as fundamentally different as the dualist supposes mental and physical states to be could
interact causally; this is a question which has been pressed upon the interactionist since
Descartes’ own time, when Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia was among the first to identify
the problem (Descartes, 1978, p.106; pp.111-112).
8I am here following Alston (1989, p.91) and Garcia (1992, p.206) in assuming that on a
standard functionalist account, these natural laws are to be thought of as deterministic.
Traditionally, concerns over divine freedom have been motivated not by any suggestion
that God is subject to natural laws, but by the suggestion that God may be constrained by
his own nature to act in some particular way – that he may, in particular (given his perfect
goodness) lack the freedom to refrain from creating the best possible world (see Rowe’s
(2004) for an extended discussion of this problem). It is characteristic of Alston’s attempt to
apply a model of the human mind to God that the problem he has in accommodating divine
freedom is more akin to the traditional problem of reconciling human freedom and deter-
minism than to the traditional problem of reconciling the perfect freedom and the perfect
goodness of God.
9Agent causation is distinguished by its proponents from event causation, the idea being –
roughly – that an agent’s actions can be free (in a libertarian sense) insofar as they are
caused by the agent herself rather than by events in her mind (Pink, 2004, pp.111-112).
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As Garcia notes (1992, pp.206-207), and as Alston himself admits (1989,
pp.94-95), this is to insert an irreducibly non-functionalist notion – libertarian
free volition – into his account. But this should come as no surprise, since
Alston clearly has no interest in preserving the naturalistic world view of tradi-
tional functionalism except insofar as it is embedded in those meanings of P-
predicates he himself proposes to devise. Of course, if those meanings strike
the naturalist as chimeras, crude attempts to graft disreputable talk of libertar-
ian free will onto an otherwise respectable way of speaking about agents, this
matters to Alston not one jot. But the conception of God embedded in the sort
of meanings he proposes to devise for our P-predicates still has to be coherent
and tenable.
Garcia maintains that it is not, for the following reason. Alston’s view rests
fundamentally on the idea that it is legitimate to speak of God as having ‘ten-
dencies’ (Alston, 1989, p.91) to act in this way or that, and that when we do so
we are not just talking about statistical laws or counterfactual truths; rather, we
are attributing to God states that play a causal role in the production of his be-
haviour. Seemingly, then, these tendencies are to be thought of as pulling an
agent in this direction or that, with the strongest tendency winning the day and
deciding what action is taken unless checked by a free volition. But if this is cor-
rect, then Alston is quite wrong to suggest that God’s free agency is causally
responsible for his actions; rather his actions are the automatic result of those
of his tendencies which he elects not to block. As Garcia suggests, God’s will
here is in a position analogous to that of a bomb specialist who can through
her free volition allow a bomb to go off or not, but cannot through her free vo-
lition cause that bomb to go off. Just as the bomb’s being set will cause an
explosion unless the specialist chooses to intervene, so some state of God will
cause him to act thus-and-so unless he chooses to intervene. This is a quite
unacceptably passive role for the divine will – God, surely, must be thought of
as having the power actively to bring things about through the exercise of his
will, not just the power to block tendencies to which he finds himself subject.
Nor will it help Alston’s case to suggest that God’s tendencies can instead be
thought of as consisting in his actively pushing in this direction or that, actively
seeking or striving towards some goal, for this would involve his actively pur-
suing multiple incompatible goals at once10 – a clearly irrational thing to do
(Garcia, 1992, pp.208-211).
These points are, I think, sufficiently powerful to suggest that Alston’s account
10This is so because if God didn’t have tendencies to pursue incompatible goals, there would
be no question of his choosing to pursue one goal rather than another by choosing to act
in accordance with one tendency rather than another.
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of the roles played by God’s will and by his mental states in the production of
behaviour is not satisfactory just as it stands. However, the fundamental diffi-
culty Alston faces here – squaring the evident importance of mental states to
any satisfactory account of an agent’s behaviour, with the intuition that freedom
of the will entails that her behaviour is not simply determined by such states
– is hardly a new problem thrown up by his attempt to apply functionalism to
the divine mind. On the contrary, it is an all-too-familiar problem which faces
any account of agency, whether divine or human. If Garcia is right and Alston
fails to give an adequate account of just how libertarian free will is supposed
to work – well, he is in good company. But here the defender of Alston could
simply help himself to a ‘get out of jail free’ card – appealing, perhaps, to Kant’s
distinction between the causality of nature and the causality of freedom (1993,
p.376), or to Colin McGinn’s (1993) ‘mysterian’ view that the problem of free will
is among those philosophical stumpers which are simply insoluble for beings
with our cognitive abilities – and choose to respect the intuition that agents, and
especially God, just must have libertarian free will whether we can see how it
works or not. So long as God’s freedom poses poses no special problem, that
strikes me as a reasonable line to take. And we must be careful not to lose
sight of the fact that Alston is attempting only to show how meanings could be
devised for P-predicates which are applicable to God, not to give a complete
and accurate account of the workings of the divine mind. If ‘God is in mental
state S’ must be taken to mean something a bit vague and woolly-sounding
like ‘God is in a state which plays a causal role in his tending to take this sort
of action in this sort of circumstances, but doesn’t strictly determine that he
does so since he has free will’, maybe that will have to do. (Very plausibly, this
leaves us no worse off in the divine case than in the human, which seems like
a reasonable benchmark against which to judge the success of an account of
God’s mental states.)
So, one option for the defender of Alston’s position in the face of Garcia’s cri-
tique is just to insist that the sort of meanings he proposes be devised for
P-predicates as they apply to God may be legitimately so devised even in the
absence of a complete and satisfactory account of the divine mind, and to take
it on faith that propositions about God expressed in those terms will not then
be flatly false (since God’s actions really must be the result of some such in-
teraction between his mental states and his will as is being presupposed). A
radical alternative would be to plump for a rationalist compatibilist account of
freedom, according to which God is perfectly free precisely because he is per-
fectly rational (see Pink, 2004, pp.48-49). This would satisfy neither Garcia
nor Alston, both of whom insist on some form of libertarian freedom for God,
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but it would give us a very neat functionalist model of the divine mind. On
this view, God’s mental states could be thought of quite straightforwardly as
being causally responsible for his behaviour, just as functionalism seems to re-
quire. To the objection that this makes God into a mere automaton, a rationalist
compatibilist advocate of functionalism about the divine mind could offer two
replies. Firstly, he can simply affirm that rationalist compatibilist freedom – with
an agent’s actions being determined rationally by his cognitive guidance and
goal-setting states, unhindered by interference from environmental factors and
irrational impulses – is precisely the sort of freedom we should expect to find
exemplified in a perfectly rational, omniscient being. Secondly, he can observe
that in the divine case, there is no place for the sort of anxieties raised by com-
patibilist accounts of human freedom, anxieties stemming from the apparent
possibility of tracing a causal chain back from an agent’s goal-setting states
to the causes (perhaps biological, cultural or physical) of her being in those
states; for God would himself be the ultimate source of all his goal-setting
states.11
8.3.3 Objections from divine personhood
8.3.3.1 The objection from the phenomenal character of mental life
Let’s now move on to consider the respects in which Alston’s account might be
thought repugnant to God’s personhood.
Alston openly acknowledges that the concepts of divine mental states we are
left with in light of his functionalist account ‘are very thin, to say the least’
(Alston, 1989, p.98). We have an idea of the sort of relations in which God’s
mental states stand to his actions and to each other, but that’s all we have; in
particular, and in contrast to the human case, we lack any idea of what it is
like to be in those states. This observation serves to put the spotlight firmly
on one of functionalism’s major perceived shortcomings: its failure to capture
important facts about the phenomenal character of mental life.
As we have seen, one of the virtues of the functionalist approach to mental
states in general is that it is not ‘chauvinistic’ as far as such states are con-
cerned – it takes seriously the idea that things quite different from human be-
ings might have the same mental states we do, but differently realized. This
11I am assuming here that it is no threat to divine freedom if some of God’s cognitive guidance
states have an ‘ultimate source’ outside God himself, e.g. if God’s knowing that p is a
consequence of its being the case that p.
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enables us to understand how a Martian, say, or a robot, or of course an incor-
poreal being, might be said to have the very same types of mental states that
we have, even though it didn’t have a physical structure anything like ours. But
what if something had neither a physical structure anything like ours, nor an
‘inner life’ anything like ours? What if something with no capacity for conscious
experience whatever – a machine, a vegetable, an organizational structure –
appeared nonetheless to be capable of entering states having the same sorts
of functional role as our mental states (e.g. registering states of affairs, setting
goals and effecting changes in the world)? Would we not then find ourselves
in the absurd position of attributing mental states to things which self-evidently
don’t have minds?12
More specifically, is this the position Alston leads us to with regard to God? It
is all very well, one might argue, for Alston to say that on his account, we don’t
know what it is like to be God; but couldn’t we go further and say that on his
account, it seems that there is nothing that it is like to be God? After all, it is not
as if we don’t know what it is like to be God in just the way that Nagel (1974)
suggests we don’t know what it is like to be a bat. While a bat differs from us
in ways that make it impossible to imagine just what its conscious experiences
might be like, it is also similar to us in ways that make it reasonable to suppose
that it has broadly the same types of experience we do – experiences of things
like physical sensations, affective responses and mental processes. But on
Alston’s account, God just does not have things like physical sensations or
affective responses, and does not go through mental processes of any sort.
So what is there for him to have conscious experiences of? In what could his
inner life – the subjective aspect of his existence – possibly consist? In the
absence of any answer to questions like these, one would surely be justified in
concluding that Alston’s God is best characterized not as a personal agent, but
as a sort of moral equivalent of gravity – an impersonal, mindless force guiding
the universe. And that is a bit too radically other for most theists.
8.3.3.2 The objection from religious belief and practice
A related, but more general problem is this. Although God may, on Alston’s
account, be ‘personal’ in some sense – Alston characterizes him as ‘a time-
less “personal system” of functionally interrelated psychological states’ (Alston,
1989, p.101) – he is plainly not the sort of person one could relate to in the way
that much of our religious discourse takes human beings to relate to God. He is
12The suggestion here, that in avoiding chauvinism functionalism ends up committing the con-
trary sin of liberalism, is closely associated with Ned Block; see for example his (1991).
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not, that is, the sort of thing ‘with which we can coherently conceive ourselves
to be in dynamic personal relations of dialogue, support, love or instruction’
(Alston, 1989, p.101). Alston is forced to acknowledge, therefore, that while
that sort of discourse may essential to the practice of religion, it must strictly
be interpreted in non-literal terms (1989, pp.101-102). But this seems likely
to have many theists tearing their hair out in despair, on two counts. Firstly,
it means that while Alston’s account may offer some insight into what it might
mean for God to know or to desire that p, it leaves our original dilemma per-
fectly intact as regards the vast bulk of our talk of God. What does it mean to
say that God loves us, hears and answers our prayers, gets angry with us, is
merciful or just in his dealings with us, and so on? We still don’t know. Worse
than that – and this is the second reason one might have to despair at Alston’s
conclusion – it looks all too possible that such talk doesn’t really mean any-
thing, because it’s based on a view of God that is flatly mistaken. It’s all very
well, one might respond to Alston, saying that we need to conceive of God in
dynamic, personal terms for religious purposes, but if we know perfectly well
that that’s not what God is like, then natural theology and religion look to be in
danger of pulling away from each other in a potentially alarming way.
8.3.4 Conclusion of section 8.3
Given the wide variation in theistic conceptions of God, none of the foregoing
objections is flat-out fatal to Alston’s account. That account might, in fact, ap-
pear perfectly acceptable to someone with the following theistic commitments:
that God is not perfectly simple; that God is not omnidetermining; that the
perfect freedom of God does not (assuming the truth of rationalist compatibil-
ism) entail the falsity of determinism; that God’s being a person with a mind
does not entail his having conscious experiences of the sort we have when
we perceive the world via our senses, go through cognitive processes, and
have affective responses; and that God is not literally the sort of being much
of our religious discourse takes him to be – a dynamic, personal agent who
interacts with his creatures – and so those portions of our religious discourse
must be interpreted metaphorically or symbolically. Nor might that account
appear wholly unacceptable to someone who broadly took that view but had
reservations about signing up to rationalist compatibilism.
However, very many theists think that God is wholly simple, is omnidetermin-
ing, and (most importantly) is a dynamic, personal agent - one whose inter-
actions with our forebears are faithfully recorded in sacred texts, and one with
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whom we may interact today. It seems to me that many theists might think
Alston has done more harm than good by leading us to a conception of a
God who is a personal agent in only a terribly thin sense, if at all. Hence it is
worth our while to ask whether some account of the meaning of P-predicates
is available that allows for their univocal application to human persons and to
the sort of God in which these theists believe. In section 8.4, I will ask whether
a phenomenal dispositionalist account might fit the bill.
8.4 Phenomenal dispositionalism and theological
language
Just as Alston concedes from the outset that functionalism is flatly inapplicable
to a perfectly simple God, I must begin this section by conceding that phenom-
enal dispositionalism is flatly inapplicable to an atemporal God. This is simply
because conscious experiences are - so far as I can see - necessarily tempo-
ral; they are something one ‘goes through’. Thus it does not appear coherent to
suppose that a being with no experience of time whatever could, as phenom-
enal dispositionalism requires, be disposed to have conscious experiences.
What follows is, therefore, an attempt to apply phenomenal dispositionalism to
a God who is temporally eternal as well as incorporeal, omniscient, omnipotent
and perfectly good.
Of course, this means that those theists who are committed to God’s atempo-
rality will judge me to have fallen at the first hurdle. So be it. No account of
the meaning of P-predicates as applied to God could hope to please all of the
people all of the time; and if a phenomenal dispositionalist reading of theistic
claims leads us to conclude that those claims are incoherent - to conclude, for
instance, that God could not be both atemporal and personal - we can always
opt to revise those claims rather than to revise that reading.
A very welcome feature of phenomenal dispositionalism, from the theist’s per-
spective, is that it is relatively untainted by any physicalist or, more broadly,
naturalist agenda. Hence I can be spared the sort of agonies Alston goes
through in trying to integrate nonphysical states and undetermined volitions
into a functionalist picture which is typically seen as advancing such agendas.
In other respects, however, I can afford to follow Alston’s line of thinking quite
closely. A phenomenal dispositional account of divine mental states, like his
functionalist account, will hinge on the possibility that God may have certain
abstract features in common with human beings; it is just that where Alston
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takes these features to include functional roles played by mental states, I will
be taking them to include phenomenal, cognitive and behavioural dispositions.
Like Alston, then, what I need to do is to establish that God could in fact share
the abstract features in question with human beings.
And of course, Alston has already done much of this work for me. His sug-
gestion that a nonphysical being may be thought of as acting if it is capable
of intentionally bringing about changes in the world will serve perfectly well to
explain how behavioural dispositions may be ascribed to an incorporeal God.
Similarly, his identification of the lawlike connections (in the form of logical re-
lationships) which hold between God’s cognitive guidance states provides us
with a useful way of thinking about God’s cognitive dispositions: there is no
barrier to our saying that just as a human being who believes that p will, if p
entails that q, typically be disposed to believe that q, so will God (though since
God is unique, and certain to believe everything that is entailed by every true
proposition, the ‘typically’ will drop out in the divine case).
With regard to God’s phenomenal dispositions, however, I will have to stand on
my own two feet. The question facing us, then, is whether the mental states of
an incorporeal, infinite and eternal being could have a phenomenal character
similar to that of human mental states. Could God be disposed to feel sorrow
at the suffering of someone he loves, for instance, or to feel anger towards the
person who has intentionally caused that suffering?
It might be argued that God’s having such emotional responses is ruled out by
the doctrine of divine impassibility, according to which God is ‘not subject to
suffering, pain, or the ebb and flow of involuntary passions’ (Johnson, 2000).
Here we must note, first of all, that there are many theists who simply deny
this doctrine.13 But we can also observe that this doctrine has not in any case
universally been thought to entail that God does not have ‘real and powerful
feelings’; rather, it has been thought by some to entail only that his feelings
are never ‘involuntary, irrational or out of control’ (Johnson, 2000). And since
phenomenal dispositionalism is not in the business of assigning ‘feelings’ any
position in a causal chain – since it is perfectly neutral on such questions as
whether they are caused directly by external events or under the control of the
will, or whether they can overrule or be overruled by reason – this point can be
accommodated quite straightforwardly.
A second, related question has to do not with whether God is capable of hav-
13The denial of divine impassibility is especially characteristic of open theism, a position which
in general takes God to be a dynamic personal agent in a very strong sense (see Hasker,
2004, p.97 et passim).
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ing mental states with a phenomenal character similar to that of human mental
states, but whether it is legitimate for us to suppose that he does. Alston makes
it very clear that he thinks it is important to ‘preserve the point. . . that we can
form no notion of what it is like to be God’ (Alston, 1989, p.71). However, if a
being shares (and indeed, exceeds) our capacity to love and care for people,
to be merciful and compassionate towards them, to understand their weak-
nesses, and so on, then there is surely at the very least a strong prima facie
case for supposing that that being has an inner life which is somewhat like ours
with regard to its phenomenal character. That being may, it seems to me, le-
gitimately be presumed to feel compassion for people, feel sorrow concerning
the suffering of those it loves, and so on. So while the theist should no doubt
stop short of saying that he knows just what it’s like to be God - not least be-
cause an omniscient and omnipresent God has an awful lot of things to have
feelings about at any given moment - it it is less than clear that he must refrain
from attributing to God dispositions to have conscious experiences having a
phenomenal character somewhat similar to our own.
Forming a rounded picture of what it would be for God to be in this or that
mental state will be a matter of thinking about what sort of person God is and
what sort of behavioural, phenomenal and cognitive dispositions a person of
that sort ought to have, given what we take to be true about the world and
about moral values. (Note that whatever dispositions God ought rationally to
have, he will have. The caveats I have raised elsewhere about taking an overly
rationalistic approach to the characterization of mental states in human beings
- given our propensity to fail to draw correct inferences, to act on the basis of
irrational fears, and so on - don’t apply in God’s case.) According to the theist,
we know rather a lot about the sort of person God is; we know that he is a
perfectly rational person, a perfectly good person, a perfectly loving person,
a perfectly just person, a person of infinite power and knowledge, and so on.
(Just how far this list can be extended will depend on the precise status of
biblical and other reports concerning God’s ‘inner life’ and overt actions.) So
for instance – and here we find ourselves, once again, following Alston’s line
of thinking quite closely – we know perfectly well that if p is the case, and if p
entails that q, then God will know that q; that if it would be best that p, then
God will desire that p; that if God desires that p, and if the most rational way
for him to bring it about that p would be to take action a, then he will take
action a (cf. Alston 1989, pp.75-76 et passim). And if the foregoing account
of God’s phenomenal dispositions is on the right lines, we are also entitled
to suppose that, for instance, God’s loving someone or his being angry with
someone entails his having certain sorts of feelings.
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This last point serves to highlight a further important difference between Al-
ston’s account and its phenomenal dispositionalist rival. On Alston’s account,
we must apparently regard God’s mental states as wholly generic, incapable
of being characterized in any terms other than their functional role in setting
goals or providing cognitive guidance. Thus Alston is forced to the conclusion
that claims about God’s mental life which go beyond the attribution to him of
knowledge concerning (possible) states of affairs and their moral value must
be interpreted metaphorically or symbolically. Phenomenal dispositionalism,
on the other hand, makes possible the literal application to God of a rich psy-
chological vocabulary – one which attributes to him mental states which vary
with regard to their phenomenal character.
Thus all of the objections we have seen levelled at Alston’s functionalist ac-
count of divine mental states are answered by switching to a phenomenal
dispositionalist account. Since we are no longer taking mental states to be
internal structures of a complex system, there is (so far as I can see) no bar
to conceiving of God as perfectly simple; a perfectly simple being may be con-
ceived of as having dispositions of the sort phenomenal dispositionalism takes
our mental state terms to ascribe to subjects. And since ‘causal chains’ simply
do not figure in our account of dispositions, there is no question of a problem
arising as regards the compatibility of free will and determinism. Phenomenal
dispositionalism is perfectly neutral on this issue, entailing no claims about the
nature of causal processes that might or might not explain why certain coun-
terfactuals hold true of the subjects to whom we ascribe dispositions.
Since phenomenal dispositionalism does not conceive of knowledge in func-
tional terms, there is also no problem with attributing knowledge to God that
plays no functional role. Nonetheless, there is a lingering question here: just
what sort of dispositions are we attributing to God when we describe him as
having this or that belief concerning contingent facts which are the result of his
creative action? The obvious candidates now become cognitive and phenom-
enal dispositions. Even if there are no behavioural dispositions whatsoever as-
sociated with God’s believing that p, he will nonetheless be disposed to believe
everything that is entailed by p and perhaps to have conscious experiences
having to do with p (such as feeling sorrow or anger concerning p).
And of course, phenomenal dispositionalism is particularly well suited to an-
swering the objection that the God described by Alston is unrecognizable as
the dynamic, personal God whose interactions with human beings are at the
heart of much religious belief and practice. Phenomenal dispositionalism in-
sists that God’s being a person with a mind entails his having a temporal exis-
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tence, and his having dispositions to act, think and feel thus-and-so in different
circumstances – meaning that he may very well be just the sort of dynamic,
personal agent much of our religious discourse takes him to be. Hence there
is no need for us to set off down the road of interpreting all such discourse
in metaphorical or symbolic terms – a road which looks to many theists like a
slippery slope terminating in de facto atheism.
8.5 Conclusion
Because I presented the material in section 8.4 as a sort of parallel to Alston’s
functionalist account of divine mental states, it perhaps read rather like a pitch
to theists intended to encourage them to sign up to a rival phenomenal dispo-
sitionalist account. So let me take a step back from this exercise in applying
phenomenal dispositionalism to a particular question, place that exercise in a
wider context, and then say what I think this chapter has really been about.
Analytic functionalism is a theory about the meanings of our mental state
terms. If this human, this animal, this robot, this deity has states that play such-
and-such causal roles - well then, yes, that human, that animal, that robot, that
deity can truthfully be said to have such-and-such ‘beliefs’, ‘desires’, ‘hopes’,
‘fears’, and so on, since that is what we mean when we use those terms. Pin-
ning down the meanings of those terms in this way means we can pin down
just what it is we’re asking when we ask (say) if animals have beliefs, if a com-
puter could have desires, or if God could have mental states in common with
human persons. By making certain assumptions about what sort of thing X is,
and then trying to figure out whether a thing of that sort has (or could have)
states playing such-and-such functional roles, you can decide whether or not
it would be legitimate to ascribe such-and-such mental states to that thing.
As we have seen, however, one of the major objections to functionalism is
that this line of thinking licenses the ascription of mental states to things that
patently do not have minds - things that functionally resemble genuine subjects
in that they generate the right sort of behavioural outputs in response to the
right sort of environmental inputs, but that wholly lack the sort of conscious
mental life that makes genuine subjects subjects. One plausible objection to
Alston’s functionalist account of the divine mind is that it does precisely this
- licensing the ascription of mental states to something that we should not
take to have a mind at all, since it has no conscious experiences. (Worse
than that, Alston’s God does not even go through any unconscious processes
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that could be described, however loosely, in psychological or cognitive terms -
which plausibly makes him a poorer candidate for mental state ascription than
a pocket calculator.)
Phenomenal dispositionalism is also a theory about the meaning of our mental
state terms, and similarly enables us to pin down just what it is we’re asking
when we ask about the mental states of non-human agents. It enables us to
address those questions by trying to figure out whether a thing of such-and-
such sort has (or could have) the right sort of phenomenal, behavioural and
cognitive dispositions to make legitimate the ascription of such-and-such men-
tal states to that thing. As such, it steers well clear of the liberalism that plagues
functionalism. It does not rule out the possibility that computers or deities could
have minds (say), but it invites us to consider more than their functional orga-
nization before concluding that they do. In the case of a computer, we might
want to ask whether they are made of the right sort of stuff to give rise to con-
scious experiences. In the case of God, we might want to ask whether he is
the sort of thing that could display intelligence. We can’t just bundle phenome-
nal and cognitive dispositions in with behavioural dispositions and declare that
whatever acts like a thinking, feeling thing thereby is a thinking, feeling thing.
In terms of the material in this chapter, then, the moral of the story is not
supposed to be that, yes, God is the sort of thing that could have beliefs and
desires, get angry, feel jealous, love people, and so on. The moral of the story
is supposed to be that phenomenal dispositionalism provides us with a way of
understanding claims about the mental states of God or of any other human or
non-human agent - claims which can then be defended or refuted, reconciled
with one another or dismissed as inconsistent, and so on.
On final point in relation to what has become a recurring theme in this the-
sis: Alston’s attempt to apply functionalism to the divine mind represents an
interesting case study in the boiling down of mental life to practical reasoning
based on beliefs and desires. At the end of this process, the God he ends up
describing is a person in a terribly thin sense, if at all. This being’s ‘mental life’,
if it has one, certainly has vanishingly little in common with the mental lives of
human beings. Of course, Alston goes to the extremes he does only because
he is seeking to characterize the mind of a being that, unlike human beings,
is perfectly rational, is all-knowing, etc. But I think it is worth asking how far
we can go down this road in characterizing human minds without getting that
characterization drastically wrong.
In Chapter 9, I consider one response to concerns that belief-desire psychol-
ogy is not up to the task of characterizing the mental lives of human beings:
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Gendler’s argument for the recognition of a state type she calls alief.
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9 A Phenomenal Dispositionalist
Case Against Alief
9.1 Introduction
As I noted in the conclusion to Chapter 8, a recurring concern in this thesis has
been that practical-reasoning-based, belief-desire psychology is inadequate to
the task of capturing the realities of mental life (and so to the task of predict-
ing and explaining behaviour in mentalistic terms). When combined with the
assumptions that this belief-desire psychology is folk psychology, and that folk
psychology is a theory about the functional organization of the mind, it is easy
to see how this concern could motivate eliminativist arguments that folk psy-
chology will ultimately be discarded in favour of a theory that does a better job
of describing the workings of the mind, in part by identifying the states that are
really involved in those workings.
One response to such arguments - the response I have been advocating - is
to adopt a dispositionalist account of mental state ascriptions. The appeal of
this move is that it allows one to concede to the eliminativist that there may
indeed be no such ‘things’ as beliefs and desires in a Standard View sense
- that these terms may not pick out any individuable, physical, scientifically
respectable states of subjects - without conceding that ascriptions of beliefs
and desires to subjects must therefore, in the final analysis, be flatly false.
Rather, the dispositionalist argues, such ascriptions can be true regardless of
what states of a subject have what content or play what causal roles - just so
long as the subject has the right dispositions.
In this chapter, I want to consider a different response to the sort of con-
cerns that motivate eliminativism. In her (2008a), Tamar Gendler concedes
that belief-desire psychology fails to pick out the states that actually produce
much of our behaviour. But rather than agreeing with the eliminativist that folk
psychological mental states must therefore be consigned to the dustbin of his-
tory, or with the dispositionalist that the Standard View must therefore be so
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consigned, Gendler argues that we should simply incorporate into our existing
taxonomy of mental states a new state type operating alongside belief and de-
sire: alief. This hitherto-unidentified state type, Gendler argues, occupies an
important causal role in generating much of our behaviour.
What I want to argue in this chapter is, essentially, that Gendler is attempting
to lead us down a philosophical rabbit hole - one that we need not enter if we
adopt phenomenal dispositionalism. In section 9.2, I will introduce Gendler’s
concept of alief, drawing attention to the sort of mental and behavioural phe-
nomena she believes alief can help to explain and to certain important char-
acteristics of alief as she defines it. In section 9.3, I will consider Muller and
Bashour’s argument that ‘aliefs simply do not constitute a legitimate psycho-
logical category’ (2011, p.371), and suggest that their criticism of Gendler
(unwittingly, no doubt) invites us to continue Gendler’s project of fleshing out
and refining a philosophically respectable taxonomy of mental states (includ-
ing alief-like states). In section 9.4, I will argue that the concept of alief is so
badly flawed that to attempt to refine it would be futile, and that attempts to de-
vise a philosophically respectable taxonomy of mental states are, in any case,
fundamentally misguided.
9.2 Gendler on alief
In introducing the concept of alief, Gendler draws our attention to a number of
cases like the following (2008a, pp.635-637):
• A subject walking on a transparent walkway high above the Grand Canyon
(the ‘Skywalk’) feels as if she is in danger of falling, and as such proceeds
more cautiously than she would if she were on an opaque walkway in the
same location; but proceed she does, and she would not hesitate to af-
firm that the walkway is safe.
• A subject is disinclined to eat a piece of fudge shaped to look like dog
faeces; but he would readily acknowledge that it would taste just the same
and be just as safe as a normally-shaped piece of the same fudge that
he would not hesitate to eat.
• A subject borrows some money because she has left her wallet at home;
but upon taking the cash, she looks in her bag for her wallet (to put the
money in).
Gendler insists that such subjects really do believe what, if asked, they would
say they believe: that the walkway is safe, that the fudge is delicious, that the
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wallet is at home. But they have aliefs that are out of line with those beliefs.
As defined by Gendler,
Alief is a mental state. . . with associatively linked content. . . That is,
a cluster of contents that tend to be co-activated. . . In paradigmatic
cases, an activated alief has three sorts of components: (a) the
representation of some object or concept or situation or circum-
stance, perhaps propositionally, perhaps nonpropositionally, per-
haps conceptually, perhaps nonconceptually; (b) the experience of
some affective or emotional state; (c) the readying of some motor
routine. . . Notwithstanding [that] characterization. . . I do not want to
rule out the possibility of there being aliefs that involve the mental
activation of a different sort of associative cluster. Perhaps there are
cases where the activation occurs at a sufficiently low level to render
the notion of representation inapplicable. Perhaps there are states
that lack an obvious affective ingredient, or that do not include the
clear activation of a motor routine, but that nonetheless sufficiently
resemble our paradigm cases that we want to count them as aliefs.
Perhaps there are cases where the most noticeable associations
are not easily subsumed under the three categories offered—cases
that primarily involve the heightening or dampening of certain sorts
of attention, or the heightening or dampening of certain perceptual
sensitivities.
(Gendler, 2008a, pp.642-644)
In the three cases described above, the subjects’ relevant aliefs have, suggests
Gendler, the following representational-affective-behavioural or R-A-B content
(respectively): ‘Really high up, long long way down. Not a safe place to be! Get
off!!’ (2008a, p.635); ‘Filthy object! Contaminated! Stay away!’ (2008a, p.636);
‘Bunch of money. Needs to go into a safe place. Activate wallet-retrieval motor
routine now.’ (2008a, p.637).
Aliefs, says Gendler, can be either dispositional or occurrent:
A subject has an occurrent alief with representational-affective-behavioral
content R-A-B when a cluster of dispositions to entertain simulta-
neously R-ish thoughts, experience A, and engage in B are acti-
vated—consciously or unconsciously—by some feature of the sub-
ject’s internal or ambient environment. A subject has a disposi-
tional alief with representational-affective-behavioral content R-A-B
when there is some (potential) internal or external stimulus such
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that, were she to encounter it, would cause her to occurrently alieve
R-A-B.
(Gendler, 2008a, p.645)
So, when a subject steps on to a transparent walkway high above the ground
(for instance), what happens is that her dispositional alief with the content ‘Re-
ally high up, long long way down. Not a safe place to be! Get off!!’ is rendered
occurrent.
Kriegel suggests that ‘Gendler’s case for the alief/belief distinction is a sort of
argument from serviceability: the distinction is indispensable for explaining a
host of mental phenomena that would be utterly perplexing without it’ (2012,
p.476). I agree that that is how Gendler’s argument goes, but in assessing
that argument, I think it’s important to understand just who is supposed to find
these phenomena perplexing, and why.
It’s interesting to note, first of all, something Gendler says about the transparent-
walkway case: ‘Though some readers may find this story politically or aestheti-
cally disturbing, none - I take it - find it perplexing’ (2008a, p.634). Clearly, then,
she accepts that the failure of a person calmly and confidently to walk along
a transparent walkway high above the Grand Canyon, in spite of her avowed
belief that the walkway is safe, is not going to leave the average person mysti-
fied in the way that - say - the failure of a brick to fall to the ground in spite of
its lacking any visible means of support would leave him mystified. The latter
event cries out for explanation in terms of some force, hitherto unrecognized
by the average person, being at work; the former event does not.
Why not? Simply because we understand very well why the person stepping
onto the transparent walkway acts as she does:
The reason, of course, is that [stepping onto the walkway] activates
a [certain] set of affective, cognitive, and behavioral association-
patterns. . . input to her visual system suggests that she is striding
off the edge of a cliff. This visual input activates a set of affective
response patterns (feelings of anxiety) and motor routines (muscle
contractions associated with hesitation and retreat), and the visual-
vestibular mismatch produces feelings of dizziness and discomfort,
leading to additional activation of motor routines associated with
hesitation and withdrawal.
(Gendler, 2008a, p.640)
In describing the phenomena that are her focus, then - cases of belief-behaviour
mismatch - Gendler does not in fact expect her readers to find them perplex-
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ing. On the contrary, she expects us to recognize the sort of psychological
processes at work in these cases straight away.
And yet Gendler goes on to say this:
I will argue that any theory that helps itself to notions like belief,
desire, and pretense needs to include a notion like alief in order
to make proper sense of a wide range of otherwise perplexing phe-
nomena. Without such a notion, I will contend, either such phenom-
ena remain overlooked or misdescribed, or they seem to mandate
such a radical reconceptualization of the relation between cognition
and behavior that traditional notions like belief seem quaint and in-
adequate. In short, I will argue that if you want to take seriously
how human minds really work, and you want to save belief, then
you need to make conceptual room for the notion of alief.
(2008a, pp.641-642)
Just what is going on here? After conceding that these phenomena are not per-
plexing, Gendler now tells us that they are. After describing them in a way she
takes to be both familiar and correct, she tells us that they are at risk of being
overlooked or misdescribed. After explaining, in familiar and seemingly ade-
quate terms, how one’s automatic responses to stimuli can lead to behaviour
that’s out of line with one’s avowed beliefs and intentions, she suggests that
these cases may mandate a radical reconceptualization of the relation between
cognition and behaviour. Why?
Gendler’s worry is that these cases present us with an apparent dilemma. If we
stick to a simple model based around belief-desire explanations of behaviour
- which she takes to be a folk psychological model - we just won’t be able
to account for these phenomena; but if we adopt an alternative psychological
model based around things like ‘visual inputs’ and ‘motor routines’ - a model
that seemingly fares much better in terms of accounting for these phenomena
- we concede to the eliminativist that an empirically respectable account of the
causal processes underlying behaviour just is not going to be based around
interactions between states corresponding to folk psychological ‘beliefs’ and
‘desires’.
Gendler’s response is to make a ‘thus far and no further’ concession to the
eliminativist. We can recognize the importance of arational mental processes
that have nothing to do with beliefs, she proposes, without denying the impor-
tance of rational mental processes that do involve belief. And we can continue
to explain subjects’ behaviour in terms of states rather than digging down a
157
9 A Phenomenal Dispositionalist Case Against Alief
level and describing detailed processes. All we need to do is divide mental
labour between belief on the rational side and a different state, alief, on the
arational.
Having set out her stall, Gendler proceeds to defend the view that the sort of
mental phenomena she’s interested in can’t be accounted for using just the
resources of belief or imagination. From there she makes the leap to the con-
clusion that we had better acknowledge the role of alief in producing behaviour.
Presumably this is because Gendler takes a narrow view of the taxonomy of
folk psychology: it recognizes beliefs, desires and imaginings as legitimate
state types, but not much else. Certainly it does not deal in the gut reactions,
feelings as if P and so on that are part and parcel of ordinary mentalistic dis-
course. Hence once belief and imagining have been tried and found wanting,
we have to look outside the existing folk psychological taxonomy of state types
for a philosophically respectable solution to the problems Gendler identifies.
9.3 Muller and Bashour’s case against alief
In their (2011), Hans Muller and Bana Bashour argue that ‘aliefs simply do not
constitute a legitimate psychological category’ (p.371). In this section, I want
to consider their reasons for thinking so.
Muller and Bashour note (2011, pp.374-375 et passim) that belief is a nor-
mative rather than merely descriptive concept, on Gendler’s view. Belief is
not simply a mental state that, as it happens, is typically formed and revised
through rational processes in response to evidence; rather, it is a mental state
the nature of which is to be thus formed and revised. Mental states that don’t
live up to that standard just don’t qualify as ‘beliefs’, and so if we don’t act as
we ought to act if we were rational and attending to the evidence, then our
actions must be due not to beliefs, but to aliefs formed through sub-rational
mechanisms.
Gendler recognizes (2008b, p.566n.26) that things can’t really be this clear-cut,
since there are clearly cases in which people’s beliefs don’t change as they
apparently ought to change in response to evidence. Some of our deepest-
seated beliefs, about religion and politics for instance, don’t routinely shift in
response to evidence, and Gendler concedes that ‘the matter requires further
thought’ (2008b, p.566n.26). Muller and Bashour argue that this is a bigger
problem for Gendler’s account than she seems to realize:
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In fact, when we compare the ways that many of our beliefs and
what she calls aliefs are shaped, we see that the alief/belief dis-
tinction collapses. Many of our deep-seated beliefs can be (and
probably have been) formed through habituation, and many of what
Gendler calls aliefs may be changed by changes in evidence.
(Muller and Bashour, 2011, p.375)
In proposing his famous Wager, Muller and Bashour note, Blaise Pascal is
acutely aware of the role played by habituation in giving rise to religious faith:
Endeavour then to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of
God, but by the abatement of your passions. . . Learn from those
who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their posses-
sions. . . Follow the way by which they began: by acting as if they
believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this
naturally will make you believe and deaden your acuteness.
(Pascal, 1958, p.68, quoted in Muller and Bashour, 2011, p.376)
In that case, the suggestion is that habituation can help a subject to acquire a
belief in the absence of supporting evidence she finds compelling. But there
are other cases in which habituation seems to hinder the revision of a subject’s
beliefs, even when that subject is presented with evidence. For instance, note
Muller and Bashour (2011, p.375), a staunch homophobe is not likely to give
up his belief that homosexuality is wrong just because he is shown that his
reasons for thinking so are inadequate.
The other side of the coin is that the states Gendler calls aliefs often do change
in response to evidence:
Consider, for example, finding out that your favourite clothing store
manufactures its products in sweat shops in underprivileged coun-
tries. As soon as you are aware of this information, your gut reaction
when walking past that store turns from one of joy or temptation
to one of disgust and anger. . . Here it is not simply the belief that
changes, but also something more affective, and it involves your
intuitive reaction. . . and this is surely the sort of phenomena [sic]
Gendler intends the term ‘alief’ to cover.
(Muller and Bashour, 2011, p.377)
For Muller and Bashour, however, the problem is not just that Gendler invites us
to see a sharp distinction between alief and beliefs where no such distinction
exists; it is also that she invites us to avert our eyes from important and genuine
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distinctions between states she lumps together under the heading ‘alief’. In
particular, they argue:
Lumping habits and instincts together obscures the role that affect
plays in the explanation, prediction, and the phenomenology of ac-
tion and reaction. A brief survey of Gendler’s own examples brings
out the salient fact that emotions are intricately involved in the in-
stinct cases and wholly absent from the habit cases.
(Muller and Bashour, 2011, p.381)
In the case of the subject stepping on to the Skywalk, Muller and Bashour
note (2011, p.382), clearly the feelings of fear she instinctively experiences are
crucial to explaining her behaviour. Yet in the case of the subject reaching for
her wallet through force of habit, the explanation for this behaviour seems to
have nothing to do with her affective response to having money in her hand.
Muller and Bashour make a similar point about the case of a subject who sets
his watch five minutes fast, in order (as Gendler would have it) to induce in
himself the alief that it is five minutes later than it really is:
it is quite a stretch to say that fear of falling and a concern that one
might be late count as “affective” in quite the same sense. And
this is because the examples of instinct involve genuine emotional
engagement in the situation while the case that involve habituation
do not.
(Muller and Bashour, 2011, p.382)
Muller and Bashour are clearly on to something here: phenomenally speak-
ing, there is a world of difference between acting a certain way through sheer
force of habit, as if on autopilot, and acting a certain way because powerful,
instinctive, affective responses to a situation have kicked in. However, I don’t
think the sort of sharp distinction proposed by Muller and Bashour will hold up,
because it’s just not the case either that ‘genuine emotional engagement’ is
present in every case where instincts are at work, or that in no case where ha-
bituation is at work are affective responses involved ‘in quite the same sense’.
When I unthinkingly take a sip of water in response to a mild sensation of thirst,
that action is instinctive if any is; but the strength of the affective response that
prompts it is a good deal closer to that of the man who feels a slight sense of
urgency upon looking at his watch than to that of the man who finds himself
overwhelmed by fear as he stands on the Skywalk. Conversely, the ‘thirst’ of
the alcoholic is clearly the result of habituation; yet in this case we do have
‘genuine emotional engagement’ and a powerful affective response.
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This is not to say that there is not a genuine and important distinction to be
made between cases in which affective response plays a key role in driving
behaviour and cases in which it does not, or that the lumping together of these
cases under the heading ‘alief’ does not serve to obscure this distinction. Nor is
it to say that the related but different distinction between instinctive and habitual
behaviour is itself not worth making, or is not similarly obscured by Gendler’s
alief/belief distinction. The point I want to make is just that Muller and Bashour
end up repeating the very mistake they identify their opponent as having made:
just as the cases Gendler lumps together under the heading ‘alief’ include
cases in which emotional engagement/affective response is present and cases
in which it is absent, so too do the cases Muller and Bashour invite us to
lump together - both under the heading ‘habit’ and under the heading ‘instinct’.
And so the temptation is to dig down another level and acknowledge not two,
but four meaningfully different types of mental phenomena where Gendler had
just one: affective-response instincts and non-affective-response instincts, plus
affective-response habits and non-affective-response habits.
I suggested in the introduction to this chapter that Gendler is attempting to
lead the philosophy of mind down a rabbit hole - and here we find ourselves
peering into it. The philosophy of mind has traditionally been in the business
of commenting on folk and (to a lesser extent) scientific psychology, asking
questions like: just what claims are being made when we ascribe mental states
to subjects? In virtue of what are those claims true or false? What, if anything,
are things like beliefs and desires supposed to be? What is the relationship
between mental phenomena and physical phenomena? But Gendler invites us
to stop musing from the sidelines and get stuck in to the business of psychology
itself - describing ‘how human minds really work’ with reference to a proprietary
philosopher’s taxonomy of mental states.
In truth, though, this rather overstates the difference between what Gendler
consciously sets out to do and what philosophers of mind have, perhaps less
consciously, long found themselves doing. For the belief-desire psychology
beloved of philosophers, with its emphasis on practical reasoning as the driver
of human behaviour, is itself a proprietary theory built from certain raw ma-
terials furnished by folk psychological language and practice; folk psychology
itself, as reflected in our everyday use of mentalistic language, is an altogether
more baroque affair.
Consider this comment by Jennifer Nagel, made in the context of Gendler’s
discussion of alief:
Perhaps in part because folk psychology makes belief attribution
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feel so natural to us, it is hard to come to see ourselves as driven
by some messier packages of representational, affective and motor
signals
(Nagel J., 2012, p.786)
The suggestion here is that, qua folk psychologists, we naturally explain one
another’s behaviour primarily in terms of our beliefs; we assume that it’s our
beliefs (in conjunction with our desires, presumably) that drive our behaviour.
And that leaves little room for the recognition of cases in which belief is wholly
or partly overruled, or perhaps just bypassed, by things like arational affective
responses to sensory inputs.
This suggestion is, in my view, quite false. Qua folk psychologists, whose
understanding of the mind shapes and is shaped by our everyday use of men-
talistic language, we do not have the slightest difficulty in recognizing and de-
scribing the operation of arational mental processes. Here, for instance, is a
folk psychological explanation for the behaviour of the subject stepping on to
the Skywalk:
Her eyes tell her she’s standing on thin air, so she can’t shake the
feeling that she’s about to fall. Even though she knows deep down
that the walkway’s safe, her instinct is to walk with extra care or get
off it altogether.
As for the subject who turns his nose up at the faeces-shaped fudge, well, just
the sight of it’s enough to make him feel ill. These explanations come naturally
to a folk psychologist. It’s the philosopher of mind, with his preference for
practical-reasoning explanations of behaviour based on a stripped-down belief-
desire psychology, who struggles to accommodate these cases and who is the
target of Gendler’s appeal for the inclusion of alief in his mental-state taxonomy.
It should come as no surprise that my own inclination, in responding to Gendler
and to Muller and Bashour, is to counsel the abandonment of this restrictive
philosopher’s model of psychology not in favour of a revised version including
alief, but in favour of a dispositionalist interpretation of folk psychology proper.
But lest anyone should be tempted to enter the rabbit hole - to embark, that
is, on the research program unwittingly opened up by Gendler and her critics,
a program based around expanding the taxonomy of belief-desire psychology
by identifying and incorporating alief-type states - I want to say why I think the
prospects for success in this area are so poor.
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It is worth noting explicitly that when Gendler describes the rendering occur-
rent of aliefs, what she describes is the going through of a mental process:
representations of one sort or another (e.g. visual impressions of something
or thoughts about something) give rise to affective responses (like emotions)
which give rise in turn to the activation of certain motor routines. On the face
of it, processes and states are very different things. Nonetheless, Gendler
thinks that we can bring these processes into the mental-state fold by defining
a new state type - alief - that serves to contain that bundle of representations,
affective responses and motor routines.
In section 9.3, we considered an important objection to that proposal: that a
focus on aliefs, as defined by Gendler, tends to obscure important differences
between distinct mental phenomena (for instance, between habit and instinct,
or between cases in which affective responses are or are not relevant to the
explanation of subjects’ behaviour). However, this leaves open the possibility
of tinkering with the concept of alief - perhaps identifying different types of
alief, or defining new state types modelled after alief. I want to suggest that the
concept of alief is so badly flawed that this would be a futile exercise.
The fundamental problem with Gendler’s account, in my view, is that the con-
cept of mental state content with which she is working is thoroughly obscure.
Just what does it mean to say, for instance, that a dispositional ‘alief has
representational-affective-behavioral content that includes. . . the visual appear-
ance as of a cliff, the feeling of fear and the motor routine of retreat’ (Gendler,
2008a, p.641)? This state must, on Gendler’s account, be possessed right
now by billions of people who have never so much as seen the view from a cliff
(since most of the people in that category would, I think it’s reasonable to as-
sume, nonetheless react to the Skywalk in much the same way as the subject
described by Gendler). How is it, then, that they each possess a token mental
state containing ‘the visual appearance as of a cliff’? How can someone who is
right now feeling no fear be said to possess a token mental state that contains
‘the feeling of fear’? What is it for a mental state to contain a motor routine?
The idea can only be, I think, that for a subject to have a dispositional alief
with content R-A-B just is for her to be disposed ‘to entertain simultaneously
R-ish thoughts, experience A, and engage in B’ (that is, to alieve R-A-B oc-
currently) in response to certain stimuli. If so, however, Gendler’s project is
radically different from the project of a Standard View theorist who thinks that
the content of my belief that tea tastes best with two sugars is stored in my
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brain in something like the way that it might be written in a book or burned on
to a disc, and that my tea-making behaviour can be explained and predicted
on the basis that I have a belief with that representational content. Gendler
does not - surely - think that right now there is a representation of the view
from the Skywalk in my brain, just waiting to be activated, and that because we
know that that representation is there (alongside an associatively linked affec-
tive response and motor routine), we can predict my behaviour upon stepping
on to the Skywalk. Rather, she thinks that when the view from the Skywalk
does force itself upon me, as I step out on to it, I can be expected to have a
certain sort of affective response that in turn makes me more likely to behave
in a certain way. What she is reaching for here appears, in fact, to be a broadly
dispositionalist strategy for predicting and explaining my behaviour: to ascribe
to me a dispositional alief with the content ‘Really high up, long long way down.
Not a safe place to be! Get off!!’ is just to say something about the way I am
disposed to react to certain stimuli.
Or perhaps I should say: it is to attempt to say something about the way I am
disposed to react to certain stimuli. For if you are told that I dispositionally
alieve ‘Really high up, long long way down. Not a safe place to be! Get off!!’,
all you are entitled to infer is that there is at least one situation in which I would
judge myself to be really high up, feel that this was not a safe place to be,
and find myself inclined to get off whatever I was on at the time. Just what
situation(s) that would happen in, though - who knows? It could be when I step
on to the Skywalk, when I climb a ladder, when I sit on a fairground ride - or
in all three of those situations, or in none of them. Similarly: what do we know
about the likely behaviour of someone with the dispositional alief ‘Filthy object!
Contaminated! Stay away!’? To all intents and purposes, nothing at all. So in
terms of predicting subjects’ behaviour, the ascription to them of (dispositional)
aliefs appears to be a thoroughly useless practice.
A possible reply to this objection might go as follows: the ascription of an alief
such as ‘Filthy object! Contaminated! Stay away!’ might indeed be useless out-
side of a meaningful context. But suppose the fudge experiment is described
to us and we’re asked to predict the behaviour of experimental subjects. Might
it not be useful to say: “well, assuming that they’re disposed to alieve ‘Filthy ob-
ject! Contaminated! Stay away!’ in those circumstances, I reckon they’re likely
to behave thus-and-so”? To this I would reply: indeed that would plausibly be
a useful thing to do (for the same reason that it would plausibly be useful to ex-
plain subjects’ behaviour after the fact by ascribing to them an occurrent alief
with that content: in both cases, a claim is being made about the occurrence of
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a mental process underlying subjects’ behaviour). But that looks to me like an
ascription to subjects of a disposition to acquire an alief, not an ascription of an
alief subjects already have. It is analogous to the following prediction of sub-
jects’ behaviour in terms of belief: ‘assuming that they’re disposed to believe,
upon seeing a lion in front of them, that there’s a lion in front of them, I reckon
they’re likely to behave thus-and-so’. That is an ascription of a disposition to
acquire a belief with the content ‘there’s a lion in front of me’ - not an ascrip-
tion of a belief with that content that subjects already have, only dispositionally
rather than occurrently.
It’s worth dwelling on the analogy with belief-based predictions and explana-
tions of behaviour here. What justifies my ascription to a given subject of the
disposition to acquire, upon seeing a lion in front of her, the belief that there
is a lion in front of her? Well, this fits a general pattern. The subject almost
always comes to believe that what she sees in front of her really is in front of
her (outside of certain specific contexts, e.g. when she’s looking at a television
or a mirror). We might say that she believes the evidence of her visual sense
can be trusted. Since she has that belief, of course, she’ll acquire the belief
that there is a lion in front of her if she sees a lion in front of her. If she also has
the belief that lions are dangerous, then it’s reasonable to expect that upon ac-
quiring the belief that there is a lion in front of her she will acquire the belief that
she is in danger, and feel afraid. Because that fits a pattern too - she almost al-
ways feels afraid when she believes she’s in danger. And when she feels afraid
of this sort of immediate physical danger, she almost always takes instinctive
action to evade the threat. So the practice of belief ascription is about spotting
patterns and using them to predict and explain the ways subjects act, think
and feel in specific circumstances. The same goes for the practice of ascribing
desires, and in my view - leaving behind the attenuated mental-state taxonomy
of belief-desire psychology for a moment - for the practice of ascribing fears.
prejudices, personality traits, and so on.
So when we see someone run screaming from a lion, and someone asks why
she did that, our explanation of her behaviour does not have to begin and end
with a description of the mental process that immediately preceded her running
away - she believed there was a lion in front of her, felt afraid and initiated a
‘run away’ motor routine. Rather, it can draw on what we know about her
dispositional profile in general - as expressed in mentalistic language such as
‘she knows lions are dangerous,’ ‘she’s got more sense than to try to fight an
animal much stronger than her,’ ‘she’s scared of anything with big teeth’ and so
on - and in so doing fit her behaviour into an intelligible pattern, reflecting and
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perhaps enhancing our understanding of her as a person.
Compare that with the alief model of explanation. Suppose I explain that some-
one ran away from a lion because she occurrently alieved ‘Lion! Danger! Run
away!’, and you press me for an explanation of why she went through that
process. The obvious answer - the answer that Gendler’s account appears to
invite - is that she possessed that alief dispositionally and the appearance of
the lion in front of her was what it took to render it occurrent. But this fails to
make any kind of sense of the subject’s behaviour. It amounts to nothing more
than a trivially true ascription to her of the disposition to go through just the
process she went through in just the circumstances that she went through it. It
doesn’t leave us feeling as if we know anything about what makes the subject
tick in general. It doesn’t leave us better able to see how the subject’s be-
haviour on that occasion fits any more general pattern of behaviour, or reflects
her personality or her attitudes.
The foregoing should not be read as a defence of the adequacy, in all cases, of
belief-desire explanations of behaviour. Gendler is quite right that belief-based
explanations of behaviour - ‘She ran away because she believes lions are dan-
gerous’ - are a poor fit for many cases. But the way belief ascription works is
better than the way alief ascription works, because it aims to tell us something
more than just: ‘in that particular circumstance, this particular response is what
we can expect (or: was what we got)’. In fleshing out belief-desire psychology,
then, what we need is to enhance our ability to ascribe general dispositions to
subjects - to build a rounded picture of the patterns of behaviour (and thought,
and affective responses) of particular subjects, so that we get an idea of how
they’d react to finding themselves in a whole range of circumstances.
And as I noted in section 9.3, and hinted again above, this does not require
us to cast around for hitherto undiscovered mental state types that can be
integrated into folk psychology. It simply requires us to take advantage of the
richness of folk psychological language as it is encountered in the wild. If we
allow ourselves to talk about subjects’ hopes and fears, prejudices and habits
of thought, character traits and so on, as well as about their beliefs and desires,
we can not only accommodate the sort of cases that so trouble Gendler, but
integrate our understanding of those cases with our understanding of more
everyday cases.
Take the Skywalk case again. Suppose I ask why that man hesitated to walk
across the Skwalk and I’m told he alieved ‘Really high up, long long way down.
Not a safe place to be! Get off!!’ Plausibly that leaves me with a rough idea of
the mental process driving his behaviour on that occasion - but that’s it. How-
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ever, suppose I am instead told that the man has a fear of heights. Suppose
it is then explained to me that the man, like most people, has a tendency to
experience affective responses to visual stimuli based on mere appearances.
Now I’m beginning to understand why he went through that process. (And it’s
not because he dispositionally alieved ‘Really high up, long long way down.
Not a safe place to be! Get off!!’ an hour before he reached the Skywalk.)
I can even start to predict how he’d feel and act when riding a Ferris wheel,
how likely he’d be to go skydiving, or how he’d respond to seeing something
he finds scary (or sexy, or sad, or whatever) depicted in a film. By building up a
dispositional profile of this man, I begin to understand why he acted the way he
did on that particular occasion, and how he can be expected to act (and think,
and feel) on other occasions.
9.5 Conclusion
In the end, it is precisely in terms of ‘serviceability’ that alief falls down. The
ascription of circumstance-specific dispositional aliefs is a positively useless
exercise in terms of predicting and explaining subjects’ behaviour compared to
the building up of dispositional profiles through ordinary-language ascriptions
of beliefs and desires, hopes and fears, prejudices and gut feelings, habits of
thought and intellectual blind spots. And without dispositional aliefs - persis-
tent states involving associative links between certain sorts of representations,
affective responses and motor routines, and underlying subjects’ reactions to
particular stimuli - the language of occurrent aliefs seems to be nothing more
than an eccentric form of shorthand for descriptions of certain mental pro-
cesses.
The problem Gendler identifies is real enough: a psychological model that
recognizes beliefs, desires and imaginings but not much else in the way of
mental states just is not up to the task of predicting and explaining human
behaviour, since it does not capture the realities of mental life. However, her
response to this problem is, in my view, desperately misguided. The way to
defend folk psychology against eliminativist arguments is not to refine it into a
proprietary philosophical theory of mind, complete with ‘new’ state types to fill
the causal-explanatory gaps left by the excision of all but a few canonical state
types; it is to challenge the assumption driving those concerns, that is, the
assumption that folk psychology is a theory about the functional organization
of the mind.
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In this thesis, I have tried to make the case that the failure of logical be-
haviourism does not entail the failure of dispositionalism. On the contrary, a
liberal, holistic dispositionalism of the sort I call (following Schwitzgebel (2002))
phenomenal dispositionalism can avoid the pitfalls both of logical behaviourism
on the one hand, and of the Standard View theories that have superseded it
on the other.
It is uncontroversial, I think, that to ascribe things like propositional attitudes
and character traits to subjects is to say something about how those subjects
are likely to respond when they find themselves in a range of different circum-
stances. In that sense and to that degree, then, it is uncontroversial that many
of our mental-state concepts are dispositional concepts. It is similarly uncon-
troversial that the ascription of these dispositional mental states to subjects
plays a central role in everyday, folk psychological explanations and predic-
tions of subjects’ actions. On these points, I think the logical behaviourist, the
Standard View theorist and the phenomenal dispositionalist can all agree.
It is when it comes to accounting for the evident success of mental-state as-
cription in everyday predictive-explanatory practice that these three traditions
part company. The logical behaviourist argues that folk psychological practice
depends for its success upon the one-at-a-time reducibility of sentences as-
cribing mental states to corresponding assertions that the subject of ascription
exhibits, or would exhibit, such-and-such observable behaviour in such-and-
such a range of circumstances. The Standard View theorist argues that folk
psychological practice depends for its success upon a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the particular mental states ascribed to subjects and particular,
categorical, internal states of those subjects’ brains, playing particular causal
roles in mediating - together with other, similar states - between sensory in-
puts and behavioural outputs. The phenomenal dispositionalist argues that folk
psychological practice depends for its success upon our ability to use every-
day mentalistic language to build up pictures of subjects’ dispositional profiles
and so to understand both how they might be expected to act, think and feel
in a range of circumstances, and how their actions, thoughts and feelings on
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particular occasions fit into broadly intelligible patterns.
The implausibility of the logical behaviourist position has long been evident. I
have tried to undermine the plausibility of the Standard View position by attack-
ing it at its root: a line of thinking according to which the success of disposition
ascription in general as an explanatory-predictive practice - not just disposi-
tional mental state ascription - depends upon a one-to-one correspondence
between the particular dispositional properties ascribed to objects and partic-
ular, categorical, intrinsic properties of those objects, playing particular causal
roles in bringing about certain manifestation events in response to certain stim-
uli. I have argued that the ascription of dispositional properties just does not,
and cannot, work like this. The claims that sugar is disposed to dissolve in
water in circumstances C and that water is disposed to dissolve sugar in cir-
cumstances C are precisely the same claim: the claim that in circumstances
C, the mixing of sugar and water would result in the formation of a sugar-water
solution. The causal relevance of certain particular, intrinsic, categorical prop-
erties (of sugar on the one hand, and of water on the other) to the production
of this manifestation event is not in doubt; but the idea that these properties
correspond one-to-one with certain dispositional properties (of sugar on the
one hand, and of water on the other) is just untenable. For the purposes of
explanatorily and predictively successful disposition ascription, it doesn’t mat-
ter what categorical properties of what objects play what causal roles in the
production of manifestation events; all that matters is that something, some-
where does the causal work required to bring those events about in the right
circumstances.
So if we are concerned to preserve our everyday folk-psychological taxonomy
of mental states, we need not wait anxiously for neuroscientists to come up
with a taxonomy of brain states that maps neatly onto it. Nor need we reassure
ourselves that such a brain-state taxonomy just must exist, since our everyday
mental-state taxonomy reflects a theory about the functional organization of
the mind that just cannot be wrong. Nor, finally, need we set about revising our
everyday mental-state taxonomy - as Gendler (2008a) suggests - in order to
make up for perceived shortcomings.
All we need do in order to preserve our everyday mental-state taxonomy, in
fact, is to look around and see that people’s actions, thoughts and feelings
really do fit into intelligible patterns and that our everyday language of mental
states allows us to describe these patterns. Discoveries in neuroscience will
no doubt shed light on the particular roles played by particular brain states in
particular mental processes, just as discoveries in chemistry have shed light
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like sugar and water in particular chemical processes; but these discoveries
represent no threat whatsoever to the truth of claims made about subjects’
dispositional profiles in the ordinary language of mental states.
I should say what I mean when I talk about our ‘everyday mental-state taxon-
omy’. It seems to me that there is a considerable but barely acknowledged
degree of tension between two influential lines of thinking in the philosophy of
mind. On the one hand, we have the line of thinking according to which ev-
eryday mental-state language is a reliable guide to a powerful and true theory
about the functional organization of the mind - a theory wielded by every user
of that language and usually called ‘folk psychology’. On the other hand, we
have the line of thinking - rarely made explicit, but everywhere evident in the
philosophy of mind literature - according to which much of our everyday men-
talistic discourse is little more than ‘noise’ that needs to be tuned out, for the
purposes of serious inquiry, so that we can focus on a handful of reputable,
canonical state types (belief and desire foremost among them) that can be
neatly defined in terms of their role in cognitive processes (and especially prac-
tical reasoning). Gendler is to be commended for daring to state what ought
to be obvious: that the taxonomically austere belief-desire psychology beloved
of philosophers is woefully inadequate to the task of expressing our common-
sense understanding of the role in human psychology of many phenomena that
don’t fit a neat practical-reasoning model: habit, instinct, affect and so on. But
the alief-belief-desire psychology she recommends is only slightly less aus-
tere and only slightly more adequate to the task. In my view all this austerity
is needless; our everyday mental-state taxonomy, consisting of all the mental
state types users of everyday mentalistic language find it useful to cite in or-
der to capture the complexities and nuances of subjects’ dispositional profiles,
should be embraced and defended in toto. Since the phenomenal disposition-
alist does not endorse the reification of mental states and does not consider
everyday mentalistic language to express a theory about the functional organi-
zation of a causal system, this is a matter of linguistic sophistication and not of
ontological extravagance or theoretical complexity.
In my view, then, the philosopher of mind should leave the psychologist and the
neuroscientist to do their work without worrying about whether their cognitive-
state or brain-state taxonomies will map on to the mental-state taxonomy of
folk psychology, and without presuming to alert them to the existence of hith-
erto unrecognized state types discovered through a process of philosophical
reflection. Similarly, she should respect the use made of mental-state concepts
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by true folk psychologists - ordinary language users - and resist the temptation
to distil from their abundant linguistic raw materials a more austere and philo-
sophically respectable theory of mind. Ordinary-language psychology, with
its emphasis on understanding subjects’ dispositional profiles rather than their
functional organization, is perfectly respectable just as it is.
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